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ABSTRACT

Purpose: This thesis examines environmental narrative disclosures of Royal Dutch
Shell plc (hereafter Shell) of oil spills in Nigeria to explore accountability for social
and environmental disasters in a developing-country context. Shell has been under
intense public scrutiny over its oil operations in the Niger Delta, especially following
the activities of anti-oil activists in the late 1990s. This thesis highlights the
discursive construction of oil spills and explores issues of responsibility where
multinational corporations exist alongside extreme poverty.

Design/Methodology/Approach: In order to interrogate the discourse and explore
power relations in the production of public documents, this thesis adopts a critical
approach to analyse Shell’s sustainability reports, annual reports of the operating
subsidiary for the period 2000-2010 and a response letter to major shareholders. Elite
theory (Etzioni, 1993; Bottomore 1993; 1991) was developed for this research as an
integration of Mills’s (1956) conception of power elites, and applied to Shell as a
corporate elite in Nigeria to expose and explain how power and dominance are
enacted. Since discourse is produced in a socio-political context, Fairclough’s (1989,
1992, 1995, 2001) Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which recognises the
inequality and power dimension in the production of text, is used to explore this
context through three levels of analysis: discourse as text, discourse as discursive
practice and discourse as social practice. In combination, CDA and the concept of
corporate elites expose and challenge the corporate rhetoric and meaning ascribed to
oil spills, as well as the power relationship operating via public discourse.

Findings: The key findings illustrate that Shell is in a position to dominate and shape
the discourse of oil spills via corporate public discourse. While oil spills are
considered ‘external’ phenomena, Shell encompasses both accidental and intentional
oil spills within their public discourse and effectively circumscribes a boundary of
responsibility for oil spills. In other words, Shell interprets the nature and subsequent
responsibility for what is considered an ‘environmental disaster’. This is enabled by
several factors, including a weak regulatory environment, the relationship between
i

Shell and the Nigerian government, the production and dissemination of corporate
accountability reports (such as mandated annual reports and voluntary sustainability
reports) and the power inequality from the coexistence of the poor in a resource-rich
country.

Research Contributions: This research makes three contributions to the literature.
First, it contributes to accounting studies of corporate narrative disclosures of a
multinational corporation (MNC) operating as an elite in a developing country, in
this case Nigeria, and explicitly demonstrates how corporate narrative disclosures
depend on the socio-political context in the country of operation. Second, the
application of CDA makes visible the conditions that facilitate elite discourse in
corporate narrative disclosures. Third, it departs from traditional accounting studies
of disclosures by using an interdisciplinary focus on words and meaning from within
the text. The application of elite theory in an accounting context allows an
understanding of how public elite discourse is crucially involved in the reproduction
of dominance and inequality in corporate narrative disclosures. This is of great
importance, given that the current global society faces severe environmental issues,
inequality and poverty, especially in developing countries.

Research Limitations: As this research is based on the availability of public
discourse, one of the limitations encountered was the limited access to the public
discourse of Shell’s Nigerian subsidiary SPDC and the Nigerian government. While
10 years of Shell’s sustainability reports were available, the SPDC annual reports
were only publicly available for a period of six years from 2000-2006.

Future Research: There are a number of research opportunities arising from this
thesis. The example of Shell as a corporate elite in Nigeria is fundamental in
understanding the role of multinational corporations (MNCs) and their operations in
developing countries. Therefore, there is an opportunity to study Nigeria and other
MNCs given that other major oil companies operate in the country. This work can
also be applied to Shell’s operations in other developing countries, such as Somalia,
where the context of the company’s operations is very similar. This thesis also
provides an example of public/private partnership between an MNC and a
ii

developing country which can be contrasted to public/private partnerships in
developed countries. Further studies could explore partnerships in a similar context
and in different locations.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
During the 1990s, Royal Dutch Shell plc (hereafter Shell) was one of the most
scrutinised oil companies in the world (Frynas, 2003). This scrutiny has been a response
to a range of environmental and social issues. In particular, the execution of Ken SaroWiwa and eight other anti-oil activists (the Ogoni Nine) brought global attention to
Shell’s operations in Nigeria. The social issues highlighted are confronting and complex
and, while not the focus of this thesis, are mentioned here because they set the scene for
the thesis topic: Shell and oil spills in Nigeria. In Nigeria, most oil spills occur in the
Niger Delta1, where the majority of the country’s oil production takes place. Compared
to more-developed countries, such as the US, “there has been a significantly higher rate
(spills per length of pipeline) of serious pipeline spills” (Steiner, 2010, p.4) in the
region.

Ken Saro-Wiwa, before his death at the hands of the Nigerian military in November
1995, accused Shell of “waging an ecological war against his people” (Okonta and
Douglas, 2003, p.95), and noted that:
[t]hirty-five years of reckless oil exploration by multinational oil companies has
left the Ogoni environment completely devastated. Four gas flares burning for
twenty-four hours a day over thirty-five years in very close proximity to human
habitation; over one hundred oil wells in village backyards; and a petrochemical
complex, two oil refineries, a fertilizer plant, and oil pipelines crisscrossing the
landscape aboveground have spilled death for human beings, flora, and fauna. It
is unacceptable (Okonta and Douglas, 2003, p.95).

1

The Niger Delta is “situated in the southern part of Nigeria is considered one of the 10 most important
wetlands and coastal marine ecosystems in the world” (Steiner, 2010, p.11).

1

This context reflects the domain in which accounting and related issues of
accountability are contested. The urgency of environmental events and the impact on
natural resource exploitation, combined with disruption to communities, puts
environmental concerns uppermost in the minds of the general public (Elijido-Ten et al,
2010). In an accounting context such events have influenced the requirements for
company disclosures and other legislation as the public is no longer satisfied with only
financial numbers as a reporting mechanism (Gray et al., 2010). This sense of urgency
and increased disclosure expectations is even more important in countries where
environmental awareness and regulation is inadequate (Elijido-Ten et al, 2010), such as
Nigeria.

Environmental disclosures have become a prominent feature in accounting research in
the past two decades (see reviews by Gray, 2002; Mathews, 1997; Owen, 2008; Parker,
2005, Thomson, 2007), and while the literature is extensive, the majority of research is
conducted within the context of Western developed countries such as the US, Australia
and countries in Europe (Belal and Owen, 2007; Islam and Deegan, 2008), where
environmental awareness and governmental regulations prevail (Elijido-Ten et al,
2010). The investigation of corporate disclosures of companies operating in developing
countries is under-researched. Craig et al. (2010) note that the corporate motivations for
undertaking social and environmental accounting in emerging economies is different to
that in Western developed countries because of the socio-economic context in which
these companies operate. Additionally, in a context where regulation and mandatory
reporting are weak and environmental awareness is generally low, it provides a rich
setting to study voluntary disclosures (Elijido-Ten et al., 2010). Prior accounting studies
focussing on Shell (Unerman, 2000; Bebbington et al, 2008; Unerman and Bennett,
2

2004, Killian, 2010) have mainly investigated Shell as the parent company of a MNC
rather than its specific operations. This thesis departs from this previous work by
specifically investigating Shell’s disclosures of oil spills in Nigeria, a developing
country.
According to Messner (2009, p.918), “calls for greater accountability from managers
and corporations are regularly voiced these days, both in the academic literature and in
public discussions more generally”. A comprehensive concept of accountability requires
the availability of information (Steccolini, 2004). Within the accounting literature it is
not surprising that the concept of accountability is predicated on the provision and
receipt of financial information (Andrew, 2001). These discussions on accountability
are often more concerned with shareholders, however; demands for greater public
accountability include a broad range of stakeholders such as employees, customers and
even future generations (Messner, 2009).

Consistent with this perspective, Schweiker (1993) asserts that the activity of giving an
account is the moral dimension ascribed to the practice of accounting. Accounting as
such is a discursive act where the ‘identity of agents’ is evidenced in fiduciary
relationships across time. Therefore, building on Schwieker’s (1993) argument, this
thesis adopts the concept of accountability that a corporation is accountable to the
‘other’ in its corporate narrative disclosures. This argument supports Shearer’s (2002)
and Roberts’s (1991) idea that the primary exposure to the ‘other’ requires an account
rather than accounting simply for oneself. Accordingly, the responsibility ‘for-the-other’
is self-interest as manifest in contractual obligations (Messner, 2009). The ‘other’ in
this thesis is the Nigerian communities affected by Shell’s oil production. By applying
3

Schweiker’s (1993) concept of a moral accountability, the thesis will examine the
subjectiveness and identities reinforced by accounting practices in mandatory as well as
voluntary corporate disclosures.

For Roberts (1991, p.361), accounting information is “produced and used within a
system of dominance”. Accounting information can reinforce particular inequalities and
needs (Cousins and Sikka, 1993). While information is required by various social
constituencies to control the powerful or call them to account (Cousins and Sikka, 1993)
there is always a problem that “information is often controlled by the very
people/groups who are to be called to account and the facts may also be constructed
according to the theories and definition which may be particularly shaped by the
priorities and influence of the powerful groups” (Cousins and Sikka, 1993, p.53).
Messner (2009, p.928) further argues:
[i]f a particular type of discourse assumes a dominant position in the sense that it
determines what kind of accountability is available and/or acceptable, then this
discourse has power effects. But power operates not only through the relative
dominance of a particular type of discourse. It is also a function of the absolute
extent to which demands for accountability shape practice, i.e. the extent to
which a practice is problematized in discourse and to which this
problematization feeds back into practice.

This thesis adopts the notion of corporate disclosures as elite discourse and uses elite
theory combined with critical discourse analysis (CDA) to expose how power is enacted
through accounting for oil spills. The following sections of this introductory chapter
provide a background to oil spills, and outline the aims of the thesis in light of elite
theory and CDA as a means to explore oil spill disclosures and accountability in the
context of a developing country.

4

1.1 The study: Nigeria and oil spills

Oil spills are common events, and the number of spills by large multinational
corporations (MNC) operating in the oil industry has been increasing. Fingas (2011)
argues that major oil spills attract attention and create global awareness of the damage
they do, environmental and otherwise. Two examples that gained international media
coverage were ExxonMobil’s oil spill in Alaska in 1989 and the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill (also referred to as the BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill) in 2010. Steiner (2010, p.6)
argues:
[a]s a result of the Gulf oil disaster, greater attention is now being paid to the
true costs of oil development throughout the world. This is a welcome
development. Yet it is unfortunate that as political leaders closely attend to the
issues of oil spills in industrialized countries, they continue to ignore similar
issues in developing countries.

To put this in perspective in the Nigerian context, the ExxonMobil oil spill was 41.6
million litres (11 million gallons) of crude oil (Birkland and Lawrence, 2002).
According to Amnesty International (2009, p.16) “people living in the Niger Delta have
experienced oil spills on par with the Exxon Valdez every year over the last 50 years”.
This makes the region of Niger Delta one of the most oil-affected ecosystems in the
world (Steiner, 2010).

Another comparison is the Deepwater Horizon, BP’s oil spill in Gulf of Mexico where
official estimates indicate that 4.1 million barrels were spilled. Recent estimates over
the 50-year history of oil operations in the Niger Delta suggest that spills each year
measure some 9 to 11 million barrels (Steiner, 2010). Further,
[w]hile the Gulf spill continues to be cleaned up, most spills in the Delta are left
unattended. And while the injured environment in the Gulf stands to receive
5

substantial funding and government attention, such environmental damage in the
Niger Delta is left largely unattended (Steiner, 2009, p. 4).
Nigeria, a West African country, is Africa’s largest oil producer, ranked among the top
ten globally (EITI, 2011). While the public usually become aware of major spills, they
generally do not recognise that spills are a daily fact of life in oil producing sites
(Fingas, 2011). Consequently, one of the biggest environmental challenges Nigeria
faces is from oil spills. These issues have been highlighted in the public domain by
many local and international non-government organisations (NGOs), such as Friends of
the Earth International (FoE) and Amnesty International (AI). These events have also
not escaped the attention of governments and supranational organisations such as the
World Bank, for various reasons. Oil spills are politically sensitive at a global level, as
demonstrated by the FoE negative report on Shell and other MNCs’ oil operations, and
controversial environmental reports by the World Bank as well as environmental
agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the World Wide
Fund for Nature (WWF).

Several MNCs have oil-producing facilities in Nigeria. Shell is one the largest and most
profitable oil companies in the world, with operations in more than 80 countries (Shell,
2012); it is ranked - number four overall, and number one in sales (Forbes, 2012). Even
though Shell operates worldwide, its operations in Nigeria are the focus of this thesis,
which aims to better understand the nuanced environment of oil-spill disclosures by
powerful MNCs and how they continue, given the international outrage generated by
other high-profile spills such as the ExxonMobile and Deepwater Horizon incidents.
According to many NGOs, the Nigerian government and the oil companies have been
ineffective preventing oil spills and addressing their impact (AI, 2009, FoE, 2002).
6

Steiner (2010, p.4) further argues that “this, and other evidence, suggests that oil
companies operating in the Niger Delta are not employing internationally recognized
standards to prevent and control pipeline oil spills”. Despite the increased scrutiny of
Shell’s operations in Nigeria, oil spills are still a common feature. Since 2000 oil spills
have become a feature in Shell’s corporate disclosures; this thesis analyses how these
oil spills are reported by the MNC parent company in their voluntary sustainability
reports and the mandated annual financial reports of the operating subsidiary in Nigeria.

In this thesis the focus is on discursive practices, particularly discourse as textual
representations or disclosures in annual reports and sustainability reports. This discourse
is also considered in the context of the corporation and its relationship with the
government in the developing country. This relationship will be analysed by
considering legislative instruments and texts. The continued oil-related issues from
Shell’s engagement with Nigeria in the last decades and research by academics, NGOs
and various government and supranational agencies provide the background for an
exploration of accounting disclosures. The disclosure of oil spills is an important issue
of accountability. Nigeria, as a developing country, is embedded within the controversy
of poverty and corruption (Chapter 3), and offers a different set of insights into
accounting disclosures and accountability than afforded by an analysis of operations
within a Western context.

Shell operates in Nigeria through its wholly owned subsidiary, Shell Petroleum
Development Company (SPDC). SPDC is the operator of a joint venture (JV) between
the government-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), with 55%
ownership, Shell 30%, Total Exploration and Production Nigeria Limited (TEPNG)
7

10% and Nigerian Agip Oil Company limited (NAOC) 5% (Shell, 2012). The JV is not
regarded as an entity for reporting purposes. Shell’s wholly owned subsidiary, SPDC
provides external financial reports on behalf of the JV’s operations in Nigeria. In this
thesis, the disclosures of the reporting entity via annual reports are considered, since
they are an important feature of public accountability discourses.

SPDC contributed around 9% of Shell’s global oil and gas production in 2009 (Shell,
2009). Even though Shell’s operations are geographically spread, SPDC accounted for
the majority of Shell’s total oil spills in the period 1998-2009, with a reported 61% of
the total volume spilled occurring in Nigeria (Steiner, 2010). The regular oil spills from
Shell’s operations pollute the environment (Ajao and Anurigwo, 2002; Okonta and
Douglas, 2003) and have resulted in many environmental problems (Ojakorotu and
Okeke Uzodike, 2006: Obi, 1997; Obi, 1999). A number of reasons for the large
number of oil spills in Nigeria from SPDC’s operation are cited, including corrosion,
technical failures, sabotage and theft (Shell, 2012). These explanations of oil spills by
Shell will be examined in this thesis, as they are pivotal to understanding issues of
accountability.

Given all the attention to oil spills in the mainstream environmental media, and the
degree of scrutiny by many NGOs, there is an opportunity to study how certain actors,
players, narrators and interested parties use the discourse of oil spills. Language is a
situated discourse embedded in broad socio-political contexts; this thesis uses critical
discourse analysis (CDA) as a mode of inquiry. The meanings attributed to oil spills
have implications for responsibility, and therefore notions of accountability. In this
thesis the particular narrator of interest is Shell, and they ascribe meaning to oil spills in
8

Nigeria through three types of narrative disclosures: annual reports (SPDC as the
operating subsidiary), sustainability reports (Shell as the parent company) and a
response letter from Shell to major shareholders’ concerns about operations in Nigeria.
The letter brings the analysis to the foreground, as it specifically articulates Shell’s
perspective and corporate policy on oil spills in Nigeria to a specific audience and
provides a link to the general-purpose reports. These texts are juxtaposed with three
counter-narratives from FoE, AI and the Christian Aid International Development
Charity. This thesis will explore how Shell ‘negotiates’ the phenomenon of ‘oil spill’ in
its narrative corporate disclosures, and will draw insights for MNC operations and
accountability frameworks.

1.2 The aim of this thesis
The aim of this thesis is to investigate Shell’s narrative disclosures and examine the
construction of meaning for oil spills in Nigeria. The context of this study is unique, as
it looks at an MNC, Shell: a giant in the oil industry in Nigeria, an oil-rich developing
country enmeshed in poverty and political struggles. It is important to analyse corporate
accounting disclosures to gain alternative insights into accounting as a discourse of
accountability in such circumstances. In this thesis, the language and discourse of oil
spills affect our views of these events. Language is a social artefact and language as
discourse affects our views of the world. It is influenced by certain social groups,
classes, discourses, conditions or relationships; in this thesis it is the discourse of a
corporate entity that is of interest. The availability of public documents plays an
important role in the corporate context as companies strive to be perceived as more
accountable and transparent about their operations. Corporate public documents may be
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considered a form of dialogue between corporations and the public. Corporations have a
number of media available to make disclosures, including annual reports, special
purpose social and environmental reports, sustainability reports, web-based disclosures
and media-based advertisements (Jenkins and Yakovleva, 2006: Buhr and Reiter, 2006).
Similarly, a majority of large MNCs use a range of different forms of communication
and media to disclose environmental issues that relates to the “natural environment,
environmental protection and resource use” (Jenkins and Yakovleva, 2006, p.273).

A number of studies analyse accounting discourse (Buhr and Reiter, 2006; Laine, 2005;
Livesey, 2002a; Livesey and Kearins, 2002; Milne et al., 2004; and Tregidga and Milne,
2006) and the power relations that exist through accounting discursive representations.
This thesis demonstrates the power of language in corporate narrative disclosures; in
particular, how discourses produced in an accounting text are dominant as they are
sanctioned by legal frameworks and widespread public use, and present a partisan view
of ‘oil spill’ phenomena in Nigeria via both regulated and voluntary disclosure.
This thesis addresses the following:
1. Shell’s discourse of oil spills as represented in narrative disclosures.
2. Alternative discourses of oil spills with respect to counter-narratives
presented by various NGOs.
3. The role played by Nigerian legislation of the oil industry and how it
sustains corporate elite status in a developing country, and facilitates Shell’s
oil spills.

Chapter 6: Text Analysis: Discursive Meaning of Oil Spills, addresses the first objective
by interrogating the texts to answer the following:
10

-

What specific words are chosen for oil spills?

-

What meaning is ascribed to oil spills?

-

Which institutions/actors are present in the text and how are they
described?

Chapter 7: Discourse as Discursive Practice, is concerned with text production,
distribution and consumption and the extent to which discourse practices enable elite
discourse. The discourse practice examines counter-narratives from various NGOs.
This is important, as NGOs, social movement organisations (SMOs) and others
interpret, dispute and counter corporate communications of specific activities and the
effects of operations (Tregidga et al., 2012). Chapter 8: Discourse as Social Practice,
is the analytical level of CDA that explores to what extent the broader socio-political
context - in particular, the key role played by the Nigerian government - has enabled or
constrained Shell’s narratives of oil spills.

This thesis makes a unique contribution by analysing corporate narrative disclosure at
three analytical levels: micro, meso and macro. These are juxtaposed with an alternative
public narrative by a number of international NGOs and situated within the broader
socio-political context.
1.3 Methodological considerations
Over the years a number of different scholars (Hopwood, 1977; 1983, Tinker et al.,
1982; Chua, 1986; Dillard, 1991; Andrew 2000; Gaffikin, 2008) have challenged the
dominance of positivist research in the accounting field. One of the main criticisms of
positivist research is that it does not take into consideration the broader social, political
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and historical context that shapes accounting practice (Gaffikin, 2008). This thesis
acknowledges the dominance and contribution of positivist research but explicitly
moves from this traditional view of studying accounting by using an alternative critical
methodology (Chua, 1986; Dillard, 1991), specifically a constructivist methodology,
which aims to investigate how meaning is ascribed and discourse is used in corporate
narrative disclosures. The critical approach to accounting studies recognises the need to
consider the social, political and economic contexts that shape accounting practices
(Chua, 1986), and is based on the assumption that “investigating relationships between
accounting and the social system provides opportunities for a critical social scientist in
accounting to engage in critical evaluation” (Dillard, 1991, p. 24). This allows critical
researchers to recognise human factors and the life world that influence accounting
practice (Chua, 1986).

The explicit use of language as a social artefact and as a discourse that affects
individuals’ world view stems from philosophical assumptions of social construction.
The concept of the social construction depends on an acknowledgement of the
interaction of objectivity and human subjectivity to form perceptions of reality (Hines,
1988; Gaffikin, 2008). Since language plays a central role in all processes of knowledge
creation (Gaffikin, 2008), and accounting can be perceived as “the language of
business” that takes “a specialised form of discourse, in part, because it relies, primarily,
on numerical representations but also, and relatedly, because it is codified” (Llewellyn
and Milne, 2007, p.806), it is appropriate to study the role of accounting in society from
a language perspective. Shearer and Arrington (1993) argue that accounting is a
specialised language of experts referring to and reporting on “actions, institutions,
histories and consequences that are economic, political, social and moral in nature”
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(Hopper and Pratt, 1995, p.12). This reporting can be in the form of a large array of text,
and for “accounting to be conceived as a broad discursive practice, it has to be free from
its particular calculus which limits its use to those individuals competent in that
particular language” (Arrington and Francis, 1993, p.113).

Realities are constructed through human agency, and humans use language to explain
the world. It follows that society can be described as a “product created by humans, and
humans are a product created by society, i.e. humans and society are in a dialectical
relationship and influence and constitute each other” (Berger and Luckmann, 2004,
pp.7-8). This makes it possible to draw conclusions about society by analysing texts and
also to draw conclusions about texts by analysing society. This research adopts such a
view to critically analyse the constructions of oil spills in Shell’s corporate narrative
disclosures as an ‘empirical reality’ problematised by contrasting, alternative ‘empirical
realities’ or counter-narratives from NGOs. In this way, the social construction of ‘oil
spills’ will be analysed from the perspective of the narrators who construct and describe
their own view of the spills' importance. In other words, different narrators
conceptualise the world and phenomena in different ways. This difference will be
explored in terms of elite theory to highlight the influence of power relations on the
production of hegemonic discourses of essentially the same phenomenon: oil spills in
Nigeria.
1.4 Elite theory
Mathews (1997, p.488) established that the “literature of other disciplines has always
had a strong influence on accounting research”. In the contemporary accounting
literature a group of political-economy theories including legitimacy theory, along with
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stakeholder theory, are often used to analyse annual reports and other corporate texts.
Legitimacy theory focuses on how organisations use disclosure strategies to gain,
maintain or regain legitimacy (Deegan, 2006). There are many studies (see Patten,
1992; Gray et al., 1995; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Deegan, 2002; Deegan et al, 2002;
O’Donovan 2002; Campbell et al, 2003 and others) that use legitimacy theory to frame
an analysis of annual reports and other corporate texts. These studies mainly focused on
disclosure changes over a period of time and in “response to particular events”
(Bebbington et al. 2006, p.353).

Gray et al. (2010, p. x) elaborate that “legitimacy theory focus may have obscured other
potential insights into reporting practices and ultimately what function social and
environmental accounting plays in society”. In addition, Deegan (2002, p.298) states
that “legitimacy theory might provide useful insights, but it can still be considered to be
an under-developed theory”. Stakeholder theory presupposes that expectations of
particular stakeholder groups have impact on corporate strategies (Deegan, 2006).
While the ideologies of legitimacy and stakeholder theory have contributed to an
understanding of the relationship between power and control in corporate disclosures,
elite theory provides different insights and highlights issues of unequal power and
control in Shell’s disclosures of oil spills; these issues cannot be studied in isolation
from the Nigerian political, social and economic context.

This thesis is informed by elite theory and the work of Mills (1956), Etzioni (1993),
Bottomore (1993; 1991) and van Dijk (1993b). Elite theory suggests that in every
society there are groups that occupy powerful positions. These groups are referred to as
‘elites’. Elite theory explicitly identifies these groups and their dominance by
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highlighting their power, control and influence. Elites can be categorised in many ways:
such as political elites, social elites, academic elites, business elites and so on. In this
thesis the concept of corporate elites is integrated with CDA to demonstrate the
mobilisation of language. Elite theory provides a theoretical lens to explore the power
relations that manifest through public discourse. Shell is identified as an elite in terms of
its economic power and control, which are interwoven with Shell’s economic, political
and social status in Nigeria. By applying elite theory (Chapter 4) this study investigates
Shell as more than an MNC within the context of a developing country, which allows
new issues and concepts to be explored. In particular, an alternative understanding of
corporate disclosure, the corporation and the relationships it can forge with the
government of a developing country will be examined. Therefore, it is appropriate to
consider the social, political and economic contexts that shape Shell’s discursive
practices in Nigeria, given Nigeria’s status as a developing country and Shell’s long
history of operations. CDA, which provides a method to analyse discourse within this
broader socio-political context, is outlined in the following section.
1.5 Critical discourse analysis
Content analysis constitutes the dominant method (Craig et al., 2010) for the analysis of
corporate narrative documents, including annual reports and social and environmental
reports in accounting research. A number of qualitative studies using discourse analysis
indicate a move away from quantitative-based content analysis (Tregidga et al., 2012).
However, consistent with this move away from quantitative analysis, this thesis adopts
Fairclough’s (1989, 1992, 1995, 2001) critical discourse analysis (CDA), which is well
established in the fields of both linguistics and sociology, and has been used as a crossdisciplinary research method in accounting. Fairclough’s CDA has been used in various
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accounting studies to direct attention to language and accountability (including:
Gallhofer et al., 2001; Craig and Armenic, 2004a; Craig and Armenic, 2004b; Laine,
2005; Craig and Armenic, 2006; Nielsen and Thomsen, 2007; Craig and Armenic, 2008;
Ferguson et al., 2009; Cortese et al., 2010; Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2012). These
studies, which demonstrate different aspects of discourse and different applications of
CDA, will be expanded upon in Chapter 5.

Language, discourse and social contexts are seen as communicative devices through
which meaning is created, received and interpreted (Fairclough, 1995). Therefore,
meaning can be imposed implicit in and influenced by the levels of context in which it
is created or in which it exists. This allows language to then become a network of signs
that give meaning to the surrounding reality. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p.8) argue
that “discourse analytical approaches take as their starting point the claim that our
access to reality is always through language”. Through “language we create
representations of reality that are never mere reflections of a pre-existing reality but
contribute to constructing reality” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, pp.8-9). The discursive
construction of oil spills found in corporate artefacts such as annual reports and
sustainability reports are analysed in the context in which that discourse has been
created, received and interpreted (Fairclough, 1992, 1995). In this thesis annual reports,
sustainability reports and a response letter to major shareholders will form the empirics
to which CDA is applied.

Fairclough (1992, p.72) believes that “we must try to understand how members of social
communities produce ‘orderly’ or ‘accountable’ world-s”. Corporations are important
members of the global society, and of the social communities that depend on them. The
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practice of meaning-making as public discourse is a strategic resource for corporations
to communicate with society. In this thesis, corporate disclosures about oil spills
(outlined earlier and discussed in Chapter 3) raises important questions, explored in
Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

The main focus of Fairclough’s CDA is to analyse discourse as text, as a discursive and
a social practice. At the text-analysis level (Chapter 6) this thesis uses the following
public documents: Shell Sustainability Reports (SSR) from 2000-2010, Shell Petroleum
Development Company’s (SPDC) annual reports (AR) from 2000-20062 and, in
particular, a letter from Shell in 2010 in response to major shareholders’ concerns about
oil spills in Nigeria. The 10-year period selected for analysis reflects corporate
disclosure following the Ogoni Nine incident and Shell’s subsequent increase in oil-spill
disclosures. The ‘discursive practice’ level (Chapter 7) includes an analysis of a number
of texts from outside the corporation. These documents serve as counter-narratives to
the text analysis of Shell’s discourse. The ‘social practice’ level (Chapter 8) uses
contextual material, including Nigeria’s oil-spills legislation, to provide insights into the
broad socio-political context of Shell’s operations.

2

SPDC annual reports were publicly available for the period 2000-2006. The researcher contacted SPDC
for the reports for 2007-2010, but received no response. Therefore, the analysis was supplemented with a
shareholder letter published in 2010 which summarised information regarding Shell’s oil spills in Nigeria.
Additionally, oil spills in Nigeria were also disclosed in the sustainability reports of the parent entity
Shell for the period 2000-2010.
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CDA also recognises the power dimension in the production of text, and this thesis
adopts the concept of corporate elites to expose and challenge the corporate rhetoric and
meaning ascribed to oil spills, as well as the power relationship operating via public
discourse. In this thesis, elite theory informs the critical discourse analysis and offers
broad and overarching views that explore the meaning-making of corporate activity
through disclosure: in this case, Shell’s corporate disclosures of oil spills in a
developing country, Nigeria. By applying the framework of elite theory, this thesis
shows the ‘identity’ and power of language in corporate narrative disclosures to
categorise specific entities; in particular, the role of power in corporate elites’
construction of the public discourses of oil spills.

The central concepts of elite theory, in this thesis, expose power and dominance in
Shell’s discursive meaning of oil spills with a systematic analysis of discourse at a
number of different levels (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). Elite theory, therefore, exposes the
relationship between power and discursive inequalities by analysing Shell’s corporate
disclosures in the context of a developing country. The application of a corporate elite
provides an opportunity to study Shell as more than a mere reporting legal entity. Shell
as an MNC is assumed to be ‘powerful’, and elite theory explicates how this elitism is
manifest in the Nigerian context.
1.6 Structure of this thesis
This thesis is organised as follows.
Chapter 2: Accountability and Environmental Corporate Disclosures explores the
concept of accountability in general, the concept of accountability adopted in this thesis
and corporate disclosures (annual reports, sustainability reports) as mechanisms of
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accountability. This is followed by an analysis of the literature on corporate social and
environmental disclosures in developing countries. The last section of the chapter
investigates relevant studies on Nigeria and Shell.

Chapter 3: Background: Nigeria and Shell Plc introduces Nigeria as a developing
country in Africa, looking in particular at Nigeria’s economic, political and
environmental context. A brief overview of the history and politics of Nigeria is
followed by an account of the economic development of Nigeria and the role oil plays
in this development. The chapter then provides a brief historical background of Shell, its
operations in Nigeria and its relationship with the Nigerian government. The chapter
contextualises both the international and national profile of Shell’s operations in
Nigeria, Nigeria’s oil industry and Nigeria’s relationship with Shell. The problems
associated with oil spills conclude this chapter.

Chapter 4: Elite Theory begins with a description of elites, their meaning and the ways
in which they are described in the literature. This is then followed by a background to
elite theory; more specifically, the ideas of classic and contemporary elite theory. Elite
theory is further extended to the idea of power elites and corporate elites. The idea of a
corporate power elite is then applied to Shell and its status in Nigeria. This theory of
elites is traced to CDA, as both refer to the role of power in the construction of
corporate disclosures.

Chapter 5: Critical Discourse Analysis presents Fairclough’s (1989, 1992, 1995, 2001)
three-dimensional framework of CDA. This chapter introduces and provides an
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overview of CDA, and explores the use of CDA in accounting studies. The relationship
between elite theory and CDA concludes this chapter.

Chapter 6: Text Analysis: Discursive Meaning of Oil Spills presents the first level of
analysis in Fairclough’s CDA framework by analysing Shell’s public discourse. The
analysis focuses on the use of dominant words ascribed to oil spills in Shell’s
disclosures and those of its Nigerian subsidiary, including sustainability reports, annual
reports and a response letter to major shareholders. The analysis highlights differences
in ascribed meaning when reporting on different causes of oil spills.

Chapter 7: Discourse as Discursive Practice presents the second level of Fairclough’s
CDA framework. At this level of analysis, the dominant discourses identified in the text
analysis are problematised using several counter-narratives in the public domain,
including those from FoE, AI and Christian Aid International Development Charity.
Shell is reconceptualised through the perspective of elite theory as a corporate elite, and
its role in controlling discursive practices taken beyond its identity as an MNC.

Chapter 8: Discourse as Social Practice is the third level of Fairclough’s CDA. This
level examines the wider power context of Shell’s disclosures. It highlights the
importance of the relationship between Shell and the Nigerian government by
examining Nigerian legislation and the regulation of oil spills. This particular discourse
and relationship is understood by coalescing CDA and elite theory.

Chapter 9: Conclusion and Contribution draws on the analysis and discussion to detail
the contributions of this thesis. This final chapter gathers the insights of the previous
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chapters into Shell’s power to control text, discourse practice and social practice.
Theoretical and methodological contributions are considered with respect to the
literature of accountability in developing countries. The chapter concludes by
suggesting future research opportunities that can be built on this thesis.
1.7 Summary
This chapter presented an overview of the study, introducing the research aims and
contributions, discussing the background, motivations and justification for this study
and describing its methodology and underlying theory. The next chapter explores
accountability in the context of social and environmental disclosures.

21

CHAPTER 2: ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
CORPORATE DISCLOSURES

2.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to provide an overview of social and environmental
disclosures in corporate disclosure mechanisms such as annual reports, and social
and environmental reports (SER) or sustainability reports. Corporate social and
environmental accounting (SEA) disclosures have become one-way: organisations
attempt to discharge accountability for their social and environmental impacts.
According to Gray et al. (2010), social pressures have influenced the rise of
companies’ non-financial accounting disclosures, which has led to an increased
disclosure about these companies’ social and environmental aspects. However, this
view of corporate accountability is contested, and a number of studies have
demonstrated that corporate narrative disclosures can function as a type of corporate
propaganda (Collison, 2003), a legitimation device (Patten, 1992; Cho and Patten,
2007; Cho, 2009), and a tool for stakeholder management (Buysse and Verbeke,
2003). Many studies are critical of corporations’ motives, and see this form of
reporting as stemming from corporations’ ‘narcissistic concerns’ to appear
responsible (Roberts, 2003), mere acts of corporate egoism (Messner, 2009).
Collison (2003), for example, links corporate media such as annual reports and social
and environmental accounting as propaganda used by elites, as the companies that
produce these reports are in a powerful position. This thesis builds on the concept of
elite discourse.
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This chapter begins with a discussion of accountability, with reference to corporate
accountability and accounting disclosures. This is followed by an explication of
accountability consistent with the methodological considerations of CDA and elite
theory, and an overview of different accountability genres used by corporations, such
as annual reports and social and environmental reports. The penultimate section
discusses relevant literature on corporate environmental disclosures within
developing countries, and the final section discusses accounting studies on Shell and
Nigeria.
2.2 Accountability
The concept of accountability is perceived differently in various contexts, and it is
often given a discipline-specific meaning (Sinclair, 1995). This is why an increasing
body of literature has demonstrated the difficulty in defining this multidimensional
concept. However, a sociological perspective of accountability provides a basis for
the common meaning of an exchange of reasons for conduct (Messner, 2009).

In the accounting literature, accountability is a concept that in simple terms refers to
a responsibility to give account for one’s actions (Gray et al., 1986, 1987, 1988,
1991, 1996). Accountability involves explaining one’s actions, in the context where
one party (the accountor) is accountable to another party (the accountee) (Steccolini,
2004). While these definitions are similar and describe a relationship, the concept of
accountability is nuanced in the accounting literature: it is an ‘elusive concept’
(Sinclair, 1995); a “multifaceted and complex concept” (Steccolini, 2004, p.330);
and, a problematic concept with a number of limitations (Roberts, 2009; Messner,
2009). There are many types, forms and styles of accountability. For example,
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Sinclair (1995) identifies forms of accountability as political, public, managerial,
professional and personal. Other concepts of accountability include: intelligent
accountability (O’Neill, 2002), moral accountability (Schweiker, 1993), hierarchical
accountability (Roberts, 1991) and transparency as a form of accountability (Roberts,
2009). For Hoskins (1996, p.267), “accountability unsettles and subsumes
responsibility, opening the subject to the prospect of a constant re-specification of
what they are answerable for”.

Hence, Sinclair (1995, p.221) notes that how accountability is defined depends on the
“ideologies, motifs, and language of our times”. For instance, “auditors discuss
accountability as if it is a financial or numerical matter, political scientists view
accountability as a political imperative and legal scholars as a constitutional
arrangement, while philosophers treat accountability as a subset of ethics” (Sinclair,
1995, p.221). This is further supported by Cousins and Sikka (1993), who argue that
the meanings of accountability can be contested, shaped and changed. In light of the
above, a number of definitions from different perspectives are offered. Table 2.1
summarises some categories identified in the current accounting literature.
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Table 2.1 Different Concepts of Accountability
Concept
Accountability as a
requirement to give an
account
Hierarchical
accountability

Moral accountability

Authors
Roberts and
Scapens (1985,
p.447)
Roberts (1991,
p.355)

Definition
Accountability can be understood as a requirement to give
an account of oneself and of one’s activities.
Relates financial accountability to hierarchical forms of
accountability. Hierarchical forms of accountability, in
which accounting plays a central role, serve to produce and
reproduce an individualized sense of self; a sense of the
self as essentially solitary and singular, nervously
preoccupied with how one is seen.
Giving an account to others.

Schweiker
(1993)
Accountability as an
Inanga (1991, A process in which individuals and organisations are
answerable action
p.5)
compelled to be answerable for their actions and
responsibilities.
Accountability
and Cousins
and Accountability meaning depends on relations of power,
power
Sikka
(1993, and has always been contested. It can be changed through
p.53)
social struggle and practice.
Accountability and
Gray et al. Duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily a
duty
(1996, p.38)
financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which
one is held responsible.
Accountability and
Shearer (2002, Answerable, i.e. one must be able to give evidence of the
other
p.545)
reasonableness of his or her actions to a community of
others. Accounting should move from an ‘accounting forthe-self’ to an ‘accounting for-the-other’.
Transparency as a
Roberts (2009, Intelligent form of accountability that “does not
form of accountability p.2)
exclusively rely on the power to make things transparent,
but acknowledges the impossibility of this ideal of a self
that is fully transparent to itself and others”.
Accountability as a
Messner (2009, To give an account means to provide reasons for one’s
morally significant
p.920)
behaviour, to explain and justify what one did or did not
practice
do.
Accountability is a morally significant practice, since to
demand an account from someone is to ask this person to
enact discursively the responsibility for her behaviour.
Accountability and
Joannides
Accountability can be understood as a requirement to give
oneself
(2012, p.245)
an account of oneself and one’s activities. The subject is
then constituted as answerable, i.e. one must be able to
give evidence of the reasonableness of his or her actions to
a community of others.

Table 2.1 demonstrates that themes of accountability are concentrated around giving
an account and answering for one’s actions. Accountability always enacts
intersubjectivity (Shearer, 2002), and therefore it is understood in different ways,
including as a personal obligation; an obligation for power or authority; and a
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consequence of scrutiny (Sinclair, 1995). The concept of accountability can be also
expanded to include groups other than individuals, such as corporations or
governments (Andrew, 2001). In this thesis, accountability is concerned with a
corporation, Shell and the accountability it discharges via its corporate narrative
disclosures. In the context of this thesis, accounting information can be a ‘powerful
and persuasive tool’, and provides a source of information that contributes to
constituting our discourses of accountability (Andrew, 2001). For example, elites
including corporations have the opportunity to produce elite discourse (van Dijk,
1993). This elite discourse is a powerful reproduction of the amount of control and
power elites have over their actions. Van Dijk (1993, p.44) argues that this control is
usually “explicitly implemented by decision making, use of special speech acts and
discourse genres (e.g., commands, orders, advice, analyses, and all forms of public
discourse), and other forms of action that directly or indirectly influence the actions
of others”. In an accounting context, this type of elite discourse is produced in
corporate narrative disclosures; elite accountability is enacted in such disclosures.

This thesis adopts a concept of accountability where accounting moves from an
‘accounting for-the-self’ to an ‘accounting for-the other’ (Schweiker, 1993; Shearer,
2002). Currently, accounting is seen as promoting a type of accountability that does
not include mutual responsibilities, and presumes individuals are mere economic
subjects (Messner, 2009). This reductionist view of accountability as a justification
of one’s actions is misconstrued (Messner, 2009). Schweiker’s (1993) concept of
accountability encompasses the view that accounting is concerned with questions of
how we should live. For Schweiker (1993), to be accountable is to establish one’s
identity as intrinsically interdependent; accountability, therefore, has a moral
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dimension subject to ethical reflection. Along similar lines, Roberts (1991, p.365)
asserts that “at the heart of accountability is a social acknowledgement and an
insistence that one’s actions make a difference to both self and others”. This is of
importance to this thesis, particularly to the ‘identity construction’ of the ‘other’ in
relation to oil spills (Chapters 6 and 7).

Shearer (2002, p.544) argues that the “moral accountability enacted by accounting
reports exhibits the same ethical deficiencies as the interpersonal relationship of
economic accountability”. This notion of moral responsibility grounds the
accountability of a corporation such as Shell with respect to the community, such as
Nigeria, in the accounting practices undertaken to discharge accountability. The very
possibility of disclosure of social and environmental impacts such as oil spills
presupposes notions of accountability and “consequently the moral status of
economic entities as well as the ethical presuppositions from which moral status
derives” (Shearer, 2002, p.543). This thesis explores corporate public discourse in
annual reports and social and environmental accounting reports as accountability
mechanisms. This means that Shell provides the account and is accountable to a
broader concept of good than its own interests.

According to Shearer’s (2002) concept of accountability Shell discloses to the
‘other’- the Nigerian community - what its operations do, as Nigeria as a whole is a
community of moral agents within which the entity is situated, and which defines
whose needs count and whose good is sought. In other words, “giving an account
renders economic forces servants of larger human and environmental purposes
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without negating the singularity of their identities or motives” (Schweiker, 1993,
p.249).

Schweiker (1993) acknowledges the importance of language in the enactment of
moral identity: “when an individual renders an account of her or his actions, this
linguistic activity enacts a ‘doubleness of identity’ whereby the individual is both the
one acting and the one accounting for the acting” (Schweiker’s, 1993, p.240). This
concept of doubleness of identity is further expanded in this thesis in Chapters 6 and
7. Shell’s disclosure of oil spills presents a twofold identity: the company and the
‘other’. Therefore,
[an] appreciation of this doubleness is critical to understanding the source of
moral agency as a discursive portrayal of an identity evokes an awareness of
relationship to others, and hence constitutes the identity as interdependent
with others. In these relations to others lies the invitation to moral evaluation,
and the source of moral agency (Schweiker, 1993, p.241).

If discourse is seen to be not merely produced by, but producing, human subjectivity,
then the “discourse in terms of which the account is rendered will define both the
behaviors for which one is accountable and the criteria of reasonableness by which
one’s activities” (Shearer, 2002, p.546) are judged. Therefore, accounting practices
have consequences. These practices are in the form of regulated financial reports and
other reporting, such as voluntary social and environmental disclosures. These have
developed from a perceived need ‘to account’ and meet societal expectations.
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2.3 Corporate media and accountability genres

Corporations communicate with their stakeholders via different forms, and
corporate public discourse comprises a combination of multiple communications
(Buhr and Reiter, 2006). After all, accounting is said to be the ‘language of business’
(Buhr and Reiter, 2006; Llewellyn and Milne, 2007) and an instrument of
representation of financial and non-financial information. Roberts (1991, p.363)
states that “accounting information acts as a mirror through which producers and
their activity are made visible”, whereby “others must view, judge and compare
individual and group performance”. The power of accounting information has
emerged from the institutionalisation of an authoritative means of making activity
visible (Roberts, 1991). Therefore, corporate disclosures are authoritative, key public
discourses of corporations.

Within the field of accounting, corporations use a number of different
communicative genres to connect with the public and present their information.
Some of these vehicles are mandatory, such as financial statements for publicly
traded companies, and some of these are voluntary, such as the social and
environmental accounting and sustainable-development reports (Buhr and Reiter,
2006).

In this thesis corporate reports are considered to be accountability mechanisms, and
the oil spills disclosures they contain are a part of this accountability mechanism.
Therefore, disclosures of oil spills provide a means to explore the ‘account’,
‘accountor’ and ‘accountee’. They are an artefact used to interrogate the discursive
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practice of accountability and all that this entails, including the construction of the
other, and the inversion of responsibility and blame to the ‘other’ (Chapter 7). It will
be argued that disclosures of this nature are a result of power, elite status and
political advantage. Corporations as producers of accounting information are
considered dominant institutions, and are given this prominent position; however, the
economically powerful need to be accountable (Cousins and Sikka, 1993). For
Cousins and Sikka (1993, p.53), “the aim of accountability is always to affect the
discretion and autonomy of those who are in positions of power”; moreover,
“information not just accounting information can be used to highlight particular
inequalities and needs” (Cousins and Sikka, 1993, p.53). Therefore, it is important to
explore the accountability of an MNC embedded within social and political struggles
of a developing country, and how accountability can be different in such a context.

2.3.1 Annual report as an accountability mechanism
Annual reports are considered as an important vehicle for corporate accountability.
Stakeholders’ perspectives of accountability are seen through this form of corporate
disclosures (Deegan, 2009). Annual reports are used because organisations
commonly signal what they perceive as important through these reporting
mechanisms (Guthrie and Abeysekera, 2006). In this case the annual reports tell us
about Shell’s corporate responsibility, what Shell needs to be accountable for and the
moral agency of accounting.

On the other hand, annual reports are often seen as mere regulatory devices or formal
public documents produced as a response to mandatory reporting requirements
(Stanton and Stanton, 2002). In contrast to other corporate media annual reports
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possess a certain degree of credibility as they are audited (Jenkins and Yakovleva,
2006). In effect, annual reports are tools that companies use to communicate to their
audiences, including shareholders, suppliers, media, government and other
stakeholders.

While companies commonly use other means of reporting media, such as newspaper
advertisements, corporate web pages and (more recently) sustainability reports, the
annual report is one of the only documents that is always available to stakeholders of
publicly-listed companies (Adams et al., 1998). Gray et al. (1995, p.82) further
argues that, besides being read by the organisation’s ‘relevant publics’, the “annual
report not only is a statutory document, produced regularly, but it also represents
what is probably the most important document in terms of the organization’s
construction of its own social imagery”. Annual reports, therefore are the “most
publicised and visible documents produced by companies” (Jenkins and Yakovleva,
2006, p.273). In this thesis, the annual reports of Shell’s subsidiary in Nigeria,
SPDC, encompass a relationship between the regulator (Nigerian government) and
the regulated (Shell). The multi-layered discourse analysis of the annual report
makes visible the relationship between Shell and the Nigerian community through oil
spills. This relationship is further explored in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

Annual reports also contain a certain amount of social and environmental
information (Jenkins and Yakovleva, 2006) and, according to Deegan and Rankin
(1996), certain stakeholders seek information from the annual report concerning
environmental activities. This has led researchers to believe that companies use
annual reports as a vehicle for a range of disclosures for those interested in social and
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environmental issues (Campbell and Beck, 2004). Therefore, in accounting research
annual reports have been used to investigate social and environmental disclosures
(see e.g., Patten, 1992; Tilt, 1994; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and Rankin,
1996; Adams et al., 1998; Campbell, 2000; 2004; O’Donovan, 2002; Cho and Patten,
2007; Laine, 2009). In addition, annual reports have been used to inform the public
of the firm’s social and environmental accountability (Tilt, 1994; Rankin, 1996; Neu
et al, 1998; Cormier, Gordon and Magnan, 2004). This thesis interrogates the annual
reports of Shell’s subsidiary SPDC in Nigeria because these reports represent
SPDC’s main publicly-available communicative mechanism on oil spills; in doing
so, this thesis contributes to an understanding of annual reports as an accountee for
social and environmental impacts.

However, this view limits accountability (Messner, 2009). To address this, “several
authors have suggested the introduction of more encompassing forms of
accountability, as may be achieved through social and environmental reporting
practices” (Gray, 2002; Shearer, 2002; Unerman and Bennett, 2004; Messner, 2009,
p.919). Furthermore, “it has also been proposed that disembodied forms of
accounting need to be complemented with a situation-specific sensitivity for the
‘particular other’ whose interests and values cannot be appropriately accounted for
by a system of general rules or principles” (Lehman, 1999; Roberts, 2003; Shearer,
2002; Messner, 2009, p.919).

Although the level of social and environmental disclosure in annual reports has
increased over the years, the advent of ‘standalone’ reporting practices is, now
evident in many countries (Gray et al, 2010, p. x) and has become a popular medium
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to report on social and environmental performance. This is explored in the following
section.

2.3.2 Environmental reports as an accountability mechanism

Environmental issues have become important topics of corporate disclosure as there
is an increased concern for the social and ecological impacts of a capitalist economic
system (Messner, 2009). Roberts (2009), points that ‘in recent years, there has been a
constant emergence of new forms of financial and non-financial disclosures to
stakeholders, arguably reflecting a faith in transparency’ and a belief that
“accounting and the environment can no longer be considered mutually exclusive”
(Andrew, 2001, p.210). In relation to the potential of greater transparency to create
environmental responsibility; Gray (1992, p.415) asserts:
The development of accountability…increases the transparency of
organisations. That is it increases the number of things that are made visible,
increases the number of ways in which things are made visible, and in doing
so encourages a greater openness. The inside of organisation becomes more
visible, that is transparent.
Compared to other forms of corporate-disclosure genres such as annual reports and
directors' letters to shareholders, the environmental report is a relatively new artefact
of corporate communication, becoming noticeable only in the early 1990s.
According to Jenkins and Yakovleva (2006, p.274) in the late 1990s companies
started to produce sustainability reports (for example Placer Dome) and also ‘reports
to society’ (for example Anglo American). The first companies to release stand-alone
Environmental Reports were those in the oil industry, in the 1980s and early-90s
(Jenkins and Yakovleva, 2006).
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Over the years the content and naming of environmental reports have changed. Most
recently, the reports have taken on the language of sustainable development with
titles to match (Deegan, 2009). This diversity of reports and the change in
nomenclature is to be expected with the changing discourse of environmentalism
(Buhr and Reiter, 2006). It can be argued that the term ‘sustainable’ gained
popularity due to the changes in global thinking about the environment and more
awareness of living sustainably. For corporations, social and environmental reports
are symbolic, and serve as the purveyor of green images and environmental
legitimacy (Buhr and Reiter, 2006) that draw on the well-established legitimacy of
accounting and annual reports (Richardson, 1987). This type of corporate
communication contributes to the ‘social construction of reality’ (Hines, 1988;
Morgan, 1988) in the same way as financial accounting (Buhr and Reiter, 2006). For
the purpose of this thesis, the extent to which Shell’s reports may or may not
represent some underlying reality is not an appropriate question; rather, the focus is
on the discourse and discursive construction concerning oil spills and the Nigerian
communities in which Shell is held to account.

Shell has been producing sustainability reports for the last 15 years, with the title and
content of the reports changing over time. Sustainability reports as accountability
mechanisms appear especially in environmentally sensitive industries such as oil
production and are an important forms of public discourse. Shell Canada produced
their first report, Progress Toward Sustainable Development, in 1991. According to
Shell Canada (2002, p.3), this was “one of first sustainable-development reports to be
published in the world, and it was pioneering in many ways and set a standard for the
company”.
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MNCs are expected to disclose environmental and social issues relating to their
subsidiaries because of their global environmental and social impact (Tilt, 1994). In
the case of Shell in Nigeria, Shell discloses oil spills from its operating subsidiary
SPDC. The following chapter expands this idea to Shell’s performance data by
regarding the number of oil spills in Nigeria over a period of 10 years, and
juxtaposing this data with a CDA analysis in Chapters 6-8.

2.4 Corporate environmental disclosure: evidence from Africa

The number of accounting studies of social and environmental disclosures has grown
over the years (see reviews by Gray, 2002; Mathews, 1997; Owen, 2008; Parker,
2005; Thomson, 2007); most of the research has focussed on corporate operations in
developing countries. For example, from the 1980s through to early 2000s the focus
has mainly been on developed countries such as Australia and those in North
America, and Europe (Belal and Owen, 2007; Islam and Deegan, 2008; Elijido-Ten
and Kloot, 2010; Craig et al, 2010) where environmental awareness and government
regulations are established (Elijido-Ten and Kloot, 2010). This could be due to high
community expectations in developing countries for corporations to produce
environmentally responsible behaviour.

Research on social and environmental accounting in emerging and less developed
countries is limited, despite the increase in MNC involvement in developing areas.
The socio-economic realities of these countries are different as are corporate
motivations for undertaking social and environmental accounting (Belal et al. 2011,
Craig et al., 2010). In addition, ‘researchers in this field consider that less powerful
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stakeholders need to be given a greater voice if there is to be true accountability’
(Tilt, 2007, p.104).

Thomson (2007) studied geographical locations in the accounting literature,
examining different empirical sites, research topics and research participants, and
found that there is a clear geographic and ideological bias toward geographic
locations and entities studied in developed countries. However, studies offering
contributions to the literature from developing countries are emerging (Teoh and
Thong, 1984; Sing and Ahuja, 1983; Abayo, Adams and Roberts, 1993; Savage,
1994; Choi, 1999; Disu and Gray, 1998; Barako et al., 2006; Belal, 1999; Belal,
2001; Kuasirikun and Sherer, 2004; de Villiers and van Staden, 2006; Islam and
Deegan, 2008).

For the purpose of this thesis, the African context provides a unique set of sociopolitical consequences. Africa contains resource-rich economies alongside extreme
poverty, and it is with this context that this thesis is situated. When it comes to
research of social and environmental accounting in Africa most studies have
explored disclosures from a sample of leading or large corporations (Savage, 1994;
Kisenyi and Gray, 1998; De Villiers and Staden, 2006; Barako et al., 2006).
Generally, the studies have focussed on the trends in environmental disclosures, on
the extent of environmental disclosure in general supported with general descriptions
of environmental disclosure practices. The disclosure studies tend to be descriptive
and use quantitative analysis to demonstrate what is reported, but do not include the
broader social, economic and political context of the countries investigated. This
provides an opportunity for studies that interrogate beyond the sheer volumetric
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disclosures to explore the texts’ meaning; this thesis makes its unique contribution in
the literature in this way.

This area of study poses a number of challenges. Authors such as Kisenyi and Gray
(1998), found it difficult to make any definitive conclusions about disclosures in
Uganda due to the reluctance of corporations to provide relevant data. In addition,
some of the literature also focused on longitudinal studies (De Villiers and Staden,
2006; Barako et al, 2006). This thesis is similar as it focuses on a longitudinal
disclosure of oil spills in Nigeria over a period of 10 years; however, it departs from
a quantitative analytic approach by applying CDA and analysing corporate
disclosures within a broader socio-political context.

The following section builds on this literature by introducing specific social and
environmental accounting studies that have been carried out in Nigeria, and specific
studies on the case company, Shell.
2.5 Studies on Nigeria and Shell

While there are only limited number of social and environmental accounting studies
in the Nigerian context, of particular importance to this study is the research of Disu
and Gray (1998), who explored social reporting of 22 MNCs in Nigeria. They note
that all companies included disclosures, such as ‘charitable donations, employment
data, pensions, employee consultation, employment of the disabled, health and safety
and corporate governance’, and suggest that disclosures are made only if they are
mandatory. This could be due to weak regulation in Nigeria and generally low
awareness of environmental disclosures.
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Accounting research concerning Shell in Nigeria is also limited. Unerman (2000)
conducted a 100-year content analysis to examine corporate social responsibility
(CSR) disclosures from a broad range of Shell’s corporate reports, including annual
reports. He found that many corporate reports, other than annual reports, contained
CSR-related information. Unerman (2000) concluded that exclusive focus on annual
reports may lead to an incomplete picture of CSR. Building on this argument, this
thesis includes Shell’s sustainability reports in the analysis of corporate disclosures
to present another representation of Shell’s oil-spill disclosures in Nigeria.

One of the limitations of Unerman’s (2000) longitudinal study was a lack of
theoretical framework to explain the disclosures. However, a later study by Unerman
and Bennett (2004) used Habermasian discourse ethics as a theoretical model to
explore Shell’s internet-based stakeholder dialogue. They examined Shell’s ‘web
forum’ as a means of “giving previously unheard stakeholders a voice in the
determination of corporate responsibilities” (Unerman and Bennett, 2004, p.702).
After examining 471 postings by external stakeholders on the web forum over two
and a half years, they concluded there was little evidence of the forum being used for
‘discourse or debate’; rather, it was more a place to express a particular viewpoint.
They also concluded, however, that the company ignored the views of many
stakeholders.

Bebbington et al (2008) analysed Shell’s 2002 CSR report using reputation risk
management (RRM) to link Shell’s disclosures to discursive reputation strategies.
Bebbington et al. (2008) concluded that reputation discourses conveyed in Shell’s
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2002 report are aimed at “the self and focus on the narcissistic manufacture of the
organisation’s identity as being good” (Bebbington et al., 2008, p.353). This thesis
also analyses discursive representations but extends the analysis to a 10-year period.

In addition, research using Shell’s corporate disclosures has been conducted outside
traditional accounting fields of inquiry (Livesey 2001; Livesey, 2002; Livesey and
Kearins, 2002; Nielsen and Thomsen, 2007; and others). Livesey (2001) addressed
the eco-discourse used by Shell that emerged as a result of two environmental
disputes. Livesey (2001) analysed the ‘language games’ between Shell and its critics
after the Brent Spar controversy and also Shell’s operations in the Ogoniland, Niger
Delta. Combining sensemaking and Foucauldian approaches, the author argued that
“local conflicts over meaning-making around the natural environment must be
understood in terms of discursive struggle at the socio-political level where they both
reflect and influence dynamics of cultural and institutional change” (Livesey, 2001,
p.58).

Further, Livesey (2002) offered interpretation of Shell’s first annual Report to
Society accompanied by additional text from Shell’s expert consultant, John
Elkington. The report was “published in April 1998 after a period of crisis, selfreflection and change, the report, Profits and Principles: Does There Have to Be a
Choice? (Knight, 1998), produced an account of Shell’s self-proclaimed
transformation” (Livesey, 2002, pp. 314-315). Livesey (2002) used rhetorical and
discourse analysis to interpret language and practice to demonstrate how Shell’s and
Elkington’s local engagements responded to and altered the broader discursive order
(Livesey, 2002). The results of this study indicate that “a large part of Shell’s
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purpose and a central function of reporting as envisioned by Elkington was to reestablish discursive regularity” (Livesey, 2002, p.338). Livesey (2002, p.338) stated
that Shell’s report “reflects a corporate desire for hegemonic control” and
“expression of its sustainability commitment and its integration of the concept into
its business lexicon demonstrated strong residual effects of the dominant discourse of
economic development” (Livesey, 2002, p.338). Livesey’s (2002) analysis focussed
on a report from a single organisation, Royal Dutch Shell, and concentrated on a
single year’s reporting; this thesis uses an extended period of time and both annual
and sustainability reports specific to the Nigerian context. This thesis builds on
Livesey’s (2001, 2002) work by examining corporate disclosures as a discursive
struggle and explores the elitist control Shell has over discourse of oil spills.

Livesey and Kearins (2002) analysed 1998 sustainability reports published by Shell
Group and The Body Shop International, using Foucauldian discourse analysis to
compare the language of reports published under disparate circumstances by the two
companies. They argued that “Shell and The Body Shop bolstered their claims of
transparency with the assertion that they were companies who cared. In expressing a
sense of caring and emotional investment, these reports paint a portrait of companies
with “'good intentions'” (Livesey and Kearins, 2002, p.252).

Studies by Livesey (2001, 2002), Livesey and Kearins (2002) and Bebbington et al.
(2008) make a unique contribution to the discursive analysis of Shell’s reporting;
however, none of these studies investigated other dimensions of analysis beyond the
text. This thesis builds on these previous studies and offers an extension of text
analysis by using CDA to interrogate text as a discursive and social practice. By
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examining the social practice this thesis looks at the inseparable relationship between
text and context (the organisational context of Shell as elite in a developing country,
but also the context of the place and the location of its operations, Nigeria). This
contribution is supported by Tregidga et al (2012) who call for this level of
understanding of the production of organisational reporting and communication as an
important element in achieving a more holistic insight into the quality and meaning
of organisational reporting and communication and the discharge of accountability.

Prior studies of Shell’s discourse mainly looked at the environmental disclosure in
general. This thesis builds on prior disclosure studies by providing a longitudinal
study over a 10-year period of a particular aspect of activity – oil-spill disclosures
within a developing country with a range of stakeholders in differing contexts and
social locations. In addition, the literature review revealed that the longitudinal
studies undertaken into corporate environmental disclosures mainly relied on a
content-analytical approach exploring the extent of environmental disclosure and
what is disclosed. This thesis departs from volumetric measures to analyse corporate
communications from a different methodological perspective. In doing so, it adds to
a growing body of literature on corporate social and environmental disclosures that
have applied discursive and similar methodologies to the studies of corporate
disclosures (Buhr and Reiter, 2006; Laine, 2005; Laine, 2009; Livesey, 2002;
Livesey and Kearins, 2002; Milne et al., 2006, 2004; Tregidga and Milne, 2006).
These studies have applied discursive and other interpretive approaches to reveal the
strategic construction of corporate disclosures to portray the organisations in a
particular light (Arrington and Francis, 1993; Hines, 1988).
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Corporate disclosures have been a subject of research and debate for some time.
Bhatia et al. (2008, p.167) argue that:
[u]nfortunately, very little attention has so far been paid to discourse
analytical investigations of the use and exploitation of language in many of
the regularly employed documents for corporate disclosures, especially in the
front matter accompanying the facts and figures about corporate performance:
that is, the communication from the senior management to the various
stakeholders through letters, reports, press releases, etc.

This thesis undertakes a detailed investigation of the use of linguistic resources in
corporate-disclosure documents: specifically, the sustainability reports and annual
reports of Shell and its operating subsidiary SPDC Nigeria, but also adding a
response letter to major shareholders into the analysis.
2.6 Summary

This chapter explored the literature on concepts of accountability and its meaning.
Accountability was then extended to different communication mechanisms (annual
reports and sustainability reports) that corporations use to justify their accountability
to relevant stakeholders. The chapter also looked into corporate disclosures in the
context of developing countries. The analysis of the literature shows there is a dearth
of literature on social and environmental-disclosures in developing countries in
general and in Nigeria in particular. This thesis was thereby located in the relevant
environmental disclosure literature in general, and within that examining developing
countries in particular.
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CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND: NIGERIA AND SHELL PLC

3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter explored the concept of accountability and different
accountability mechanisms with respect to corporate disclosures and the literature on
environmental disclosures in developing countries, and in Africa in particular. This
chapter provides a context for the case of an MNC, Shell, and its operations in a
developing country, Nigeria. This context is important as it helps to understand the
relationship between MNC and the Nigerian government. In Chapters 4 and 8 this
context and relationship will be reconsidered in light of elite theory.

The first section presents the history of Nigeria and its economic and political
environment. An understanding of the economic and political environment is
particularly salient in Nigeria, as the government has an important relationship with
Shell and its oil productions. This background is brief but will be revisited in Chapter
8, as its significance is embedded and implicated in the public discourse of both the
MNC and the developing country. This will be followed by a description of the oil
industry and the role oil plays in the economic development of Nigeria. The chapter
then introduces Shell and its history, and provides both an international and national
profile of Shell’s operations in Nigeria. This is followed by a discussion of oil spills
in Nigeria, Shell’s oil spills in particular and oil spills resulting from sabotage.
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3.2 Nigeria in brief
Nigeria, officially the Federal Republic of Nigeria, is a ‘federal constitutional
republic comprising of 36 states and one Federal Capital Territory’ (CIA World
Factbook, 2012). Nigeria is located in West Africa, and despite having an
international profile as a large oil-producing country it is still considered a
developing country with political instability and poverty. As of July 2012 Nigeria’s
population was estimated to be 170,123,740, which makes it the most populated
nation on the African continent and the seventh most populous in the world (CIA
World Factbook, 2012). It is also the largest oil producer and exporter in Africa
(EITI, 2012; World Bank, 2013b), and, ranks as the sixth-largest oil-producing
country in the world (NNPC, 2012). Nigeria is an OPEC member (Steiner, 2010).

Nigeria’s large population, combined with its massive oil wealth, have made it
strategically important in Africa and globally (Falola and Heaton, 2008). Despite the
country’s relative oil wealth, poverty is widespread (World Bank, 2008). According
to the World Bank, GDP per capita in 2011 was about US-$1,452 (World Bank,
2012). The majority of Nigerians are poor, with 71% of the population living on less
than US$1 a day and 92% on less than US$2 a day (UNICEF, 2011). O’Neil (2006),
for example, questions why it is that half a century of oil extraction in Nigeria has
failed to make the lives of the people better. As a result of this massive oil wealth,
issues of corruption, environmental degradation, poverty and violence have escalated
over the years (O’Neil, 2006). Therefore, despite its oil wealth Nigeria is considered
a developing country; the significance of this will be better understood in relation to
Shell and its operations.
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The economy of Nigeria is one of the fastest-growing in the world (World Bank,
2013a), and over 80% of government revenues are sourced from oil production
(EITI, 2012). Nigeria is located closest to two of the world’s three largest markets for
crude oil and petroleum products, Europe and the USA, followed by the Middle East.
This makes Nigeria an attractive investment for an MNC interested in oil production.
In Nigeria, oil operations are dominated by joint-venture arrangements between the
government and six major international oil companies: Shell, Mobil, Chevron, Agip,
Elf and Texaco (EITI, 2012).

Since the government owns all oil rights in Nigeria, it has a majority interest in the
operations, including its joint venture with Shell (NNPC, 2010). This important
relationship between Shell and the Nigerian government is central to this thesis.
According to O’Neil (2006) the government has controlled oil revenues since it
nationalised the oil industry. This control may be more tenuous or complex given
arguments that Shell has, in effect, hegemonic control (Livesey, 2002) due to its
relationship with the government.

The Nigerian government has been ranked as one of the three most corrupt in the
world (Omeje, 2004; Singer, 2005). Indeed, Transparency International has
“consistently ranked Nigeria since 1995 among the five worst countries in the world
on its Corruption Perception Index” (Steiner, 2010, pp.40-41). For example, in 2003,
it was estimated that 70% of oil revenues, more than US $14 billion dollars, was
stolen or wasted (O’Neil, 2006). Falola and Heaton, (2008, p.3) argue that “high
levels of corruption among government officials have made sustainable development
elusive and brought extreme poverty to the majority of Nigeria’s citizens”.
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According to Omeje (2005, p. 321) ‘the prominence of Nigeria’s political economy
has led many to analyse the Nigerian state primarily with reference to oil politics
shaped largely by state violence’. The state response to oil-related threats and
conflicts has been military violence (Omeje, 2004). For example, the government
usually intervenes if there are protests by the oil communities against MNC oil
companies (Omeje, 2004; 2005). Further, the majority of the population does not
benefit from the revenues of oil exports because:
by stealing government funds for personal use and by distributing money and
government contracts to cronies and allies, politicians can claim to be taking
care of their own, while at the same time growing excessively wealthy and
powerful themselves (Falola and Heaton, 2008, p.8).
In addition to corruption and violence, Nigeria’s oil deposits and large oil production
have had a negative impact on the environment (Eweje, 2006). Researchers argue
that the Nigerian natural environment and communities have suffered ever since oil
production began in 1958 (Okonta and Douglas, 2003; Nwilo and Badejo, 2006).
The environmental issues that Nigeria is facing due to oil spills include air, land and
water pollution, soil degradation and rapid deforestation (International Fertilizer
Development Center3, 2012). According to the 2006 Niger Delta Human
Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2006),
6,817 oil spills occurred between 1976 and 2001, resulting in a loss of approximately
three million barrels of oil. However, analysts suspect that the real number of oil
spills may be 10 times higher than reported (O’Neil, 2006).

3

The International Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC) is a “public international organisation
addressing critical issues such as international food security, the alleviation of global hunger and
poverty, environmental protection and the promotion of economic development and self-sufficiency”
(The International Fertilizer Development Center, 20012, n.p.)
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To understand the importance of the relationship between Shell and the Nigerian
government it is important to have some insights into the history and politics of the
country. This brief background will begin in 1914, when the geographic borders of
Nigeria were determined (Faloala and Heaton, 2008).

3.2.1 Political context of Nigeria

The history of the Nigerian polity goes back many centuries: archaeological evidence
indicates that human societies have been constantly present in all regions of Nigeria
for several thousand years, dating back to 9000 BCE (Falola and Heaton, 2008).
Nigeria borders the Gulf of Guinea, between Benin and Cameroon (CIA
Worldfact Book, 2011), and these borders were established in 1914 by British
colonisers (Falola and Heaton, 2008). Prior to 1914, Nigeria had two separately
governed colonial territories: the northern and southern protectorates (Okonta and
Douglas, 2003).

Since independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria has been a federal republic based
on the US model with executive power exercised by a president (CIA World
Factbook, 2012). While the government is nominally a democracy, it has a “long and
brutal history of military dictatorships” (FoE, 2004, p.4). Since independence Nigeria
has been governed by military regimes and unstable civilian governments (Falola and
Heaton, 2008); however, it is currently experiencing its longest uninterrupted period
of civilian rule since independence (Falola and Heaton, 2008). This political
instability has been linked to oil wealth, with “massive inflows of oil revenues and
external loans facilitating corrupt and irresponsible management of funds that have
characterized both civilian and military governments” (Falola and Heaton, 2008,
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p.9). While this thesis is not a political treatise, this brief background serves to offer
insights into some aspects that shape and are shaped by political control within
Nigeria.

3.2.2 Nigeria and oil
Historically, oil has played a very important role in Nigeria’s economic and political
development. The first discovery of commercial quantities of oil in Nigeria was in
1956, and this discovery transformed Nigeria’s political economy. Since the 1970s
oil has provided approximately 90% of foreign-exchange earnings, and 80% of
federal revenue (World Bank, 2010). To increase the monetary and technological
benefits from oil, the government created the NNPC in 1977 to cooperate with
existing companies and become involved in government-owned equity in these
companies (Ogri, 2001).

The majority of Nigeria’s oil reserves are found along the country’s coastal Niger
River Delta (Nwilo and Badejo, 2004), and therefore, the majority of Nigeria’s oil
industry is located in this area (Ogri, 2001). As one of the world’s largest oil
exporters, Nigeria produces more than 2,000,000 barrels per day (NNPC, 2013). For
example, in 2009, Nigerian daily oil production was estimated to be 2.211 million
barrels per day (CIA World Factbook, 2011). In 2011, the oil industry accounted for
‘95% of Nigerian exports, which were estimated at more than US$100 billion’, and
over ‘80% of government revenue’ (EITI, 2012, n.p.). Nigeria produces oil that is
high in quality, as it is very light with a low sulphur content4 (Okonta and Douglas,

4

Low sulphur content means that “oil burns easily in the process of refining and discharges minimum
waste into the atmosphere” (Okonta and Douglas, 2003, p.54).
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2003). Therefore, it is sought after by refineries in Europe and the United States,
where there are very strict rules guiding environmental pollution (Okonta and
Douglas, 2003). These high-quality oil deposits give Nigeria an important role in the
world’s oil production.

For a large section of the community the distinction between the oil industry and the
state is blurred (Omeje, 2005). This is mainly due to the governments’ influential
involvement with MNC oil companies and oil production. According to Douglas (in
Omeje, 2005, p.325):
Nigeria is a mere geographical expression created by multinational oil
companies and continues to be governed by the by multinational
companies….. These companies (Shell, Chevron, Mobil, Elf, etc.) actually
dictate in which direction the country should go. There is a symbiotic
relationship between the military dictatorship, the civilian dictatorship, and
the multinational companies.
Accordingly, Falola and Heaton (2008, p.184) argue that “power lies with the oil
companies and corruption is widespread in the absence of public accountability other
than that owed to MNCs that pay the governments’ rents and loyalties”.

Since 1999, some small economic improvements have been made; however,
[t]he average Nigerian is still mired in extreme poverty despite the country’s
immense oil wealth; and the political class is still more concerned with
solidifying its own power than with governing democratically in the best
interests of the majority of the population and until issues such as these are
addressed and resolved, Nigeria will remain a land of unrealized potential
(Falola and Heaton, 2008, p.15).
According to the CIA (2008, n.p.) the “current democratic government is facing the
daunting task of reforming the oil based economy, whose revenues have been
squandered through corruption and

mismanagement,

democracy”.
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and

institutionalizing

3.2.3 Oil and Economy

Historically, Nigeria has had long-standing global relationships even before 1914
(Falola and Heaton, 2008). Nigeria is classified as an emerging market, and currently
attracts significant interest from global financial markets (International Monetary
Fund, 2008), mostly due to its large oil production and oil exports. Nigeria is not a
typical developing African economy, as oil plays a dominant role in providing
exports and has pushed agriculture, the traditional mainstay of African economies, to
the background (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, 2008). Oil spills have
exacerbated poverty through the destruction of land and food crops and water
pollution (Nwilo and Badejo, 2006).

Since the late 1970s, the fluctuations in world petroleum prices (Falola and Heaton,
2008) have contributed to economic instability. Since independence this economic
instability has led to high unemployment levels (Falola and Heaton, 2008). On the
other hand, despite increasing poverty and lack of employment opportunity, since its
return to civilian rule Nigeria has paid off almost all its external debt and had real
GDP growth, reaching an exceptional peak of 10.4% in 2003 and remaining between
5.5% to 6.5% in subsequent years (EIU, Country Profile, 2008).

3.2.4 Nigeria in summary

Although the growth of the oil economy has brought massive revenues, the potential
for economic growth and sustainable development has been unrealised because of the
mismanagement of these revenues (Falola and Heaton, 2008). For most Nigerians,
there is no electricity, no clean water, no medicine and no schools (UNDP, 2011).
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The World Bank categorises Nigeria as a fragile state5, “beset by the risk of armed
conflict, epidemic disease and failed governance” (World Bank, 2007, n.p.). Adesnik
(2007, p.18) notes that the “paradox is that oil generates enough wealth to provoke
lasting and violent conflicts, but not enough to raise the nation out of poverty and
misrule”. This thesis therefore provides a window to understand this paradox of oil,
wealth and MNCs.

3.3 Shell as a multinational corporation
Royal Dutch Shell plc (Shell) is a group of companies engaged in the exploration,
production, marketing and transportation of oil, natural gas and petrochemicals
(Shell, 2011). Since its creation in 1907 Shell has played a key role in the global oil
industry (Howarth et al., 2007). The company is incorporated in the United
Kingdom, its executive offices are in the Netherlands, and it holds the number one
ranking in the Fortune 500, with revenues of US$484,489 million and profits of
US$30,918 for the year ending 2012 (Fortune Magazine, 2012). Shell operates in
more than 80 countries and explores oil in more than 28 different countries and
currently employs 90,000 people worldwide (Shell, 2013). According to Shell
(2011), the company produces 2% of the world’s oil; this makes Shell an important
MNC in terms of size, employment, geographical reach and economic contribution to
its host countries. In Nigeria, Shell operates through its wholly-owned subsidiary,
Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), an operating entity for the joint
venture between several oil companies and the Nigerian government. Although it

5

The World Bank defines fragile states as “low-income countries scoring 3.2 and below on the
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which is the primary tool used to assess the
quality of country policies” (World Bank, 2007, n.p.).
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may seem obvious or a foregone conclusion that Shell plays a significant role in
Nigeria, the significance of this will be understood further with insights from elite
theory (Chapter 4).

The majority of Shell’s oil spills occur in Nigeria, and these contribute to
environmental degradation (Holzer, 2007). Shell has also been linked to cases of
human-rights abuses against demonstrators (Corporate Human Rights Abuse, 2008).
These issues are mentioned here to demonstrate that Shell has also been implicated in
events in Nigeria concerning human rights, and has had considerable international
attention. However, while this is an important social issue, the focus in this thesis is
on oil-spill disclosures; the issues of pollution and human rights provide contextual
material. A detailed examination of the implications, either directly or indirectly by
comment or omission, is not within the ambit of this thesis.

3.3.1 Historical context - Shell in Nigeria
Shell’s oil spills in Nigeria (Appendix 1 lists the number of oil spills in Nigeria for
the period 2000-2010) are well-documented in the public domain via the company’s
corporate public disclosure, and also via other reporting mechanisms such as
alternative reports produced by non-government organisations (NGOs); and these
alternative reports are analysed in Chapter 7. The following sections provide a brief
history of Shell and its beginnings in Nigeria. This is then followed by Shell’s public
controversies and its operations in Nigeria.

Shell has had a long and controversial history in Nigeria, including: criticism for its
relationship with the previous military dictatorship; its alleged role in the Ogoni Nine
52

execution in 1995; and environmental destruction in the Niger Delta region (FoE,
2006). Okonta and Douglas (2003, p.52) note that “any Nigerian schoolchild will tell
you that Oloibiri, a small village in the Niger Delta (Nigeria), is where the first oil
well was struck by Shell in 1956”. This indicates Shell’s importance and its long and
well-recognised history in the country in general, and specifically in oil production.
The links between Shell and Nigeria go back to 1937, when Nigeria was still under
British colonial rule. This long history of Shell in Nigeria created an important
relationship, and for the purposes of this thesis the significance is understood through
the theoretical lens of elite theory.

Shell was the first company granted rights to start oil exploration and production in
Nigeria. Since Nigeria was a British colony until 1960, British oil companies were
given preferential treatment (Frynas, 1998). In 1938 Shell D’Arcy was “awarded the
sole concessionary rights covering the whole territory of Nigeria to prospect for oil”
(NNPC, 2008, n.p.). However, it was not until after 50 years of exploration that oil
was discovered in Nigeria in 1956, at Oloibiri, in the eastern Niger Delta region. The
discovery of commercially viable quantities of oil (Falola and Heaton, 2008) was
made by Shell-BP Development Company (a joint venture of Shell and British
Petroleum). Official production began two years later, and Nigeria became an oil
producer with its first oil field producing 5,100 barrels per day (NNPC, 2008).
According to NNPC (2008, n.p.) “this discovery opened up the oil industry in 1961,
bringing in Mobil, Agip, Safrap (now Elf), Tenneco (Texaco) and Amoseas
(Chevron) to join the exploration efforts in both offshore and onshore areas of
Nigeria”. Prior to this development, Shell had the monopoly of the oil industry in
Nigeria (NNPC, 2008).
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3.3.2 Shell, SPDC and the joint venture

Shell operates many joint ventures with national governments in the countries in
which it operates, and with other oil companies (Birley, 2005). Since 1973, Shell in
Nigeria operates through its wholly-owned subsidiary the SPDC (Shell, 2012). SPDC
is the operator of a joint venture with Shell owning 30%, Total Exploration and
Production Nigeria Limited (TEPNG) 10% and Nigerian Agip Oil Company limited
(NAOC) 5% 6(Shell, 2013). Shell’s subsidiary SPDC is the operating entity for
Nigeria’s largest oil and gas joint venture with these MNCs and the governmentowned NNPC, which holds the remaining 55% interest in the JV (Shell, 2013). The
following Figure 3.1 represents the structure of the joint venture.

6

Shell is “clearly responsible for all operations of SPDC as agreed through the Joint Operating
Agreement (JOA) with the three other partners” (Steiner, 2010, p.42).
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Shell Plc

100%
Nigerian
Government

SPDC
(Operating entity for the
joint venture)

100%

30%

55%
NNPC

Joint
Venture

10%
Total

5%
Agip

Figure 3.1: Joint venture arrangement with SPDC as the operating and
reporting entity

Shell’s corporate structure is more complicated than that of many MNCs as there are
hundreds of Shell entities (Frynas, 2003). Okonta and Douglas (2003, p.43) note
that:
Shell has grown constantly, diversifying its holdings, stretching its tentacles
to virtually all countries in the world, and decentralizing its operations to such
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an extent that even some of the company’s senior managers run into difficulty
trying to explain precisely how Royal Dutch Shell functions.

Like the other major oil-producing companies, such as ExxonMobil and BP, Shell is
a vertically integrated oil company that conducts oil exploration and production,
transportation, refining crude oil and, finally, sales to end-consumers (Frynas, 2003).

From its inception, SPDC has been described as one of the most important privately
owned companies in Nigeria (Okonta and Douglas, 2003). SPDC can produce an
average of one million barrels of oil per day (Steiner, 2010; Shell, 2013), which is
approximately “40% of the country’s oil from over 1,000 onshore wells in the Niger
Delta, an area nearly the size of England” (Shell, 2008, p. 20). This makes SPDC the
largest oil producer in Nigeria, with operations in the Niger Delta - spread across
some “30,000 square kilometres and incorporating a network of over 6,000
kilometres of flowlines and pipelines, 90 oil fields, 1,000 producing wells, 73 flow
stations, eight gas plants and two major oil-export terminals” (at Bonny and
Forcados) (Shell, 2008a, n.p.). Figure 3.2 demonstrates its geographical spread.
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Figure 3.2: Map of Niger Delta region indicating Shell’s oil operations (SPDC,
2001, p.9)
SPDC also contributes around 9% of Shell’s global oil and gas production (Shell,
2009). Financially, the joint venture between Shell and the government appears to be
successful; however, Okonta and Douglas (2003, p.50) argue that it is difficult to
determine the exact revenue, since
[t]he company shrouds the financial side of its operations in Nigeria in
mystery, using an elaborate cover of misleading statistics, vague statements,
and sometimes outright hostility, to ward off prying eyes.
For the Nigerian government, oil production through the joint venture provides
multibillion-dollar payments in royalties and taxes (Shell, 2006). For example, in
2008 the Nigerian government received payments in royalties and taxes from Shell
of US$4.1 billion (Shell, 2008). Shell considers their Nigerian operations to be “one
of the most difficult places where Shell companies do business” (Shell, 2012, n.p.),
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citing controversial and contextual events as one reason for this difficulty. This thesis
focuses on one such controversial event, oil spills.

3.3.3 Public controversies
Shell’s activities have been publicly scrutinised and criticised: some would say more
than any other large MNC (Frynas, 2003). For example, in the 1970s and 1980s Shell
faced criticism over its investments in South Africa and breaking oil sanctions
imposed on Rhodesia (Frynas, 2003). Also, during the mid-1990s, Shell came under
intense public pressure from two events that ‘galvanised public opinion’ (Frynas,
2003). The first was the “company’s controversial decision to ‘dump’ the Brent Spar
floating oil-storage platform7 in the North Sea” (Frynas, 2003, p.275.). This decision
caused international outrage and controversy. The second was the execution by the
Nigerian government of Ken Saro-Wiwa, a leader of the Ogoni people (an ethnic
minority of about 500,000 people who have been suffering from oil spills and other
harmful side-effects of oil production with no financial compensation for any of the
damages) and a campaigner against Shell’s Nigerian operations (Frynas, 2003). SaroWiwa organised mass protests against Shell to reform its operations in Nigeria
(Frynas, 2003). The protesters “demanded that Shell take responsibility for its
massive environmental devastation of Ogoni’s homeland and denounced the
injustices that Shell has inflicted on the Ogoni and other peoples in Niger Delta”
(Shell Accountability Coalition, 2007, p.14).

7

Greenpeace International criticised Shell’s plans to sink the Brent Spar, as the storage facility
contained harmful substances. While Greenpeace occupied the Brent Spar in the North Sea, public
protests took place elsewhere; they were strongest in Germany, where Shell faced a major decline in
petrol sales (Frynas, 2003, p.278).
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Frynas (2003, p.278) argues:
[the] Nigerian government staged a show trial against Saro-Wiwa and eight
other Ogoni leaders on pre-fabricated charges and Saro-Wiwa and eight other
Ogoni’s were hanged on November 10 1995 in Port Harcourt Prison.

Furthermore, Okonta and Douglas (2003) allege that Shell bribed two witnesses to
testify against Saro-Wiwa. Shell has consistently denied these allegations; however,
according to Okonta and Douglas (2003), the company has not provided evidence to
substantiate its denial. Shell has used its corporate-media disclosures, as well as
stating on their web site:
In the coverage of the trial and death of Ken Saro-Wiwa emotional charges of
environmental devastation have been laid at the door of Shell Nigeria. We
recognise that there are environmental problems in the area. Some have also
argued that [Shell] should use its influence with the [Nigerian] regime to
force it to respect human rights and release political prisoners (Campbell and
Beck, 2004 p.107)
According to Corporate Human Rights Abuse (2008, n.p.), “Shell was intimately
involved in developing the Nigerian government’s strategy leading to the unlawful
execution of the Ogoni Nine”8. In 1996, the Centre for Constitutional Rights (CCR)
began a series of cases against Shell, to hold the company accountable for these
human rights violations (Corporate Human Rights Abuse, 2008). These controversies
are presented here, to demonstrate that public condemnation of Shell has been
ongoing. Further, it drew this researcher’s attention to Shell’s oil spills, and raised
questions such as: given the protracted public outcry, to what extent is Shell
accountable for its oil spills and why are they still occurring?

8

The Ogoni Nine were a group of nine activists from the Ogoni region of Nigeria, including Ken
Saro-Wiwa, executed by hanging in 1995 by the military government at the time.
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Both incidents in the 1990s, the Brent Spar and Ken Saro-Wiwa crises, damaged
Shell’s image and reputation. Accordingly, and not surprisingly, since 1995 “Shell
has reappraised its place in the international political economy and put more
emphasis on exchanges with civil society and local communities” (Frynas, 2003,
p.280) and introduced many internal reforms that reflected the “company’s newly
found interest in engaging with stakeholders and social responsibility” (Frynas, 2003,
p.280). For example, in 1997 Shell committed itself to contributing to sustainable
development, fundamental human rights, and made this commitment a part of the
general business principles in all Shell companies globally (Shell, 1997; Frynas,
2003).

In 1997, Shell began reporting publicly on its social and environmental performance.
Their first report, Profits and Principles – Does There Have To Be A Choice (Doyle,
2002), focussed on how Shell was “living up to its financial, social and
environmental responsibilities, with some focus on Nigeria” (Doyle, 2002, p.178).
This signalled an important emphasis on accountability, and now raises questions
about whether the report was mere rhetoric, obfuscating continued environmental
transgression in the form of oil spills. These public controversies provide the context
to analyse the discourse of oil spills via public-accountability mechanisms such as
corporate social and environmental reports and annual reports.

3.3.4 Oil spills in Nigeria
Despite the relatively short history of Nigeria’s oil industry, it has resulted in similar
environmental issues to those in countries where oil operations have been established
for longer (Ogri, 2001).

In 2011 a UN Environment Program reported that
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Ogoniland, Nigeria, will be the site of the biggest oil-spill clean-up in history (United
Nations Environment Programme, 2011). According to AI (2009) ‘there are a
number of reasons cited for the occurrence of oil spills in Nigeria, including
corrosion of oil pipes, poor maintenance of infrastructure, spills and leaks during
refinery processing, human error and deliberate vandalism (sabotage) and theft of
oil’. Oil spills have occurred in different parts of Nigeria and at different times. For
example, between 1976 and 1998 a total of 5,724 incidents and 2,571,113.90 barrels
of oil was spilled into the environment (Nwilo and Badejo, 2001; Steiner, 2010).
From 1997-2001, Nigeria has publicly reported more than 2,097 oil spills (Nwilo and
Badejo, 2005). This suggests that the number and frequency of incidents have
increased over the years. According to Nwilo and Badejo (2005), the most fatal
incident, the Jesse Fire Incident in 1998, claimed ‘thousand lives’ due to the spillage
of 40,000 barrels of oil at one of Shell’s refineries. Further, according to a report by
Niger Delta Natural Resource Damage Assessment and Restoration Project, it is
estimated that 9-13 million barrels (1.5 million tons) of oil have been spilt in the
Niger Delta over a 50-year period, which is 50 times the amount spilled by the Exxon
Valdez in Alaska in 1989 (Shell Accountability Coalition, 2007; Steiner, 2010).

Oil spills are the primary cause of environmental damage, including air, land and
water pollution, soil degradation and deforestation (Eweje, 2006). Major oil spills in
Nigeria have also contaminated “marine shorelines, causing severe localised
ecological damage to the near-shore community”, with large areas of the mangrove
ecosystem destroyed (Nwilo and Badejo, 2001, n.p.). In addition, the drinking water
is also polluted, and there are significant effects on fishing and farming (Nwilo and
Badejo, 2001) and the health and food security of rural people living near oil
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facilities (FoE, 2002a). Ikuroma Samipe, fisherwoman and mother of five children
(FoE, 2002a, p.24), states:
When oil spills here, those of us who go to the mangrove forest to harvest
periwinkle and other sea foods suffer. The crude oil affects the growth and
development of the mangrove forest resources such as periwinkles, oysters
and crabs. When the river is polluted they all die.
Apart from the environmental damage, people have lost their lives due to oilspillage-related explosions at some of the refineries (Johanson, 2008).

In addition to the water and land pollution, the air quality has also been greatly
affected (Ogri, 2001). According to Ogoni minority-group leaders, many of the
companies’ gas flares are located near villages and in close proximity of Ogoni
homes (Eweje, 2006). They argue that oil companies have been flaring gas in their
villages 24 hours a day since 1958, and that it affects plant life and pollutes the air
and surface water (Eweje, 2006). Flaring in the Niger Delta is said to contribute to a
considerable percentage of world’s total greenhouse-gas emissions (Eweje, 2006).

3.3.5 Public awareness

As indicated above, there is significant public awareness of Shell and its operations
in Nigeria, mainly due to heightened international media attention. During the last
decade, environmental reports produced by the World Bank as well as by
environmental agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
Friends of the Earth International (FoE) and the World Wide Fund for Nature
(WWF) have focussed global attention on oil spills. The disclosure of the volume
and number of oil spills by Shell in Nigeria has been questioned by many NGOs. For
example, Greenpeace alleges that Shell’s records do not include the large number of
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minor spills that occur daily that are not usually taken into account in a rough
estimation (Okonta and Douglas, 2003). Omeje (2005, p.328) further argues that
there are ‘legal and public-relations advantages’ to underreport the number of oil
spills.

According to AI (2009, p.15) “both local and international environmental experts
claim that the system for reporting of oil spills in the Niger Delta has been
completely dysfunctional for decades, and that the figures provided by the companies
and reported by DPR do not reflect the full scale of oil spillage”. This is further
supported by Steiner (2010, p.12), who claims that:
[o]il spills in the Niger Delta have been extensive, difficult to assess, and
dramatically under-reported. Reasons for this under-reporting include
difficulty in accessing some spill sites (due to swamp conditions and
remoteness), security concerns limiting access, some spills occurring away
from community locations, a long time-lag between the initiation of a spill
and its detection, the high volatility of the oil causing an estimated 50% to
evaporate within 24-48 hours, intentional company and government
underreporting, and inadequate government oversight.
At the beginning of the period of this study it was reported that most of the oil pipes
and tanks were very old and lacked regular inspection and maintenance (Nwilo and
Badejo, 2001; Steiner, 2010). According to ‘international standards, oil pipes should
be replaced after 15 to 20 years; however, most pipelines in use in Nigeria are 20 to
25 years old, making them subject to corrosion and leakage’ (Nwilo and Badejo,
2004, n.p.). As a result, thousands of barrels of oil have been spilled into the
environment, although oil companies maintain that sabotage is the main cause of oil
spills (Amnesty International, 2009). Companies assert a range of reasons to focus on
sabotage, including the capacity for an MNC to control the debate surrounding oil
spills. Accordingly, this public debate is important and constitutes the empirical
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material for this thesis, including Shell’s corporate discourse (Chapter 6) and
alternative or counter-narratives (Chapter 7).

3.3.6 Shell’s oil spills in Nigeria

As a result of SPDC operations, 61% of the total volume of reported oil spills by the
Shell Group occurred within the period 1998-2009 (Steiner, 2010). Shell has
documented, on average, 250 spills each year, of which 97% of the volume spilled is
claimed to be sabotage (Shell, 2010).

Even without oil spills, the infrastructure has the potential to cause difficulties for
farmers in the densely populated rural areas (Amnesty International, 2009). Poor
maintenance is often cited by NGOs as a major reason for oil spills. However, Shell
offers a different explanation for oil spills and this forms an important part of its
public discourse (Chapter 6).

3.3.7 Shell and sabotage

The number of oil spills disclosed by Shell in the course of its operations (Appendix
1) has increased from year to year. Shell and SPDC attribute the majority of the oil
spills to sabotage and illegal bunkering (theft) by local community members (Steiner,
2010). For the period 2000-2010, Shell publicly disclosed more than 2,000 oil spills.
According to Steiner (2010, p.6) “local communities assert that most of the spills are
caused by inadequate maintenance and integrity standards of the oil pipelines”.
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Professor Claude Ake, a former Shell employee9 who sponsored the Niger Delta
Environmental Survey, also dismissed “Shell’s claim of sabotage as irresponsible,
arguing that it is in fact the local communities who go out of their way to clean up
the oil spills” (Okonta and Douglas, 2003, p.72). Moreover, there have been more
than 500 oil-spill-related cases filed against Shell in Nigerian courts (Nwachukwu,
2011). According to AI (2013,n.p.),
[o]ver the last decade, Shell has claimed that most of the oil spilt in the Niger
Delta is due to sabotage of its pipelines on the basis of a system that includes
publicly contested data and relies almost exclusively on information provided
by the company itself. The alleged sabotage cases have not been verified by
any independent bodies. Moreover, some of Shell’s statements on the
percentage of oil spilt due to sabotage are contradictory.
The claims of sabotage are in Shell’s “financial interest to release them from the
legal responsibility to clean up spills or compensate the local communities” (Steiner,
2010, p.6). Although Shell claims that oil spills are due to sabotage by local
communities in order for the saboteurs to claim compensation (Shell, 2010),
alternative reports produced by FoE (2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2006), Amnesty
International (2009) and several Nigerian court cases have challenged these claims.
This thesis explores these contradictions through an interrogation of public
disclosures in Shell’s reports and alternative reports of FoE and AI, using elite theory
and critical discourse analysis.
3.4 Summary
This chapter introduced the context within which Shell, an MNC, operates within
Nigeria, a developing country. Nigeria’s history, politics and economy have been
briefly described in relation to the oil industry in general and oil spills in particular.
Shell, through its subsidiary SPDC, has a dominant presence in Nigeria; this will be
9

Appointed as a commissioner by Royal Dutch/Shell on an environmental project in the Niger Delta.
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further explored in the thesis through the lens of elite theory. Since the thesis
explores corporate public disclosures of oil spills in Nigeria, this chapter has
presented a broad socio-political and historical setting for an analysis of corporate
narratives. The following chapter presents elite theory as the theoretical framework
to support the textual analysis.
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CHAPTER 4: ELITE THEORY

4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 presented the history of Shell and its operations in Nigeria, as the
background for this thesis. Given the nature of the relationship between Shell and
Nigeria, this chapter conceptualises a theoretical framework of corporate power elites
to investigate corporate narrative disclosures in accountability discourses where these
unique power and economic asymmetries exist. Elite theory, which is informed by
the work of Mills (1956), Etzioni (1993), Bottomore (1993; 1991) and van Dijk
(1993b), explicitly identifies the dominance of powerful and influential groups in
society, including corporate elites. The main thrust of elite theory is that power,
control and influence are concentrated in and confined to a small number of elite
groups (Arslan, 2005). Some corporations operate with enough power to dominate to
distinguish them as part of an ‘elite’. Elites influence social and cultural practices
through various media, including disclosures in cultural artefacts such as annual
reports, sustainability reports or corporate social reports.

The next section discusses elites in general, followed by a background of elite theory
to clarify the underlying concepts and constructs of a corporate elite. Later in the
chapter, this concept is extended to power elites and applied to Shell in the context of
its operations in Nigeria. The final sections explicate the relationship between power
and discourse.

67

4.2 Defining elites
This section analyses the various characteristics used to define elites. There is a
range of definitions of the concept of elite (Farazmand, 1999); the definitions
examined in this section are notable examples within the extant literature that allow a
conceptual application of corporate elites in the context of a developing country.

The term ‘elite’, originally derived from the Latin eligere, ‘to choose’, has been used
to describe “commodities of particular excellence” (Bottomore, 1996, p.1); and
superior social groups (Bottomore, 1996). The Oxford Dictionary (2012, n.p.)
similarly defines elites as a “group of people considered to be the best in a particular
society or category, especially because of their power, talent, or wealth”. According
to Domhoff and Dye (1987, p.220), elites are an “inevitable feature of all societies”.
They have an important role in terms of economic, political and social power and, as
Figueroa (2008) notes, are an important feature of most social systems. Since they
hold such a powerful and influential position in society, studies of elites and their
ability to wield power also exposes inequality (Marcus, 1983).

Based on the various definitions of elites, different models and constructs have
developed as frames of analysis (Farazmand, 1999). Table 4.1 lists important
definitions of the concept of elites from the early 1930s to current critical theorists
such as van Dijk.
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Table 4.1: Different Definitions of Elites
Author(s)
Pareto (1935)
Mosca (1939, p.50)

Michels (1939)
Mills (1956, pp.3-4)

Suleiman (1978)

Field and Highley (1980,
p.20)

Merger (1981,p.368)

Van Dijk (1993b, p.146)

Bodley (1999, p.596)

Definition
“Elites are those who are most capable in any area of
activity”.
“In all societies from less developed to the most
advanced, two classes of people appear, a class that
rules and a class that is ruled...the class that rules is few,
whereas the second, the more numerous class, is
directed at and controlled by the first, in a manner that
is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary
and violent”.
All organisations are elitist.
Extends the notion of elites to power elites who are
composed of individuals whose “positions enable them
to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men
and women; they are in positions to make decisions that
have major consequences”.
“All those who occupy positions of authority are part of
the elite. Most of the definitions in the literature equate
elite status with the incumbency of key organizational
or institutional positions” (Suleiman 1978, in Domhoff
and Dye, 1987).
“Elites are the persons who occupy strategic positions
in public and private bureaucratic organizations, e.g.
governments, parties, militaries, productive enterprises,
trade union and other occupational organizations, as
well as media, religious and educational organizations”.
Elites are those who “occupy the society’s top positions
of power and wealth...[and] who exercise authority,
influence, and control of resources within the society’s
important organizations”. Within this definition are
elites such as governmental, corporate, educational, and
others.
“Those elites who literally have everything ‘to say’ in
society, as well as their institutions and organizations,
are an example of groups involved in power abuse or
domination”.
Elites are defined as “those social groups at the top of
any rankable social-power scale. The rankable scale
includes various types of assets, such as economic or
social”.

Table 4.1 demonstrates that two broad concepts of elites emerge. First, individuals
are described as particular elites; and second, particular institutions are considered as
elites. Early elite theorists such as Pereto (1935) and Mosca (1939) focussed on
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defining individuals as elites. Pareto (1935) ‘introduced the term into the social
sciences and defined elites as a class of people most capable in any area of activity’
(Abbink and Salverda, 2012 p.31). Similarly, Mosca (1939) argued that there will
always be always two classes of people; those who ‘rule’ and those who are ‘ruled’.
According to Field and Highley (1980, p.18) these early elite theorists contended
“not only that elite rule is inherent and inescapable in all societies, but that elites are
essentially unlimited and unchecked”. In other words, their basic contention was that
elites are an “inevitable feature of all societies” (Domhoff and Dye, 1987, p.220).

Mills’s (1956) concept of elites first describes individuals, and then moves to
government and similar institutions prior to the development and establishment of
the concept of power elites (Section 4.3.1). Theorists such as van Dijk (1993b) and
Merger (1981) have extended this idea into different elite organisations such as
political, corporate, academic, educational and media elites. Bodley (1999) has
further extended the concept by adding an economic aspect to the definition of elites.

Van Dijk (1993), a critical discourse theorist, introduced the concept of elites in his
studies on discourse and racism (see, for example, van Dijk, 1993b, 1996) and
provided an insight into ‘what is said’ by elites in public documents. While van Dijk
(1993) focuses on the reproduction of racism, these insights accommodate and are
compatible with the focus on public discourse and the discursive construction of the
‘other’ in representations and disclosures of oil spills. In this thesis, corporations, as
institutional elites, are conceptualised as having power and prestige that is
operationalised in accountability discourses (Section 4.3.2).
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Elites “come in many forms and express themselves in an extraordinary variety of
ways” (Masamichi, 2007, p.1). However, despite the differences all elite theorists
agree on one characteristic: that elites are either powerful individuals with powerful
positions or powerful institutions, including corporations that are in a position to
make influential decisions. Put simply, “the elite are those who have the most of
what there is to have, which is generally held to include money, power, and prestige
and the ways of life to which these lead” (Mills, 1956, p.9). This is further supported
by Marcus (1983), who points out that the term ‘elite’ has remained a flexible cover
term that refers to the rich, powerful and privileged in any society. As society has
become more complex, the definition of elites has developed. For the purposes of
this thesis, elites will be defined as:
[t]hose who hold institutionalised power, control the social resources and
have a serious influence (either actively or potentially) on the decisionmaking process (Arslan, 2005, p.3).

In this thesis corporations are conceptualised as institutional elites that have
economic, political and social power and prestige. This concept is applied to Shell
not only as an MNC, but as an elite MNC that has a special relationship in Nigeria
that gives rise to access to resources of power. In the context of this thesis Shell
holds the institutional power, has control of social resources and has influence in the
decision-making process of corporate narrative disclosures and the discursive
construction of the meaning of oil spills (Chapters 6 and 7). For van Dijk (1993b,
p.44) “the power resources of elites may be multiple and include property, income,
decision control, knowledge, expertise, position, rank, as well as social and
ideological resources such as status, prestige, fame, influence, respect, and similar
resources ascribed to them by groups, institutions, or society at large” (see for
example, Mills, 1956; Bottomore, 1964; Domhoff, 1978). These resources and power
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give access to control and this type of control is usually, according to van Dijk
(1993b, p.44), “explicitly implemented by decision making, use of special speech
acts and discourse genres (e.g., commands, orders, advice, analyses, and all forms of
public discourse), and other forms of action that directly or indirectly influence the
actions of others”. This is particularly relevant in this thesis, as the focus is on
narrative disclosures and accountability of ascribed meaning to oil spills. According
to van Dijk (1993b, p.44), this type of “control is usually in the interest of the elites
themselves”; Chapter 6 discusses this issue further.

In summary, the term elite appears to be ‘descriptive’ (Prewitt and Stone, 1973, p.2),
as it holds that all societies can be divided into those who rule and those who are
ruled (Prewitt and Stone, 1973). However, as this section illustrated, there are
numerous definitions and perspectives on elites that accommodate a range of
contexts and concepts where the powerful are given elite status. The following
section draws on the concept of the elite to introduce elite theory.

4.3 Background to elite theory
Elite theory is associated with the writings of sociologists Robert Michels (1929;
1939), Gaetano Mosca (1939) and Vilfredo Pareto (1968) during the late 19th and
beginning of the 20th century (Marcus, 1983). According to Marcus (1983, p.13),
“although many historical and philosophical accounts have unselfconsciously
assumed the determinative social role of elites, the body of theory most explicitly
linked to the elite concept was independently developed by these three scholars”.
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Elite theory emerged, in part, as a response to Marxism. Elite theorists argue that a
class struggle exists in every society, and have rejected the property/class theory of
power and the Marxist idea of a classless society (Domhoff, 2005). Elite theory, on
the other hand, claims that the history of all society is the history of elite struggles
(Prewitt and Stone, 1973). A distinguishing feature of elite theory is that it is based
on the study of power and the influence of different classes, and the inequalities that
arise from a lack of power (Arslan, 2005). This power, in turn, is based on resources
such as economic assets and monetary wealth, which may give rise to control over
other resources. According to Arslan (2006, p.2):
elite theory is one of the major theories which aims to analyse and explain the
power structure and power relations. It investigates power and control and
aims to analyse elite and non-elite (mass, public) differentiation.
The non-elite or the mass/public in this thesis are identified as the Nigerian
communities affected by oil production generally, and oil spills specifically, and that
lack access to power resources.
Following the early elite theorists, there was a later critical adaption of elite theory
generally associated with American thinkers such as Mills (1956), Domhoff (1967)
and Bottomore (1964, 1996). Mills (1956), for example, incorporated the notion of
‘minorities’ and ‘power’ into an elite theory that deals with the “minority in whose
hands power, wealth or privilege is concentrated” (Mills, 1956, p.9). He also asserted
that societal power rests with key institutions, including corporations, executive
branches of government, the economy, the state and the military. In other words, a
“highly-concentrated number of ‘elites’ control most of the wealth, most of the
power and most of the privilege in society – and use this wealth, power and privilege
to influence the decisions of government” (Mills, 1956, p.9). In this thesis this aspect
of influencing governments is an important feature, as the Nigerian government has
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an economic relationship with Shell and its joint venture SPDC (Chapter 3).
Bottomore (1964, 1996) proposed a theoretical framework premised on the
assumption that while elites exist in every society, there is and must be a small group
- the elite - that has more power than the majority.
Bottomore’s (1993; 1991) framework reinforces Mill’s (1956) assumption that
societies are divided into the ‘few’ who hold power and rule and the ‘many’ who are
ruled. The elites “effectively monopolise power and the non-elites public or the
masses have relatively no power and no choice but to accept the decision of the
minorities” (Arslan, 2005, p.3).
Domhoff (1967) introduced a governing-class model to the framework of elite
theory. Domhoff (1967) applied this concept to the US, arguing that there was a
corporate upper class that ‘owns and controls the bulk of wealth’. According to
Domhoff (1967), this class, by virtue of its economic power is part of the elite. Both
Bottomore and Domhoff open elite theory to incorporate the notion of a corporate
elite, such as an MNC that assumes a powerful role in society through economic
resources, with the ability to use these resources to direct communication and media.
Etzioni (1993, p.19) added to elite theory by focussing on the resources related to
elites so that power, in turn, is based on “other resources such as economic assets and
organisational strength and for its part may give rise to control over other resources
as well” (Arslan, 2006, p.2).

In their eagerness to challenge the Marxist paradigm, elite theorists contend that elite
rule is ubiquitous in all societies, and is essentially unchecked, except by the actions
and effects of the elite themselves (Field and Highley, 1980). Therefore, an elitists
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paradigm holds that elites determine important social change (Field and Highley,
1980).

Elite theorists point to the existence of elites in society’s most influential institutions,
including large corporations (Brym and Lie, 2009); this is discussed further in
Section 4.3.2. According to elite theory, those who ‘control these institutions make
the important decisions that affect all members of society’ (Brym and Lie, 2009).
However, while elite theorists seek to understand and explain dominance over
economic resources, this thesis investigates the particular resource of language
through accounting disclosures and the relationship between discourse and the
broader political economy. The application of elite theory as a framework to
understand accounting discourse provides new insights to the accounting literature.
The following section follows the development of a power elite to a corporate elite,
and offers a discussion of elite discourse.

4.3.1 Power elites

Mills (1956) conceptualised the notion of power elite and argued that they occupy
what he terms the ‘top command’ posts of society. This power elite includes
business, political and military elites. In the context of this thesis it is business elites,
more specifically corporate elites, that are of interest. However, Shell as a corporate
elite is in a complicated relationship with the political elite the Nigerian government.
Mills (1956) proposed that societal power rests in the control of key societal
institutions, including corporations. For Mills (1956), organisations are instruments
of domination, and the elite, including business corporations, occupy positions where
their decisions have major consequences even on the nation as a whole.
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Van Dijk (1993b, p.255 emphasis in original) argues that:
[t]his social, political and cultural organization of dominance also implies a
hierarchy of power: some members of dominant groups and organizations
have a special role in planning, decision-making and control over the
relations and processes of the enactment of power.
In this thesis the concept of elites is defined in terms of institutional position (Mills,
1956), and is applied to Shell as an MNC because of its institutional position in
Nigeria. Mills (1956) has stated that the power elites are controllers of the major
hierarchies and organisations that make up modern society. They run large
corporations, the military establishment, and claim wealth, power and celebrity status
within the social structure (Mills, 1956). These concepts are more comprehensively
explained and applied in the following section on corporate elites and Shell in
particular.

While the power elite make the important decisions, Mills (1956) cautions that, in the
process, they often must take into account other forces outside the elite, and
sometimes influence others, particularly politicians for their benefit. Power elites
derive their power from controlling powerful positions in major institutions. Mills
(1956, p.9) further notes that “no one, accordingly, can be truly powerful unless they
have access to the command of major institutions, for it is over these institutional
means of power that the truly powerful are, in the first instance, powerful”. Such
institutional power held by the “major owners and executives of the larger
corporations” (Mills, 1956, p.9) is of interest in this thesis.

Elites agree on the basic outlines of the “free-enterprise system, including profits,
private property, the unequal and concentrated distribution of wealth, and the sanctity
of private economic power” (Barham, 2010, p.184). More importantly, they are
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united in their belief that the primary responsibility of government is to maintain a
favourable climate for their business operations (Mills, 1956). The early version of
elite theory asserted by Mills (1956) still has relevance to Western capitalist societal
structures. However, for the purposes of this thesis, the society in Nigeria is different,
due in large part to its developing status.

Even though Mills’s (1956) framework was proposed many decades ago, it is still
one of the most used and referred-to frameworks when it comes to the notion of
elites and power elites. Critical discourse studies refer to this concept of elites
widely. For example, van Dijk (1993b) uses elite discourse and the concept of power
elites in his studies on discourse. Based on empirical studies, van Dijk (1993b)
demonstrates that elites play a primary role in the reproduction of ethnic dominance
and racism. Even though these are not the focus themes of this thesis, they are still
relevant as van Dijk in his studies uses-public discourse and ‘what is said’ by elites
to identify the ‘other’, the marginalised and the powerless in a specific context.

According to van Dijk (1993b, p.44) “elite power can be defined in terms of the type
or amount of control elites have over their actions”. Van Dijk’s (1993b) use of elite
theory and its explicit reference to public discourse make elite theory very applicable
to this thesis. In Chapter 5 elite theory and its relationship to CDA is further
explained.

Mills’s (1956) description of power elites emerged from a study on individuals in
institutionalised positions of power, in which he found that power resulted from
access to economic resources through positions of prestige. While this observation
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was relevant to Western society in the 1950s, this context has altered dramatically
with the rise of the MNC and its increasing access to economic resources via a
globalised economy. The concept of a power elite, therefore, has shifted to the
corporate entity.

Farazmand (1999, p.325) points out that “almost all definitions of elite theory have
invariably stressed the word organization as a central means of exercising power by
those holding the elite power”. It then becomes important to acknowledge the
existence of corporate elites in our contemporary society and the prominent role of
large MNCs, which are considered elites. Robinson (2011) suggests that the
composition of ‘capitalist classes and elites in developing countries has been altered
mainly by capitalist globalisation’. Subsequently, the “spread of transnational circuits
of accumulation present elites in developing countries with new opportunities to
pursue their class and group interests by reinserting local economic activity that they
manage as segments of globalized circuits” (Robinson, 2011, p.356).

4.3.2 Corporations as elites
The elite theory of organisations is “interdisciplinary and concerned with allocation,
distribution, and exercise of power and the consequential conflicts and decisions that
may arise from those activities in organizations” (Farazmand, 1999, p.336).
Farazmand (1999) notes that research into the organisational elite rather than the
individual elite did not received enough attention in organisational research. This is
also the case in accounting studies, which is surprising given the amount of current
literature that focuses on the corporation as an institution. This thesis largely takes
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corporations as elites and explores the consequences of that power in terms of
dominant discourse.

Corporations play a very important role in the globalised economy and have become
ubiquitous in many societies, especially in societies described as developed. Due to
the fast growth and development of globalisation, the majority of the wealth in the
world is owned by corporations. This wealth allows corporations to influence the
social, political and economic domains in which it operates. Because of such wealth
and economic presence in studies of elites, business corporations play a prominent
role (Domhoff, 1978; Mills, 1956), as they have shown to wield increasing power,
not only economically or financially, but also in political, social and cultural affairs
(Mattelart, 1979; Schiller, 1989). Accordingly, Farazmand (1999, pp.328-329) states
that “organizations, public or private, are instruments of class domination,
exploitation, and control for the purpose of maintaining and enhancing the capitalist
system controlled by the ruling class”. In the elite model explained previously, the
“centrality of key organizations and their position holders is emphasized as a
necessary institutional mechanism through which elites act and exercise power”
(Farazmand, 1999, p.335). They then become dominant institutions in society.

In developing countries MNCs play a central role and hold a dominant position,
especially in terms of economic contributions to the host countries. In the context of
this thesis, MNCs in the oil industry play an important role in terms of tax revenue,
employment and economic development in general. This thesis examines a MNC
from the perspective of elite theory as it brings attention to the relational powers of
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the corporation forged by accountability disclosures between an MNC and its
stakeholders.

This thesis builds on this notion of corporate control and monopolisation of
economic and financial resources, which gives it the opportunity for power and
control using its corporate disclosures. In terms of material resources such as
economic and financial resources, wealth and societal positions of leadership are
complemented by resources that provide symbolic ‘power’; in particular their
‘preferential access to public discourse’ (van Dijk, 1993b). Due to this access to
material resources and public discourse, elites, including corporate elites, have the
opportunity to produce elite discourse. The corporate elite possesses a broad network
of influential relationships with different groups in society.

4.3.3 Shell as a corporate elite in Nigeria

Shell occupies the position of a corporate elite in Nigeria; this encompasses several
notions of elitism in terms of differentiated power. Definitionally, Shell is an
economic elite in the global oil industry, given its status as one of biggest and most
profitable oil corporations in the world (Chapter 3). To define Shell as a corporate
elite raises the issue of what counts as an elite, in both the oil industry and Nigeria
when various metrics and other indicators of influence abound. To begin
conceptualising Shell’s elite status, popular and academic convention is followed in
defining the largest as the Fortune 500 largest industrials and service firms (Davis et
al., 2003). Shell usually holds the number one or two ranking, with an annual income
of US$12.7 billion and a capital investment of US$31.7 billion (Shell, 2010). In
addition, on the Forbes (2012) list of the 2,000 global leading companies Shell is
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ranked as number four overall and number one in sales. This indicates Shell’s
economic power and wealth not just in the oil industry but across all sectors.

The usage of the term ‘corporate elite’ is here is to designate Shell’s status in terms
of economic power interwoven into political and social influences and dependency in
Nigeria. The main intent here is to show that Shell possesses such power and is large
and powerful enough to dominate corporate narrative disclosures on the phenomena
of oil spills in Nigeria. Not only is the status of Nigeria as a developing country
juxtaposed with Shell as an MNC, there is an added complexity in the relationship
between Shell and Nigeria. This added complexity relates to the joint venture SPDC
and the government.

As discussed in Chapter 3, Shell earns billions of dollars in oil revenues.
Consequently, the Nigerian government depends heavily on the taxes and royalties it
derives from oil companies, especially Shell, as the oil sector accounts for more than
80% of federal-government revenue (Shell, 2011), and Shell represents a high
percentage of the oil sector in Nigeria. Shell’s elite status in Nigeria is not just
economic but also political and social. These three components are interrelated
through the reporting entity, SPDC, and give rise and opportunity to Shell’s
economic, political and social power in Nigeria (Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1: Shell as an Elite in Nigeria
Shell’s elite status is manifested by the operations of SPDC, and is based on the
economic, social and political attributes described below. Shell’s political elite status
in Nigeria is established through its relationship to the government via the joint
venture SPDC. SPDC, although 100% owned by Shell, is the operating entity on
behalf of the joint venture between the government-owned Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation (55%), Shell (30%) and small shareholding interests by Total
Exploration and Production Nigeria Limited (TEPNG) (10%) and Nigerian Agip Oil
Company limited (NAOC) (5%) (Shell, 2012). According to Arslan (2006), power
elites work interdependently to coordinate a common interest. For example, political
elites rely on business elites for financial resources (Arslan, 2006), and business
elites need political elites to give them power. Shell and the Nigerian government
form a power elite: the government provides political power by allowing Shell to
operate in Nigeria and to hold the richest oil-producing fields in the Niger Delta.
Shell, in turn, provides financial resources. This relationship gives rise to the
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challenges of corporate oil-spill disclosures and notions of Shell’s accountability and
responsibility in Nigeria.

Shell’s economic elite status in Nigeria comes from the company’s economic
contribution through payments of taxes and royalties to the government, and also the
government’s 55% share in SPDC. Nigeria heavily depends on the oil industry, as it
is the source of 95% of export earnings and 80% of government revenue (Central
Intelligence Agency, 2012). According to Shell’s Sustainability Report (Shell, 2005,
p.26), during the 2005 financial period US$4.3 billion in taxes and royalties were
paid to the Nigerian government. In 2006 reported payments were US$3.5 billion
(Shell, 2006) and from 2007 to 2011, according to figures provided by Shell,
revenues from SPDC to the Nigerian government totalled $38 billion (Shell 2012a).
In 2003, with the permission of the Nigerian government, Shell became the first
company to publicly disclose the royalties, taxes and other payments made to its host
government (Shell, 2009) through the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
(EITI)10. Shell states: “to help improve accountability, we support a mandatory
global reporting rule for extractive industries in line with current EITI requirements,
and in support of the EITI goals” (Shell, 2012b,n.p.).

10

Shell is a founder and board member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
“The UK government launched this global initiative in 2002 to increase transparency in revenues that
governments receive from oil and mineral activities” (Shell, 2012b, n.p.). The EITI’s approach
includes countries, civil society and companies. Shell believes it remains the most effective way of
providing transparency in government revenues for countries that depend on energy resources for
income (Shell, 2012b).
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As a result of its strong economic and political status in Nigeria, Shell is also a social
elite. In addition to its political and economic contributions, Shell claims to generate
through its operations local jobs and contracts (Shell, 2009). In Nigeria, Shell
employs more than 4,500 people, emphasising that 95% are Nigerians with 66%
from the Niger Delta (Shell, 2012c). In addition, another “20,000 people are
employed indirectly through the network of companies that provide supplies and
services” (Shell, 2012c, n.p.).

Therefore, to say that Shell is a corporate elite in Nigeria is an understatement. Shell
holds an influential position in Nigeria, and forms an important part of an elite
relationship with the government. Shell has power in Nigerian society, as it owns and
manages large income-producing oil fields; this allows it to influence the Nigerian
power structure politically and economically. The historical development of Shell in
Nigeria demonstrates that from its earliest beginnings in the country, the company
was a privileged elite due to its British11 origins, and was one of the first companies
given the licence to operate in Nigeria and in the richest oil-producing fields.

Bottomore (1993, p.72) states that “there is no context that the idea of elites has been
invoked more frequently since the Second World War than in the discussions of the
problems and the prospects of the developing countries”. For example, anti-corporate
advocates criticise MNCs for entering countries that have ‘low human rights or low
environmental standards’ (Kallianiotis, 2013). They claim that multinationals ‘export
the profits, exploit countries for their natural resources, limit workers' wages, erode
traditional cultures, and challenge national sovereignty’ (Kallianiotis, 2013, p.112).

11

Nigeria is a former British colony.
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MNCs, according to Koenig‐Archibugi (2004, p.6), should be “accountable to the
general public mainly through the governments of the countries where the companies
conduct their activities”. While this may be desirable, the fast pace of globalisation
creates accountability gaps, especially in developing countries.

Elite corporations like Shell in Nigeria have power, wealth, status and privilege and
with this status comes increased stakeholder demand for public accountability. In an
accounting context this accountability is via corporate public discourse such as
annual reports, sustainability reports and other reporting mechanisms. This thesis
focuses on issues of power in corporate discourse by analysing Shell’s corporate
disclosures about a particular facet, oil spills in Nigeria. This power will be
explicated through the empirics of the public discourse about oil spills, as explained
in the following section.
4.4

Discourse and power

Inequalities in the distribution of power are common features of contemporary
society. This power inequality comes in many forms, including a lack of economic
and political power over the distribution of wealth. According to elite theorists this
inequality is manifested where societies are separated into the ‘few’ who hold power
and rule and the ‘many’ who are ruled (Bottomore, 1993, 1991). For example,
according to Podeh (1999, p.11):
Societal power is concentrated in elite groups who control resources of key
social institutions and are not accountable to the masses, origins of societal
power lie in control of social organizations, regardless of how (un)democratic
a society maybe, Elites hold the bulk of power; use all and any means to
retain power, power becomes end in itself.
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The notions of discourse and communication have an important power relationship
(e.g., Clegg, 1975, 1989; Lukes, 1974, 1986; Wrong, 1979). According to Oakes et
al. (1998), language and power are central to an understanding of control. Foucault
(1981 as in Maaka and Andersen, 2006, p.169) suggests that “not only is discourse
always implicated in power, discourse is one of the “systems” through which power
circulates”. Van Dijk (1993a, p.255) argues that “power and dominance are usually
organized and institutionalized” such that:
[The] social dominance of groups is thus not merely enacted, individually, by
its group members, as is the case in many forms of everyday racism or sexual
harassment. It may also be supported or condoned by other group members,
sanctioned by the courts, legitimated by laws, enforced by the police, and
ideologically sustained and reproduced by the media or textbooks (van Dijk,
1993a, p.255).
This notion of social dominance enacted by elites and legitimated by law is an
important concept to consider in the relationship between Shell and Nigeria. Shell’s
elite status in Nigeria is supported by the Nigerian government, which enables
Shell’s operations (this concept is further explored in Chapter 8). Due to mutually
beneficial oil exploration and its partnership with the Nigerian government, Shell’s
public discourse is implicitly supported by the Nigerian government.

Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p.91) argue that “power is always oppressive; it is used
by certain interest groups and imposed on passive subjects”. The elites, according to
van Dijk (2001) ‘initiate and control the most influential forms of institutional and
public text and talk’. This is enabled by the preferential access elites, including
corporate elites, have to media and other public discourses that can influence and
form the opinion-making of the non-elites (van Dijk, 1993b). As discourses possess
the power to control (van Dijk, 2001), organisations may engage in discourses to
influence stakeholder perception. In this thesis it is the notion of power and the issue
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of dominance through discursive representation of phenomena and control of
discourse that is of interest. This is further explored in Chapter 6.

4.5 Limitations of elite theory

According to van Dijk (1993b), the framework of elite theory is both complex and
multidisciplinary. It is complex as the term elite is classificatory and descriptive of
certain groups in our society. This description of a group as being elite depends on its
context, so an elite in one field may not be elite in another. For example, a priest may
be elite in a church but not in the political field. In an educational context, there are
prestigious universities and schools; in the business context there are corporations
that are superior to others; in the political context certain governments are more
influential than others, and so on. Elite theory can describe an individual, a group, or
an institution as elite.
Consistent with van Dijk’s (1993b) arguments, Farazmand (1999, p.330) challenges
assumptions of elite theory by calling them “vague and subject to divergent
perspectives on the concept of elite”. In this thesis this issue is addressed by
establishing Shell as corporate elite through looking at the political, economic and
social power it possesses in Nigeria. In addition, the first section of the chapter also
provided a number of definitions to develop a clearer understanding of the concept.

To advance the ideas within elite theory, according to Field and Highley (1980, p.3)
“it is not enough merely to argue, as Pereto, Mosca and Michaels do, that elites
always or usually exist and that they are probably of decisive importance”. This
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thesis therefore first established and demonstrated that Shell is an elite in global
industry and in Nigeria. The path undertaken to demonstrate Shell’s elite status
encompasses the economic, political and social importance of Shell’s operations in
Nigeria. In addition, elite theory offers and assumes an economic dimension to
power; i.e., the ability to garner resources to consolidate economic power. This thesis
extends this notion to include legislative and regulatory dimensions delivered
through corporate narrative disclosures.

Even though elite theory is developing and has some unclear concepts, in this thesis
the idea of corporate elites, in conjunction with the concepts of power and CDA,
contributes to understanding Shell’s corporate disclosures in Nigeria. Without the
notion of elites it would be much more difficult to determine why Shell discloses oil
spills the way it does (Chapter 6) and to establish the clearly elitist relationship
between the company and the government (Chapter 8).

4.6 Summary
This chapter presented the concept of elites and discussed ideas of elite theory. Elite’
small groups that have more power and wealth than non-elites have been identified in
many areas, such as business, politics, military and academia. It is the corporate elite,
however that is of interest in this thesis. Shell is differentiated as an elite institution
and forms a corporate power elite in Nigeria. Mills (1956) believed that corporate
executives and related officials form but one part of the power elite. There is a
perceived mutual interest between the political elite and large corporations. Mills
argued this in 1956, and more than 50 years on, this is even more evident, as
exemplified by a modern corporation, Shell, and its relationship with Nigeria.
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Using elite theory can have great importance within sociological studies “because
elites are the main agents of social change” (Arslan, 2006, p.1) especially in
developing countries. According to Arslan (2005, p.11), “they manage the direction,
the speed and the form of social change, because they hold institutional power and
influence social decisions on a macro level”. This is an enabling or emancipatory
concept where there is the potential for Shell, with its economic, political and social
power, to have a positive impact in Nigeria. Their operations and presence provide
employment and government revenue, for example. However, Nigeria is also mired
in poverty and environmental destruction, with a clearly unequal distribution of
resources.

According to Prewitt and Stone (1973, p.229) “elite theory raises the types of
questions that need to be addressed when debating the kind of society a nation
desires”. This thesis adopts contemporary elite theory because it concentrates on the
power and control of institutions, including corporations, and the impact of this
power in controlling and dominating the public discourse on accountability in
general, and oil spills in particular.

Elite theory therefore, informs, and contributes to discourse studies (van Dijk,
1993b). Elites are institutional and hierarchical, and have the resources of
institutional mechanisms such as accounting discourse to enact or exercise power. In
Nigeria this discourse is part of a ‘globalised circuit’ of Shell’s operation as an MNC.
In conjunction with CDA (discussed in the following chapter), elite theory illustrates
the role language plays in the discursive reproduction of power. The following
chapter introduces methodological considerations and CDA.
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CHAPTER 5: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

5.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the analytical framework for this thesis, critical discourse
analysis (CDA), and explains the reasons and significance for using a critical
methodology. The aim is to investigate Shell’s oil-spill disclosures in the context of a
developing country. Norman Fairclough’s12 (1989, 1992, 1995, 2001) framework of
CDA is used to study corporate disclosures, as it recognises that discourse is
complex. To disaggregate this complexity, he offers three levels of discourse
analysis: discourse as text, discourse as discursive practice and discourse as social
practice. Importantly, Fairclough’s framework encompasses a power dimension
within a broad social and political context, and therefore is compatible with elite
theory. The three levels of Fairclough’s CDA are concerned with how discourse is
presented, constituted and understood, although they are not definitive. As
Fairclough himself suggests, there is no one correct way of applying CDA; in this
thesis, these levels are structured as best fits the purpose and objectives, which are to
highlight and explicate the corporate discourse of an elite in a developing country.

The following sections present an explanation of critical discourse analysis,
including Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework. CDA is positioned within the

12

Fairclough’s Language and Power (1989) is considered among scholars to be the milestone
publication for the beginning of CDA (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000). Today, Fairclough is one of
the most cited and leading critical discourse theorists. Fairclough has published over 10 books and a
large number of journal articles on CDA.
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field of accounting studies, and the application of CDA and its complementarity with
elite theory are explained.
5.2 Critical discourse analysis (CDA)
CDA gained popularity in the late 1980s as a programmatic development in
European discourse studies, pioneered by Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak and
Teun Van Dijk (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000). Since then, CDA has become one of
the most influential methodologies of discourse analysis (Blommaert and Bulcaen,
2000). CDA draws on traditions within linguistics, such as classical rhetoric, text
linguistics, pragmatics and sociolinguistics (Fowler et al., 1979; Wodak, 2001).
However, it is the acknowledgment of the ‘power of language’ which is the focus of
CDA, and a feature of this thesis.

CDA has emerged from a critical theory of language that situates language as a form
of social practice (Janks, 1997). The ‘critical’ in CDA implies “showing connections
and causes which are hidden; it also implies intervention, for example, providing
resources for those who may be disadvantaged through change” (Fairclough, 1992,
p.9). In other words CDA is a critical analytic approach as it aims to reveal unequal
relations of power in social relations (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2008) and has
emancipatory or enabling potential. As a critical approach, therefore, CDA seeks to
explore issues of power, dominance and inequality. Van Dijk (1993a, p.252) asserts
that the focus on
[d]ominance and inequality implies, unlike other domains or approaches in
discourse analysis, that CDA does not primarily aim to contribute to a
specific discipline, paradigm, school or discourse theory.
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In the literature there are many discourses and definitions of CDA, due to its
complex nature (Atkins, 2002). Fairclough (2005, p.2) defines discourse as “a
particular way of representing the (physical, social, psychological) world” and sees
CDA
[a]s the study of often opaque relationships of causality and determination
between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and
cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices,
events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of
power and struggles of power; and to explore how the opacity of these
relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power
(Fairclough 1995, pp.132-133).
CDA enables an examination of the relationship and power that exists between
MNCs and their host government to be brought into focus. CDA may, therefore,
seek to effect change through a critical understanding of the prevailing social system
(van Dijk, 1993) that creates and perpetuates the relationships of power between
Shell and Nigeria. More importantly, CDA focuses on the “distal context and how it
privileges some actors at the expense of others, and how broad changes in the
discourse result in different constellations of advantage and disadvantage” (Phillips
and Hardy 2002, p.25). In this thesis the application of CDA, therefore,
accommodates and is combined with elite theory. This combination extends
corporate disclosure research in the accounting discipline.

In comparison to other discourse analytical approaches13, CDA is distinctive due to
its focus on ‘social justice and sense of responsibility’ (Widdowson, 1998). And as
such according to Fairclough (2001, p. 229) “social issues and problems are the
starting points for CDA” and as van Dijk (1996, p.84) argues CDA should:

13

Other approaches to discourse analysis include: interpretive structuralism, social linguistic analysis,
and critical linguistic analysis (Phillips and Hardy, 2002).
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[d]escribe and explain how power abuse is enacted, reproduced or legitimated
by the talk and text of dominant groups and institutions.
Fairclough’s version of CDA (1989, 1992, 1995, 2001) is concerned with the
relationship between power and discourse and, more specifically, “how control of
discursive practice can be viewed as hegemonic struggles over orders of discourse”
(Ferguson, 2007, p.920). The critical targets for discourse analysts are the “power
elites who enact, sustain, legitimate, condone or ignore social inequality and
injustice” (van Dijk, 1993a, p.252). This relational dynamic is consistent with the
theoretical framework of this thesis (elite theory), which unmasks complex
relationships such as the one Shell has with the Nigerian government.

Based on its concentration on social injustice and power abuse and dominance, CDA
“should have an effect in society” (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000, p.449);
moreover, as Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000, p.449) further elaborate, it should
focus on “empowering the powerless, giving voices to the voiceless, exposing power
abuse, and mobilizing people to remedy social wrongs”. Although Blommaert and
Bulcaen (2000) provide a narrative intent (‘should’ in this thesis) the aim is to
examine not necessarily what Shell should do, but how Shell as a corporate elite is
able to negotiate and maintain its powerful position in Nigeria, despite the pressure
of NGOs and the broader public’s challenge of Shell’s domination. In this thesis,
CDA and elite theory will explore the use of counter-narratives (Chapter 7) to
present other voices in relation to Shell’s oil spills in Nigeria.

The following section presents Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework of CDA to
analyse discourse. First, the meaning of a discursive event is explained followed by
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an explanation of each of Fairclough’s levels; discourse as text, discourse as
discursive practice and discourse as social practice.
5.3 Fairclough’s three dimensions of a discourse event
For Fairclough (1989, 1992 and 1995) discourse is the use of language, as a form of
social practice, and discourse analysis explores how texts work within sociocultural
practice (Fairclough 1995). This social practice is embedded in the way Fairclough’s
framework is constructed, as it reflects the social and political contexts in which
discourse is shaped and is crucial to the “production, reproduction or transformation
of relations of domination” (Fairclough, 1992, p.87; van Dijk, 1993). In this thesis
the Nigerian context in which discourse is generated that is, environmental,
economic, political and institutional discourse is used to critically evaluate Shell’s
narrative oil-spill disclosures. This helps an understanding of power inequalities
resulting from the creation and the distribution of discourse. However, these levels in
Fairclough’s CDA framework are intended to assist, not restrict, a researcher, and
therefore are not fixed, as argued in the later sections of the chapter.

Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995, 2001) considers every discursive event can be a piece
of text, an instance of discursive practice and an instance of social practice. A
particular discursive event can be seen at three levels as:
1. discourse as text,
2. discourse as discursive practice and
3. discourse as social practice.
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These dimensions are in a dialectical relationship; therefore, it is important to analyse
“the relationship between texts, interactions, and contexts” (Fairclough, 2001, p21).
Fairclough expresses this diagrammatically in a three-dimensional framework
(Figure 5.1).

TEXT

DISCURSIVE PRACTICE (production, distribution and
consumption)

SOCIAL PRACTICE (institutional settings)
Discourse practice (text production,

Figure 5.1: Fairclough’s Three Dimensions of Analysis (Fairclough 1992, p.73)
distribution and consumption)

This multidimensional framework links text with its broader social context. As
Fairclough (1995, p.97) argues:
The method of discourse analysis includes linguistic description of the
language text, interpretation of the relationship between the (productive and
Practice
representative discursiveSociocultural
processes and
the text, and explanation of the
relationship between the discursive processes and the social processes
[emphasis in original].

Text as a facet of discourse relates to the process of text description (Fairclough,
1995). The discursive practice
of the framework
S Sociocultural
practice examines text production,
S consumption (how the text is interpreted
distribution (how the text is articulated) and
or perceived) in society (Fairclough, 1992). In the last dimension of the discourse
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event, social practice, Fairclough (1992) emphasises that discourse is social and
therefore requires reference to the context in which it is generated. Specifically, the
focus is on the institutional and organisational context within which discourse occurs
and is maintained. Fairclough’s CDA framework enables the event to be seen as
more than mere text by examining the social structure within which text is produced;
therefore text becomes an “interactive process of meaning-making” (Fairclough,
2003, p.10). The following sections consider each of these facets further.

5.3.1 Discourse as text

The first dimension of the CDA framework is discourse as text. According to
Fairclough (1995, p.4), “text is traditionally understood to be a piece of written
language” or “the written or spoken language produced in a discursive event”
(Fairclough 1995, p.135). Text comes in many different forms and can be a poem or
novel, newspaper, textbook and so on, and in this thesis, the discursive event is
specific: Shell’s and its subsidiary’s narrative of oil-spill disclosures. These
disclosures are in corporate texts including Shell sustainability reports (SSRs), SPDC
annual reports, and Shell’s response letter to major shareholders. These disclosures
form a substantive part of the empirical material in this thesis and represent one form
of Shell’s public accountability discourse regarding oil spills in Nigeria.

Texts are one of the main foci for CDA, as “texts can have causal effects upon, and
contribute to changes in people (beliefs, attitudes, etc.), actions, social relations, and
the material world” (Fairclough, 2003, p.8). Thus text and discourse are not inert
representations, but rather can have powerful rhetoric effects. Fairclough (2001,
p.20) believes that “a text is a product rather than a process, a product of the process
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of text production” and “a resource to the process of interpretation” (Fairclough,
2001, p.20).

In Fairclough’s earlier work (1992, 1995), he suggests that text analysis can be
organised according to vocabulary, grammar, cohesion and text structure. According
to Fairclough (1992, p.75):
[t]hese can be thought as ascending in scale: vocabulary deals mainly with
individual words, grammar deals with words combined into clauses and
sentences, cohesion deals with how clauses and sentences are linked together,
and text structure deals with large-scale organizational properties of text.
In this thesis the main focus is upon the vocabulary of the texts. Even though
Fairclough does not suggest a method of how one is to perform the analysis of the
individual words, he suggests a number of approaches, including word meaning,
which is of interest in this thesis (Fairclough, 1992). The focus in the word-meaning
approach is “how the meanings of words come into contention within wider
struggle” (Fairclough, 1992, p.77). The discursive contention of oil spills then
contributes to the formation of the texts. Chapter 6 will demonstrate how oil spills
were assigned a different rhetoric; for example, oil spills from controllable
operations such as old pipes and uncontrollable activities such as sabotage.

Fairclough (1995) does, however, state that different research questions and foci
influence how one does critical discourse analysis, in that the researcher emphasises
differing aspects and dimensions of the analysis. The application of CDA in this
thesis also reflects of this position; therefore, the analysis of the vocabulary of the
texts is appropriate given that the focus of this thesis is on a particular language use
for oil spills. That is, the focus is on the usage of the individual or dominant words
representing oil spills. It becomes very important that keywords are analysed to
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elucidate the language used when disclosing oil spills. The text analysis then
provides a view of the discourse and examines contested words. Fairclough (1995,
p.5) argues that:
[t]extual analysis can often give excellent insights about what is ‘in’ a text,
but what is absent from a text is often just as significant from the perspective
of sociocultural analysis.
This is a very distinctive feature of CDA, as it considers what texts include (and what
they omit) to produce alternative ways of constructing and defining an event, which
in this case have organisational and national significance. It further involves the
“construction of identities of participants discussed in the communication, and
strategies to frame the content of the message” (McGregor, 2003, p.3). According to
Fairclough (1995, p.58), text analysis is concerned with presences as well as
absences in texts that could include “representations, categories of participant, and
constructions of participant identity or participant relations”. These concepts of
identity, relationships and power will be explicated through the theoretical lens of
elite theory.

The results of the textual analysis are presented in Chapter 6. The current chapter
analyses only the three types of written text produced by Shell: the SSRs, SPDC’s
annual reports and the letter to major shareholders. While the letter is also a public
discourse document, it differs in that it is used for a particular purpose to question
Shell’s response to oil spills in Nigeria. In this thesis the letter is used for analysing
the oil-spill discourse. Its significance will be further discussed in Chapter 6.
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5.3.2 Discourse as discursive practice
The second dimension of Fairclough’s framework is the analysis of discourse as
discursive practice. The analysis at this level focuses on the processes of text
production, consumption and distribution (Fairclough, 1992) and consists of
understanding how discourse participants produce and interpret texts. According to
Jørgensen et al. (2002, p.69),
[a]nalysis of discursive practice focuses on how authors of texts draw on
already existing discourses and genres to create text, and on how receivers of
texts also apply available discourses and genres in the consumption and
interpretation of the texts.
In his earlier work, Fairclough (1992, p.72) considered that “a way of linking this
emphasis on discursive practice and processes of text production, distribution and
consumption to the text itself is to focus upon the intertextuality of the latter”. This is
also supported by Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000, pp.448-449) who argue that
approaching discourse as discursive practice means that in:
[a]nalyzing vocabulary, grammar, cohesion, and text structure, attention
should be given to speech, acts, coherence, and intertextuality – three aspects
that link a text to its context.
Kristeva (1986)14 coined the term ‘intertextuality’ based on the work of Bakhtin15.
Fairclough (1992) draws on the works of both Bakhtin and Kristeva, in which
“intertextuality plays a prominent role in the consideration of aspects of production,
transmission and reception” (Ferguson, 2007, p.920).
According to Fairclough (1993, p.72) discourse analysis seeks to:
Trace explanatory connections between ways in which texts are put together
and interpreted, how texts are produced, distributed and consumed in a wider
sense.
14

Kristeva (1986, p.36) points out that a given text is “a permutation of texts, an intertextuality: in the
space of a given text, several utterances, taken from other texts, intersect, and neuteralize one other”.
15
Bakhtin (1986) argues that every text is related to other texts.
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This concept of intertextuality, according to Fairclough (1992), refers to the
processes of the production, distribution and consumption (interpretation) of text. In
terms of production, an “intertextual perspective stresses the historicity of texts” and
how they “consist of remnants of prior texts” (Fairclough, 1992, p.84). Texts are
produced in specific ways and in specific social contexts. For example, text such as
an annual report is produced through a culmination of complex routines, involving a
team of people.

According to Fairclough (1993) in terms of distribution, intertextuality explores the
networks along which texts move, and the transformations they undertake as they
move from one text type to another. For example, accounting standards appear in
legislation or comment letters, and annual reports and sustainability reports can
perpetuate a text and a view about an event, such as an oil spill, in terms of its cause
(e.g. sabotage) rather than in terms of its consequences (e.g. social and
environmental damage).

Consumption brings a range of texts to the interpretative process, which shapes
understanding of the text themselves. Interpretation takes a number of forms, and can
involve “close scrutiny or cursory attention, for aesthetic, rhetorical or instrumental
purposes” (Thomas, 1998, n.p). Therefore, the consumption of a text does not occur
in isolation. Texts are consumed differently in different social contexts (Fairclough,
1992, 2003) and this consumption can be either individual or collective (Fairclough,
1992) and through different media (Thomas, 1998). For example, some texts, like
political speeches can be transformed into other texts such as journal articles and
media articles. In accounting, accounting standards define ‘users’ of corporate texts.
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However, users can be very far reaching once the text is ‘out there’. According to
Fairclough (1992, p. 82) “interpreters not only interpret text they also interpret the
context of the situation that is shaped by their mapping of the social order”. The
researcher at this level is the interpreter and synthesises how the text fits in with the
producer’s or consumer’s experience of the world – “what aspects of the world the
text relates to and what conceptions of the world it presupposes” (Fairclough, 1989,
p.78). In this thesis, this interpretation and synthesis is through elite theory.
Simultaneously, the researcher is “establishing of a ‘fit’ between the text and the
world” (Gallhofer et al, 2001, p.127).

Ferguson (2007) challenged this notion of intertextuality and considers that
Fairclough does not provide guidance of how one is to do this type of analysis.
Ferguson (2007, p.923) states that “Fairclough does not make it clear how the analyst
is to explore such intertextual features (beyond the use of conjecture and
speculation)” and “not only is Fairclough’s application of intertextuality remarkably
unconvincing, it tells us virtually nothing about aspects of the production,
distribution and consumption of text” (Ferguson, 2007, p.923). Even though
Ferguson’s (2007) concerns are valid, Fairclough (1995) has argued that
intertextuality depends highly on the researcher’s interpretation. Since this thesis is
premised on the notion of social construction, interpretation is both inevitable and
appropriate. In this thesis the interpretation is guided by CDA and informed by elite
theory.

In this thesis, intertextuality is considered as a feature, and Fairclough’s (1992, 1995)
non-prescriptive approach is actually enabling and does not constrict the analysis in
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this thesis. By performing intertextual analysis one can see a bigger picture of the
meanings of selected texts. Also their creation and consumption provides insight into
how texts are perceived, understood, and used. In this thesis, this subjective element
is augmented by using elite theory as a lens for interpretation. A detailed description
of the approach to discursive practice is provided in Section 5.6.3.

5.3.3 Discourse as social practice

The third dimension is discourse as social practice. This provides an explanation of
the previous two levels by looking at the context of discourse. Fairclough (2003,
p.25) defines social practice as “articulations of different types of social elements
which are associated with particular areas of social life, and the function of social
practice is to articulate discourse (hence language) together with other non-discoursal
social elements”. The level of discourse as social practice is then concerned with the
context, including those of the institution and the wider society. In this thesis social
practice provides an understanding of the discourse by analysing the institutional
context through the legislative environment in Nigeria (Chapter 8).

Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995) is particularly concerned with the “relationship
between power and discourse and, more specifically, how control of a discursive
practice can be viewed as hegemonic struggles over orders of discourse” (Ferguson,
2007, p.920). Fairclough’s (1989, 1992, 1995) framework is developed from a
Bakhtinian theory of genre (at discourse practice level) and a Gramscian theory of
hegemony (at social practice level). The theory of hegemony “highlights both how
power relations constrain and control productivity, and how creativity in discourse
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practices (order of discourse) constitutes one domain of hegemony” (Fairclough,
1995, p.2).

The social-practice level “stresses features of discourse that it shares with social
practice more generally” (Gallhofer et al., 2001, p.125). This includes the
“ideological effects and hegemonic processes in which discourse is a feature”
(Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000, p.448). Van Dijk (1996, p.84) suggests that one of
the most crucial tasks of CDA is
[t]o account for the relationships between discourse and social power…such
an analysis should describe and explain how power abuse is enacted,
reproduced or legitimised by the text and talk of dominant groups or
institutions.
Discourse is conceptualised as affecting other facets of the social aspect, as well as
being shaped by the political and ideological aspects, of the interaction between
social structure and discourse (Gallhofer et al, 2001, p.125). In this thesis (Chapter
8), at the social-practice level, the analysis examines practices and institutions, and in
particular Nigerian legislation on and regulation of oil spills.

CDA is a comprehensive approach to studying the relationship between language use
and its social context. Social context is of particular importance, as it “comprises
distinct settings where discourse occurs (marketplace, classroom, conferences), each
with a set of conventions that determine rights and obligations – what each is
allowed and expected to do” (McGregor, 2003, p.3). This is one of the great features
of CDA, as “text becomes more than just words on a page; it discloses how those
words are used in particular social contexts” (McGregor, 2003, p.3).
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Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p.65) argue:
It is central to Fairclough’s approach that discourse is an important form of
social practice which both reproduces and changes knowledge, identities and
social relations including power relations, and at the same time is also shaped
by other social practices and structures.

As it is concerned with hegemonic practices enabled by socio-political resources,
elite theory articulates as a lens to view this relationship.
5.4 CDA and accounting research

CDA has typically been associated with linguistics and the field of discourse
analysis. Even though accounting studies of language have largely been conducted in
isolation, various forms of discourse analysis have been used in accounting research.
Ferguson (2007, p.913) points out that:
“[t]he increasing interest in language and discourse throughout the social
sciences has had a notable impact on accounting research: numerous studies
in accounting reflect the different approaches to analysing discourse and
language that dominate the area”.
Similarly, Gallhofer et al. (2001) state that many of these studies may not necessarily
draw on explicit methods associated with discourse analysis, but they all share an
interest in examining aspects of accounting language or language used in relation to
accounting. These analyses are largely “textually oriented”, with focus on
“accounting texts” such as annual reports, social and environmental reports and
textbooks (Ferguson, 2007, p.913).

The ‘literature on accounting discourse and language is extremely diverse, covering
many different foci of analyses (for example, annual reports, social and
environmental reports and Chairman’s statements), and consider various approaches
to text analysis (for example, content, rhetoric, narrative or metaphor)' (Ferguson,
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2007, p.918). There have been several studies using CDA in the accounting literature
(Gallhofer et al., 2001; Craig and Armenic, 2004a; Craig and Armenic, 2004b; Laine,
2005; Craig and Armenic, 2006; Nielsen and Thomsen, 2007; Craig and Armenic,
2008; Ferguson et al., 2009; Cortese et al., 2010; Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2012).
These studies are all examples of the hegemonic and ideological use of accounting
discourse.

Gallhofer et al. (2001) applied Fairclough’s CDA in what has been referred to as the
first attempt to fully apply CDA in an accounting context (Ferguson, 2007). In their
study of struggle over takeover legislation in New Zealand, they applied all three
dimensions of Fairclough’s framework for analysis to investigate the letters of
submissions of two business lobby groups. At the textual-analysis level the benefits
of the takeover legislation were represented as ‘value-creating’ or ‘economic
efficiency’, and the study’s analysis of vocabulary and connotations of keywords in
the submission letters found important differences between the submission letters. At
the discursive level of analysis, Gallhofer et al. (2001, p.137) found that discourse
used in the letter resembled a “U.S. mainstream finance research which is
characterised by its positivistic and scientistic character analytical abstract theorising
(necessarily involving simplification) typically yielding hypotheses tested by large
sample size statistical research” to show that “a more powerful discourse is
constituted, transforming previous conventions” (Gallhofer et al., 2001, pp.138-139).

Gallhofer et al. (2001) refer to Fairclough’s concept of production, distribution and
consumption of text; however, as Ferguson (2007, p.918) states, they
[o]veremphasise the internal characteristics of the text, and pay insufficient
attention to issues of production and reception as well as to the social and
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historical conditions in which they are embedded. In this sense, and despite
the merits of the work, Gallhofer et al.’s (2001) analysis falls into the “fallacy
of internalism”.
At the social-practice level Gallhofer et al (2001) investigated the funding
arrangements between the business sector and policy-makers to discern the takeover
issue as a site of struggle. As Fairclough (1992) emphasises, the application of CDA
depends on the situation under investigation and the research objectives. In this
thesis, the discourse of oil spills is the situational context as a site of struggle, and the
overlay of elite theory will overcome the limitation referred to by Ferguson (2007).

In addition to the Gallhofer et al (2001) study, Fairclough’s CDA has been used in
accounting in limited ways by various accounting scholars. For example, Craig and
Armenic (2004a) used CDA to study the privatisation of the Canadian National
Railway Company through an analysis of articles in the company’s internal
newspaper. However, their analysis mainly focussed on the first level (textual
analysis), and only briefly touched on the social-practice dimension. Nevertheless,
Craig and Armenic (2004a) made a unique contribution to the literature, as their
study demonstrates how accounting is present in all levels of document creation. In
addition, Craig and Armenic (2004b) studied the discourse that emerged after the
Enron collapse, analysing rhetorical tactics at play in the shareholder’s letter and
Berardino’s16 congressional testimony. Their study revealed inconsistencies and
silences that emerged in a micro-discourse analysis of the shareholder’s letter. This
thesis also uses a shareholder letter as empirical material. Similarly, Merkl-Davies
and Koller (2012) used Fairclough’s (2003, 2006) work to consider the micro- mesoand macro-levels in an evaluation of social actors and events. They analysed a
16

CEO of Arthur Andersen, Joseph Berardino, to the US Congress in December 2001 (Craig and
Amernic, 2004b).
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chairman’s statement from a 2002 annual report of Meggit plc, a UK defence firm
specialising in the aerospace, defence and energy markets. Tregidga et al. (2012,
p.151) stated that in their 2012 paper, Merkl-Davies and Koller
[c]ontribute to the literature not only through the empirical findings and
explanations presented, but also through the promotion of the method of
CDA. They show how CDA and the study of linguistic devices such as
impersonalization and evaluation can not only be used to achieve managerial
agendas but also to guide audience interpretations of organizational activities
and outcomes.
CDA has also been specifically used in examining particular texts such as annual
reports and sustainability reports (as illustrated in the following section). For
example, Laine (2005, p.395) used Fairclough’s CDA to analyse the term
‘sustainable development’ as represented in narrative disclosures of listed companies
in Finland. The companies’ annual reports and other stand-alone disclosures, such as
environmental, sustainability and CSR reports for the years 2001 and 2002, were
collected. Laine (2005,p.395) concluded that “Finnish listed companies employ the
rhetoric of weak sustainability in their disclosures related to sustainable
development, subsequently reinforcing the societal discourse of business can deliver
sustainable development”. While this study is concerned with the particular
discursive construction of sustainability, it highlights the rhetoric of language use in
corporate public discourses.
Nielsen and Thomsen (2007) used Fairclough’s (1995) model of CDA to analyse
annual reports of six Danish corporations’ CSR reporting, examining the reporting
strategies in their 2004 annual reports from a rhetorical and discursive point of view.
Their findings indicated that the disclosures across the companies were dissimilar,
and they concluded that different companies employ different rhetorical strategies.
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Therefore, studying a particular MNC in a particular context focussing on an event
such as oil spills will deliver insights into the practice of disclosures.

Cortese et al. (2010) applied Fairclough’s (1993, 1995, 2003) framework to examine
the role of power in the international standard-setting process for the extractive
industries. This study highlighted the influence of international standard-setting on
the promulgation of IFRS 6 (Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources)
by analysing the social practices of the standard-setting process. This thesis
incorporates the social-practice level as an important indicator of key actors and their
influence on discourse.

As discussed in Chapter 2, accounting researchers have focussed on aspects of
Shell’s operations using CDA. Livesey (2002), Livesey and Kearins (2002), have
analysed sustainability reports of both Shell and The Body Shop. Livesey (2002) has
also studied ExxonMobil’s corporate public discourse of global warming issues. In
addition to Livesey’s works, Holzer (2007) examined how corporate responsibility
for human rights is framed in public discourse. Holzer (2007) examined Shell’s
operations in Nigeria, particularly during the 1990s. Two sources of data were used
in Holzer’s study to
[e]xamine how the responsibility of Shell for human rights woes and
environmental degradation in Nigeria was discursively constructed:
newspaper reports about Shell’s situation in Nigeria in the crucial year 1995
and several interviews with Shell employees, consultants, and social
movement activists conducted between 1997 and 2001 (Holzer, 2007, p.282).

Based on an analysis of the public discourse of Shell operations in Nigeria in 1995,
Holzer’s (2007, p.281) results suggest that “once the corporation is framed as a moral
actor, it gets difficult for the corporation to deny its responsibility for human rights –
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even though the actual influence of the corporation may be limited”. In a complex
social situation like the one in Nigeria, the responsibility of Shell cannot be taken for
granted. It is established through public discourse that responsibility “necessarily
reduces the complexity of social reality by powerful and widely accepted narratives”
(Holzer, 2007, p.283). This thesis contributes to this literature by using Fairclough’s
(1989, 1993, 1995, 2001) CDA in analysing corporate narrative disclosures. As
Phillips and Hardy (2002, p.32) assert, “the creation of new concepts, such as toxic
waste and endangered species, has led to new understandings of the relationship of
business and the environment”. While several researchers in accounting have
explored Shell’s disclosures, this thesis provides insights to the broader sociopolitical context through the discursive event of oil spills.

5.6 Application of CDA in this thesis
This section further explains how CDA is adopted in this thesis. This thesis argues
that CDA levels are not absolute; indeed, the levels of text analysis, discourse
analysis and social analysis must inform and influence each other. The
linear/separate disaggregation in this thesis is for analytical purposes only and is
presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, discourse as text analysis, discourse as discursive
practice and discourse as social practice, respectively (Figure 5.2).
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Figure 5.2: Application of CDA in this thesis

5.6.1 Data sources: annual reports, sustainability reports, shareholders’ letter
In order to explore Shell’s narrative disclosure of oil spills, this thesis focusses on
public documents published from 2000-2010, including 10 sustainability reports17
from 2000-2010 by the parent company Shell, Shell’s (2010) response letter to major
shareholders and six SPDC annual reports from 2000-200618. Shell has been

17

In 2005, Shell changed the title of its Social and Environmental reports to simply ‘Sustainability
Report’. Appendix 3, Table 1 shows how the name of the reports has changed over the 10-year period.
18
SPDC annual reports have limited public availability, and only six annual reports were obtained for
the selected period. This is discussed further in Chapter 9.
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disclosing social and environmental information since 1997, two years after the
Ogoni Nine crisis (Chapter 3).

The Ogoni Nine crisis is a pivotal event in Nigeria’s and Shell’s history, and oil
spills became a prominent feature from the 2000 sustainability report. Both Shell and
its subsidiary, SPDC, report on oil spills in Nigeria, albeit via different reporting
mechanisms. Annual reports are produced by the SPDC, and are mandated by
corporate regulators; the format is prescribed by accounting standards19.
Sustainability Reports are produced by the parent company, Shell. This type of
reporting mechanism is voluntary, and therefore provides a greater scope for
companies to control the content of the text.

The consolidated reports of the parent company, Shell, have been omitted from this
thesis because of the lack of detail and differentiation in aggregated disclosures of
environmental performance. Shell’s annual reports include information on its
worldwide operations and this makes it difficult to separate what is reported and
disclosed exclusively for Nigeria. On the other hand, specific details of their social
and environmental performance in Nigeria are disclosed in their sustainability
reports.

In addition to sustainability reports, a response letter to major shareholders sent by
Shell in 2010 is used for analysis. This letter is Shell’s response to major
shareholders’ inquiry about the company’s oil-spill performance in Nigeria. As the
letter addresses Nigeria in particular, it is important to use it as a corroborative
19

For the period under investigation SPDC used Nigerian Accounting Standards. From January 2012
Nigeria adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
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source to support the analysis of the sustainability and annual reports. Although it is
a single instance, it is important to this thesis, as it is a public document specifically
addressing Shell’s oil spills in Nigeria. The letter identifies a number of questions
asked by the major shareholders, and Shell’s response is an important example of a
corporate elite controlling discourse. While sustainability and annual reports are
often considered a secondary data source for the purposes of CDA, they are primary
as ‘language in use’ or discourse in the public domain.

5.6.2 Analysis of text
Text analysis, according to Fairclough (1993, p.75), can be organised under four
main headings: vocabulary, grammar, cohesion and text structure. In this thesis the
analysis of texts involves examining their form and meaning through vocabulary.
Vocabulary deals mainly with individual words or keyword analysis (Fairclough,
1992). This mode of keyword analysis is the focus of this thesis at the textual level of
Fairclough’s framework.

The use of keyword analysis in this thesis is consistent with Gallhofer et al.’s (2001)
study, which referred to dominant words. Craig and Armenic (2004, p.814) argue
that “analysis of words is especially important in understanding the public discourse
of corporate leaders (including their accounting-related discourse), since their written
and verbal text contributes to the ‘battery of belief forming institutions’ in society”.
In this thesis the keywords include the discourse of oil spills to expose how Shell, a
corporate elite, constructs a broader meaning in terms of operational versus sabotage
spills.
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Fairclough (1992, p.8) argues:
[a]s there is no set procedure for doing discourse analysis; people approach it
in different ways according to the specific nature of the project, as well as
their own views of discourse.
In addition Gee, (1999, p.5) asserts that any technique used depends on the
perspective of the researcher because:
[a]ny method of research is a way to investigate some particular
domain … people with different theories … will use different methods
for their research … [as] methods [are] essentially … “tools of
inquiry” and strategies … designed to describe and explain what the
researcher takes to exist [epistemology] and to be important in a
domain.

In order to conduct the text analysis, each text was read multiple times to identify
dominant words chosen for oil spills. First, the response letter as a key public
discourse was analysed with attention to how Shell responds with regard to oil spills
in Nigeria. It was identified in the letter that Shell classifies oil spills according to
cause (Figure 6.2). Following on from the letter, each annual and sustainability report
was analysed in search of any explicit comment on oil spills in general, and then oil
spills in Nigeria. It was found that each type of report had a particular section titled
‘oil spills’. Each of the reports was summarised, and the dominant words were
identified as text. The text analysis provides a view of the oil-spills discourse and
involves examining the form and meaning of vocabulary. It focusses on Shell’s
discourse concerning oil spills as represented in narrative disclosures by
interrogating the text to answer the following:
-

What specific words are chosen for oil spills?

-

What meaning is ascribed to oil spills?

-

Which institutions/actors are present in the text and how are they
described?
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In analysing the distribution of the discourse, the focus is on consistency and
repetition. Intertextuality is evident between public documents replicating the text so
as to create a discourse of oil spills across the three types of accountability texts:
annual reports, sustainability reports and the response letter to major shareholders.
Further, the analysis is informed by elite theory, since it alerts the researcher to
‘hegemonic control’ by Shell, a corporate elite. This is further developed in the
discourse practice and social-practice analysis (Chapters 7 and 8).

5.6.3 Analysis of discursive practice

The key actors engaged in the text production are Shell and its subsidiary, SPDC. It
is noteworthy that the Nigerian government is a major shareholder in the jointventure arrangement operated by SPDC; the significance of this relationship is
analysed as social practice. Both Shell and SPDC have commented on the oil spills
and have produced a particular discourse in their public documents. The text therein
presents particular meanings for oil spills and reveal how oil-spill events have been
discursively constructed.

The analysis (Chapter 7) considers the discourse production and the effect of
competing interpretations of oil spills. The application of elite theory will be used to
explain the inconsistencies between the discourse production of Shell, a corporate
elite, and that of NGOs. Tregidga et al. (2012, p.224) state that “little is known about
the manner in which, for example, non-government organizations (NGOs), social
movement organizations (SMOs) and others seek to interpret, dispute and counter
these organizational communications”. The challenge to Shell’s construction of oil
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spills by NGOs is used as a series counter-narratives to highlight the consumption
aspect of discourse practice. The counter-narratives considered are produced by:
–

Friends of the Earth International (FoE)

–

Christian Aid International Development Charity

–

Amnesty International (AI)

These particular NGOs produce alternative reports to Shell’s oil spill-disclosures in
Nigeria. In analysing the consumption of the discourse, the focus is given to Shell’s
elite status in Nigeria and its relationship with the Nigerian government. The
discourse-practice level of analysis is presented in Chapter 7.

5.6.4 Analysis of social practice

This level of analysis gives CDA a critical focus, as it demonstrates the broader
social picture by considering context. In this thesis the context refers to Nigeria’s
status as a developing country, and to Shell’s elite status. In particular, the Nigerian
legislation of oil spills is used to provide the contextual material in this dimension of
analysis (Chapter 8). The legislation used includes:

1. Oil Pipelines Act (1958)
2. The Nigerian Petroleum Act (1969)
3. Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation (PDPR) (1969)
4. Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Decree (1988)
5. Department of Petroleum Resources, Environmental Guidelines and
Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN) – revised 2002
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In addition to the above legislation, the analysis draws on Nigeria’s economic,
environmental and political context as a developing country and its relationship with
Shell. The concepts of elite theory are used to make sense of discourse produced and
interpret the context in which it occurs. This is further explained in Chapter 8.

5.7 Relationship between CDA and elite theory

CDA recognises that “power abuse is enacted, reproduced or legitimated by the talk
and text of dominant groups and institutions” (van Dijk, 1996, p.84). In addition,
CDA challenges the status quo, power asymmetries and social domination
(Fairclough, 1993, 1995). CDA focuses on the ways in which “knowledge, subjects,
and power relations are produced, reproduced, and transformed within discourse, and
is operationalised” through the analysis of texts in context (Leitch and Palmer, 2009,
p.2). The aim of critical text analysis approaches is to expose the “the hidden
meanings in corporate narrative documents that serve the interests of the socially and
politically powerful” (Prasad and Mir, 2002, p.96). This is consistent with the
argument in this thesis that the narrative disclosure in Shell’s public discourse serves
the interests of the powerful elite, i.e. Shell and the Nigerian government.

Fairclough (1992) argues that language can be selected and used by dominant groups
to control discourse, so that it takes on a common-sense meaning to make things or
events appear inevitable. Therefore, such control can enable the abuse of power and
subvert responsibility and accountability. Elite theory provides a way of examining
this complex phenomenon without overtly imposing a template.
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Shell is viewed as a corporate elite in Nigeria due to its close relationship with the
government and its privileged corporate status. Shell has been in close relationship
with all governments in Nigeria from military dictatorships to the democratic
government since the beginning of their corporate presence in Nigeria more than 50
years ago. Van Dijk (1993, p.284) suggests that dominance of a corporate elite is
usually “enacted and legitimated through text and talk”; corporations are involved
daily in many forms of text, talk and communications, including reports, meetings,
decision-making, orders and instructions and informal conversations (Mumby, 1988).
In this thesis the focus is on annual reports, sustainability reports, and a letter to
major shareholders, and the discourse they contain regarding Shell’s oil spills in
Nigeria.

Annual reports often take the form of “glossy positive self-presentation” (van Dijk,
1993, p.129), and are an example of composed text. In contrast, this “dominance may
be enacted and reproduced by subtle, routine, everyday forms of text that appear
natural and quite acceptable” (van Dijk, 1993a), as is the case with corporate texts.
Van Dijk (1993a, p.254) argues that “one crucial presupposition of adequate critical
discourse analysis is understanding the nature of social power and dominance”. He
further asserts that “[p]ower involves control, namely by (members of) one group
over (those of) other groups” (van Dijk, 1993a, p.254) [emphasis in original]. This is
consistent with the main principles of power elite theory where “such control may
pertain to “action and cognition: that is, a powerful group may limit the freedom of
action of others, but also influence their minds” (van Dijk, 1993a, p.254).

117

Elite theory is concerned with “inequalities based on power or lack thereof” (Arslan,
2006, p.2). Both elite theory and CDA challenge power asymmetries in society. CDA
exposes and challenges power, and elite theory explicates power inequalities and the
production and influence of the corporate elite’s dominant text (van Dijk, 1993a).
Both CDA and elite theory adopt the belief that humans are agents of social change.
This thesis argues that discursive (re)production of power results deliberately by the
powerful, as “they are truly the means of the symbolic reproduction of dominance”
(van Dijk, 1993a, p.259). This is further argued in Chapters 7 and 8.

5.8 Summary
This chapter presented the methodological framework used in this research and
identified CDA as an appropriate framework for studying Shell’s oil-spills
disclosures in Nigeria. The chapter discussed Fairclough’s CDA and its application
in this thesis. CDA examines the language used and provides “excellent insights
about what is ‘in’ a text, but [also] what is absent from a text”, which “is often just as
significant from the perspective of sociocultural analysis” (Fairclough, 1995, p.5).
This type of qualitative analysis has been used in accounting research, and this thesis
explicitly builds on this literature. An analysis of the data, which includes
description, interpretation and discussion, is presented in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 6: TEXT ANALYSIS: DISCURSIVE MEANING OF
‘OIL SPILLS’

6.1 Introduction
The preceding chapters introduced the methodological assumptions and theoretical
framework that support a critical analysis of Shell’s oil-spill disclosures. As
indicated in Chapter 5, Fairclough’s CDA identifies discursive events in a three
dimensional framework: text analysis, discourse practice and social-practice analysis.
Although there is no one predetermined sequence in applying Fairclough’s (1992)
framework, this thesis structures the analysis from the micro text level to the macro
social-practice level.

This chapter presents the first level of CDA: text analysis of Shell’s sustainability
reports and its letter to major shareholders and SPDC’s annual reports. These public
documents are the sites of the discursive event and form the micro-level of analysis
(Figure 6.1). More specifically, the focus is on the usage and meaning of dominant
words ascribed to oil spills, as the “analysis of words is especially important in
understanding the public discourse of corporate leaders (including their accountingrelated discourse), since their written and verbal text contributes to the battery of
belief-forming institutions in society” (Craig and Amernic, 2004, pp813-814). This
concept of corporate leaders is important for this thesis, as Shell is considered a
corporate elite in the oil industry, and in Nigeria (as discussed in Chapter 4). The
process of text analysis is shown in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1 Process of Text Analysis

The purpose of the analysis is to identify what Shell says about the oil spill
phenomena in Nigeria in its public corporate disclosure. This analysis is then
followed by the meso-level of analysis, discursive practice (Chapter 7), and the
macro-level of analysis, social practice (Chapter 8). Each of the levels provides
insight into the next as the focus moves from the text itself and the words in use, to
the discourse and perspectives of the creators of the documents (Chapter 7), and
lastly to the social and institutional context of the discourse (Chapter 8).

The discourse as text is presented as a series of quotations from the documents, from
which dominant discourse is identified.
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6.2 Overall structure of the public documents
The public discourse of oil spills is analysed in three types of documents: Shell’s
sustainability reports, SPDC’s annual reports and Shell’s response letter to major
shareholders. These documents are primary sources of publicly available disclosures
and form the empirical data. As indicated in Chapters 1 and 3, Shell’s oil spills have
significant environmental and social impacts on Nigeria. Appendix 1 shows the
number and volume of Shell’s and SPDC’s oil spills in Nigeria for the period 20002010. The appendix also shows the number of Shell’s oil spills in Nigeria according
to SPDC compared to the whole group of Royal Dutch Shell companies. Given the
impact of Shell’s operations in Nigeria via its subsidiary SPDC, there is,
unsurprisingly, an expectation of available public disclosure on the issue. In this
thesis it is the public documents in its written form that are of interest 20.

Both Shell and SPDC publicly disclose oil-spill incidents via different reporting
mechanisms. Shell uses voluntary sustainability reports that are unregulated, but
have become a popular method used by corporations to disclose their social and
environmental performance (Yakovleva, 2006). Shell began to disclose its social and
environmental performance in 1997, two years after two major events for which
Shell was widely and publicly criticised. That such sustainability reports have
occurred are consistent with Patten (1992), who noted an increase in voluntary
disclosure as a response to negative events. Shell’s social and environmental report
in 1997, ‘Profits and Principles – Does There Have To Be a Choice’, focussed on

20

Other public discourses such as media speeches of Shell’s executives and other media publications,
are available. However, for the purposes of this thesis the annual and sustainability reports are
necessary to put the thesis in an accounting context.
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how Shell was “living up to its financial, social and environmental responsibilities,
with some focus on Nigeria” (Doyle, 2002, p.178). The report examined the
“company’s performance under its new business principles, and considered the case
of Nigeria” (Doyle, 2002, p.178). Additionally, in 2009, voluntary disclosures were
premised on the notion that “we do it to be open and honest and to show how we are
contributing to sustainable development” (Shell, 2009, p.i). Since 1997 Shell has
consistently disclosed information about oil spills. In 2010 Shell presented its 13 th
sustainability report.

Shell’s subsidiary, SPDC, produces annual reports, which are regulated and given
authority by accounting standards and audit processes (Appendix 3 lists the reports
accessed to undertake the text analysis). In contrast to these general-purpose reports,
Shell’s response letter to shareholders is a special-purpose document designed for a
known audience. The actual letter is shown in Appendix 4. Shell and SPDC disclose
a substantial amount of detail on oil spills in Nigeria (Appendix 2).

Both the sustainability and annual reports consist of multiple sections. Even though
Shell operated in a number of countries during the period of investigation from 20002010, the sustainability reports contain a special section on Nigeria (Table 3 in
Appendix 2 provides a summary of Shell’s sustainability reports). This indicates that
Shell considers its Nigerian operations to have a level of importance. The SPDC
annual report also contains a special section titled ‘Oil Spills’, which describes the
year in review and reports on oil-spill performance (Appendix 2 provides a summary
of SPDC’s annual reports). Over a 10-year period it is apparent that disclosure on oil
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spills has become a prominent feature of both Shell’s and SPDC’s reporting
framework.

6.3 Shell’s letter to shareholders
This section of the chapter analyses Shell’s 2010 letter to shareholders 21 (Appendix
4). The letter, dated 31May 2010, is a direct response by Shell to specific
shareholders inquiring about Shell’s oil spills in Nigeria. Despite the letter being a
special-purpose message to individual shareholders, Shell has published it on its
website for public consumption. It thus forms discourse in the public domain, and
falls within the ambit of this thesis. The letter sets the context and scene before
further analysis is undertaken of the annual and sustainability reports.

The letter is a key public statement from Shell and represents a carefully constructed
discourse to provide management an opportunity to articulate its views on oil spills.
The letter discusses a range of issues, such as Shell’s other operating subsidiaries 22 in
Nigeria; Shell’s relationship with the country; and, oil spills and oil-spill-related
issues. It also provides tables showing the volume and number of oil spills for the
period 2000-2009. The letter is a response to three requests for Shell to:

1. Kindly provide information on the numbers, volumes, locations and
timings of crude oil spills in the period 2000 to date associated with the
past and current operations under your company’s control, management
or operation.

21

The letter is addressed to ‘Mrs and Mr’, which may indicate more than one shareholder. The names
are not included in the letter.
22
Shell’s other companies in Nigeria include: Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company Ltd
(SNEPCO) and Nigeria LNG Ltd (NLNG).
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2. Kindly provide a description of your company’s past and present
prevention, mitigation, remediation and monitoring procedures relevant to
crude oil spills.

3. Kindly provide a list of the above spills and spill sites where adequate
clean-up operations were not done, either no clean up at all or only partly
clean up, and the reasons (s) for the lack of adequate clean-up.
(Shell, 2010a, n.p.)

Shell indicates that the shareholders’ letter centres on oil-spill issues related to
operations in Nigeria, and, adding “we understand that your questions are directed at
Shell’s onshore activities there” (Shell, 2010a, n.p.). However, before any of
shareholders’ requests are addressed the company stresses that it is a responsive and
accountable operator in Nigeria:
Let me start by saying that we 23 are committed to a high level of openness
and transparency. We welcome the opportunity to update you on Shell’s
activities in Nigeria, and look forward to a continued dialogue with (Shell,
2010a, n.p.).
Before updating shareholders on oil spills, the letter first describes Shell’s other
activities in Nigeria, and provides a wider context:
Your letter centers on oil spill issues related to operations in Nigeria, and we
understand that your questions are directed at Shell’s onshore activities there.
However, let me briefly update you on the Shell Nigeria portfolio overall,
where various Shell companies are involved in three distinct activities, and
produced 281,000 barrels of oil equivalent (boe) per day in 2009 (Shell equity
share). It is important to look at the total picture in a country where in fact
many of Shell’s activities have been very successful for many years (Shell,
2010a, p.1).
The letter emphasises Shell’s success in Nigeria and other business arenas, despite
concern about a specific issue, ‘oil spills’. The letter further states:

23

The letter finishes, Yours sincerely, Royal Dutch Shell Plc’, and is signed by Dr.J.J. Traynor,
Executive Vice President, Investor Relations.
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We understand that the questions in your letter are aimed at getting a clearer
picture of JV (SPDC), and we will address that in the next section on the
basis of the information provided by SPDC. However before we do so, please
be assured that SPDC is committed to taking all reasonable action within its
power to avoid oil spills and reduce environmental impacts from the JV’s
operations in the Niger Delta (Shell, 2010a, n.p.).
These excerpts set the scene for the shareholders to understand how Shell is
‘committed’ and ‘taking all reasonable’ action. Furthermore, before answering
shareholders’ questions, the letter highlights the challenges SPDC faces in Nigeria,
indicating that the Nigerian context can be violent. The following excerpts leave one
in no doubt of this hostility:
Heavily armed and well-organised groups attack oil and gas facilities in the
Niger Delta, shut down operations, kidnap staff and sabotage pipelines (Shell,
2010a, n.p.).
Some of the oil theft is crudely organized, but much is highly sophisticated
organized crime, with barges taking stolen oil to tankers waiting offshore for
export (Shell, 2010a, n.p.).
An understanding of the root causes of this militant violence and theft –
poverty, unemployment, corruption and a lack of basic social services – is
fundamental to any assessment of the situation in the Niger Delta (Shell,
2010a, n.p.).
Shell states that communities are frustrated because of poverty and subsequent
targeting of energy companies’ operations (Shell, 2010a). Nonetheless, this violent
context sets up the idea that not all oil spills are Shell’s fault or responsibility. The
letter identifies the context of Nigeria as a ‘war zone’ before embarking on the
details of SPDC’s oil spills and responding to the shareholders’ concerns. In the
excerpts above, the operating environment for Shell is described as ‘heavily armed’
by ‘highly sophisticated organized crime’. Violence and anarchy are prominent in
any discussion of the social context of poverty.
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The response letter provides a number of reasons for oil spills which can either be
controllable or uncontrollable depending on their cause. Controllable spills are
attributable to SPDC (Shell, 2010a, n.p.) and are therefore referred to as operational
spills. Operational spills might include equipment failure, human error, corrosion and
engineering faults. In the letter Shell states that:
For all spills that are within our control to prevent, we assess the extent of
damage and provide an appropriate compensation package to the impacted
communities (Shell, 2010a, n.p.).
Shell argues that for all operational spills they “have an integrity management
programme, which is designed to ensure that equipment and infrastructure is kept in
good condition, and does not fail and so damage the environment” (Shell, 2010a,
n.p.).

Uncontrollable spills are attributed to sabotage and results “when thieves drill into
pipelines or damage wellhead equipment to steel oil and natural gas liquids” (Shell,
2010a, n.p.). Shell claims that sabotage and theft in Nigeria are the largest single
cause of their oil spills.

In the letter, Shell states:
Please be assured that SPDC is committed to taking all reasonable action
within its powers to avoid oil spills and reduce environmental impacts from
JV’s operations in the Niger Delta (Shell, 2010a, n.p.).
This sentence draws attention to the company’s assurance that it is doing everything
in its power to prevent oil spills, and then guides the reader’s attention to sabotage, to
further portray the company itself as acting as responsibly as it can in a crime-ridden
environment.
Over this period more than 70% of the spills and related volumes were the
result of sabotage and theft, which increased to 98% in 2009. Theft and
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sabotage has also impacted infrastructure – about 500 kilometres of flow lines
(pipes that carry oil from the well to processing facilities) have been stolen in
the western delta since February 2006 – and caused major environmental
pollution (Shell, 2010a, n.p.).
The above excerpts from the 2005 sustainability report and the response letter show
how these two sources reinforce and replicate the discourse. The following is Shell’s
response to the shareholders concerning controllable spills:
However, less than 30% of spill volumes in the last five years have been due
to operational failures, such as pipeline corrosion, equipment failure and
human error. SPDC has been working hard to minimise spills due to
operational failures, and only 2% of the 2009 spills were caused by these
issues (Shell, 2010a, n.p.).

As well as narrative about controllable and uncontrollable oil spills, Shell also
provided graphs in answer to shareholders’ questions on the number, volume,
locations and timings of crude-oil spills 24. Associated with the operations under
Shell’s control, management or operations for the period 2000 to May 2010, Shell
states:
Over the last five years the JV has recorded 875 spills totalling 36.4 thousand
tonnes (around 270,000 barrels). Over this period more than 70% of the spills
and related volumes were the result of sabotage and theft, which increased to
98% in 2009 (Shell, 2010a, n.p.).
There emerges a discourse of ‘blame’ for oil spills defined in the letter as theft and
vandalism by organised community groups (Shell, 2010a). Further, when discussing
the spills there is reference to a ‘series of attacks’, ‘ongoing security problems’,
‘threat to people’ working there that ‘continues and remains real’ and ‘theft and
sabotage that has also impacted infrastructure’ (Shell, 2010a, n.p.). Further to this,

24

Figure 1 and Figure 2 in Appendix 1 show the spills in thousands of tonnes by category and number
of oil spills by category for the period 2000-2009.

127

Shell states that the situation in Nigeria is worsening, and that oil spills25 due to
sabotage are increasing. This is illustrated in the following excerpt:
Over the years, as the problem of sabotage and theft has escalated, the JV has
steadily increased the manpower and financial resources available to deal
with the resulting clean-up and remediation work (Shell, 2010, n.p.).

One of the key ideas that the letter conveys is the harmony of interests between the
company and the country: as explicitly stated, the goal of the company is to find
ways of working constructively with communities in relation to sabotage spills. This
harmony of interests will be revisited later in terms of the relationship between Shell
and Nigeria.

The letter is framed by Shell’s senior management to highlight the company’s
responsibility toward the shareholders who requested the information. It represents
the crystallisation of responses to a number of defining questions from the
shareholders, culminating in important behaviour showing accountability and
responsiveness by Shell and SPDC. This type of disclosure is a tool to persuade these
particular shareholders of the different meanings surrounding oil spills, with a shift in
the use of discourse when reporting on or describing different causes of oil spills.
Presumably, the letter was written very carefully and deliberately, with the intent of
serving as a very public26, formal statement of Shell’s corporate accountability for oil
spills in Nigeria. While the response letter indicates that Shell operates in a complex
context in Nigeria, a dominant theme around uncontrollable spills and Shell’s
responsible behaviour emerges. Amernic et al. (2010, p.26) argue that “such letters
are narrative accountability texts offering valuable insight to the motives, attitudes

25
26

The letter does not state whether this is the number or volume of oil spills.
The letter appeared on Shell’s website.
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and mental models of management”. The letter, sustainability reports and reports
reiterate Shell’s attitude and motives, as demonstrated in the following text analysis.

6.4 Analysis of Shell’s sustainability reports and SPDC’s annual reports
The letter highlights the nature of operational spills versus sabotage spills; this
section analyses these themes further by investigating other narrative disclosure
mechanisms by Shell and SPDC: Shell’s sustainability reports and SPDC’s annual
reports. The following figure provides a summary of Shell’s oil spills according to
the letter, sustainability reports and annual reports.

Oil Spills

Controllable

Operational
Failure

Equipment

Failure

Corrosion

Uncontrollable

Human
Error

Engineering

Sabotage

Faults

Figure 6.2 Summary of Shell’s explanation of the causes of controllable and
uncontrollable oil spills in Nigeria

Text analysis focuses on dominant words and the dominance of certain discursive
means and institutions or actors represented in the discourse, rather than the quantity
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of words describing oil spills. It should be noted that the major analysis undertaken
in this chapter is to identify the dominant words, or keywords, by highlighting
excerpts from selected text. The analysis focuses on the specific words chosen for
‘uncontrollable’ oil spills, i.e. sabotage, and ‘controllable’ oil spills, i.e. operational
spills. From the analysis of the letter, Shell, SPDC and the affected communities in
Niger Delta are portrayed differently in the discourse of oil spills. The descriptors of
oil spills and the identification of institutions and actors are either directly or
indirectly reflected in Figure 6.1.

An analysis of the sustainability and annual reports in Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2
highlights a shift in the discourse when reporting on controllable oil spills
(operational spills) and uncontrollable spills (sabotage). Figures 6.3 and 6.4
summarise the dominant words used in Shell’s and SPDC’s oil-spills disclosures.

Figure 6.3 Keywords on controllable oil spills
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When reporting on operational spills, Shell constructs a particular image in terms of
‘we are responsible’. Words such as ‘we must’, ‘we continue’ and ‘we are’ suggest
that Shell is taking responsible action and control of their operational spills. This
lexicon implies ongoing, proactive and successful action on the part of the company.
Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p.84) argue that corporate rhetoric is usually a
“promotional discourse, and consequently, their construction of identity, which is
dominant”. Shell is characterised, for example, as ‘responsible’, ‘caring’ and
‘accountable’. In other words, Shell is personified through discourse with a particular
identity reinforced through this nominalising language (Jørgensen and Phillips,
2002).

Figure 6.4 Keywords on uncontrollable oil spills

The discourse of uncontrollable oil spills is dominated by sabotage, and indicates the
use of language that attributes blame to others. Words such as ‘criminals’, ‘gangs’,
‘thieves’, ‘theft’, ‘wilful damage’ and ‘bombed’ are most evident and recur
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frequently in the documents. These words are usually not used stand-alone and are
often accompanied by emotive terms and phrases, for example ‘organised theft’ and
‘attacks by militants’ (discussed in 6.4.2). Once oil spills are categorised as
uncontrollable, Shell uses words that identify deliberate action rather than an
accident or forces of nature. Instead, by referring to the actions as unlawful
behaviour, Shell clearly delineates these oil spills as not being its responsibility.
Further reference to such unlawful actions implies that the responsibility for
detection, enforcement and punishment rests with the Nigerian government, as they
are a breach of Nigerian law.

According to Shell’s and SPDC’s disclosures, the main saboteurs of pipes are
individuals in the Nigerian oil communities who are criminals, thieves and gang
members. The Oxford Dictionary (2012, n.p.) defines a criminal as “a person who
has committed a crime”, which involves a regulatory or legislative decision that the
act is against the law. In relation to Shell’s disclosures it would then appear that these
criminals, thieves and gangsters have performed a criminal act. However, nowhere
does Shell define what it means to be a criminal, thief or gangster as identified in
their disclosure. Assuming that criminals are the individuals or gang members who
steal oil, Shell clearly considers the Nigerian people to be the ‘other’; the ‘saboteurs
of pipes’.

The following sections provide excerpts of the words associated with ‘operational’
versus ‘sabotage’ spills, and illustrate an application of Fairclough’s method of
dominant word analysis. These excerpts were chosen because they convey
communication about controllable and uncontrollable oil spills. The excerpts further
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exemplify this identity-shaping discourse and demonstrate a consistent pattern in the
use of words, reinforcing the theme of discourse of ‘Shell’ and the ‘other’. The key
words or terms are underlined for analytical purposes.

6.4.1 Operational controllable oil spill discourse

To shed further light on the discourse of operational spills, this section provides
examples of the keywords used in the selected texts. Consistent with the response
letter to major shareholders, Shell defines controllable incidents as spills “from
factors we can control, like operational failure” (Shell, 2007, p.20). The first excerpt
starts with Shell’s 2000 sustainability report, wherein the company states:
In 2000 we met27 our aggressive target to reduce the volume of spills with
volumes down by nearly 50% on last year. This was mainly due to improved
maintenance to reduce corrosion (Shell, 2000, p.15).

The underlying emphasises words that indicate a proactive response, such as reduce
and improved, together with the collective expression of ‘we’; i.e. Shell, the
company. Similar disclosures are noted in the following years, as shown in the
excerpts below.
Increases in oil spills and gas flaring were disappointing. We are resolved to
improve (Shell, 2001, p.3).

In Nigeria, we have been running a programme to clean up old oil spills since
June 1999. Of the more than 500 sites requiring remediation, work has been
completed on 245 (Shell28, 2002, p.29).

27

Hereafter in this section, the author uses underlying to highlight the keywords for the convenience
of later analysis, and to highlight where and how dominant words are used in the texts.
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The main improvement came in our Exploration and Production business,
where the volume of spills attributed to sabotage in Nigeria was reduced by
more than 50%. Nevertheless, we still had more than a thousand spills (Shell,
2002, p.25).
In 2004 Shell reports on controllable incidents:
We have reduced the number of controllable spills (79 in 2004) by more than
half and their volumes by over 95% since 2000. In 2004, we cleaned up 199
sites, exceeding our target of 100. We are on track to restore all spill sites that
have been identified for remediation by the end of 2006, provided
communities allow us access (Shell, 2004, p.16).
The use of terms to suggest quantification, such as ‘we have reduced’, implies
managements’ response to controllable oil spills. On the other hand, the use of ‘on
track’ implies a systematic response to previous oil spills.

They continue by saying:
We must improve our environmental performance and make up for past
mistakes, including cleaning up oil spills, preventing new ones and ending
continuous flaring of gas (Shell, 2004, p.16).
We have increased pipeline security, buried or caged some of the most
vulnerable sections and increased the hiring of surveillance teams from the
community (Shell, 2004, p.16).
We continue working to come as close as we can to meeting the
government’s and Shell’s target to end continuous flaring by 2008 (Shell,
2004, p.16).
These excerpts indicate an attitude of being ‘responsive’. There is a plan, and they
are organised, managing and disciplined. Even though they report on controllable oil
spills, they still imply sabotage and the need for pipeline security by hiring
community surveillance teams as defacto militia. The overwhelming use of ‘we’
demonstrates how Shell highlights its responsible behaviour, and even acknowledges

28

In 2001-2002 Shell’s sustainability report was entitled the People, Planet & Profits: The Shell
Report. The 2002 report became The Shell Report: Meeting the Energy Challenge. The 2003-2010
reports changed their titles. Appendix 3 shows full list of the report titles.
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past mistakes. Shell is aware of the company’s past performance and is portraying
an image of a company with a solution to a controllable problem as a responsible
corporate citizen. These words of action connote a responsive company, and this
labelling of responsibility give an impression of a company trying to do everything
possible within their control to prevent spills. In other words, the text develops
around responsibility and the company’s role in managing oil spills. In 2005 and the
following years similar disclosures appear:

We continued to improve our spill response, hiring local community
surveillance teams and educating communities on the dangers of sabotage
(Shell, 2005, p.27).
This statement shows that Shell is supportive of communities, and strives to educate
them about sabotage. It appears that spills that are controllable are ‘good news’
stories even though it’s the company’s fault, as is interpreted from:
Improvements in pipeline maintenance and monitoring since 2000 have
reduced new spills from corrosion or operational failure by 90% by volume
(Shell, 2005, p.27).
A similar discourse is also established in 2006 and 2007. Shell comments that:

In Nigeria, in areas where we could operate, spills from corrosion and
operational failures were at their lowest in seven years as better inspection
and repair continued to improve performance (Shell, 2006, p.17).

By 2006, SPDC had dramatically reduced operational spills, thanks to better
pipeline monitoring and maintenance (Shell, 2007, p.25).
Wherever SPDC has been forced to withdraw because of the current security
situation, it has fully shut down the production facilities to limit the spill
damage from sabotage by criminals and militants (Shell, 2007, p.25).
We are working to reduce the environmental impacts from our operations
(Shell, 2007, p.19).
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It is also noteworthy that Shell still couches its message to communicate a sense of
being responsible even when oil spills are caused by the ‘other’. Shell’s ‘responsible’
discourse is also evident in 2008 and the years that follow.

Between 2003 and the end of 2005, SPDC had dramatically reduced its
operational spills thanks to better pipeline monitoring and maintenance.
Unfortunately progress then stalled as the security and funding problems took
their toll (Shell, 2008, p.21).
In 2008, some operational improvements were made, despite the security
situation. Operational spills in areas where the joint venture had access (and
so where reliable information was available) were lower than in the previous
two years (Shell, 2008, p.21).

Reducing spills we can control in our facilities requires clear procedures,
consistent compliance and a lot of hard work. The number and volume of
these operational spills, for example from corrosion or operational failures,
have fallen since 1998 (Shell, 2008, p.31).

Since 1997, we have been reducing the amount of spills from our operations
that occur for reasons we can control. We have done so through clear
procedures, consistent compliance and a lot of hard work. However spill
volumes from sabotage rose sharply in 2008 due to one sabotage incident in
Nigeria, pushing up our total volume (Shell, 2008, p.41).
These two excerpts highlight Shell’s substantive response to operational oil spills
with the word compliance. However, these efforts by Shell cannot control sabotage.
The excerpt above suggests a quantifiable reduction of oil spills and how, since 1997,
these spills have been controlled. This focus on reducing the number and quantity of
operational oil spills became prominent in the 2009 report.
In 2009, our operational spills of oil and oil products totalled around 1,300
tonnes, the lowest amount we have ever recorded. We continue to learn from
such spills. As a result, we developed additional guidelines for the inspection
and repair of all our distribution pipelines (Shell, 2009, p.15).
Shell elaborates:
The total number of spills in 2009 was 132, against the average between 2005
and 2009 of 175 per year (SSR, 2009, p.15). In operations that we control we
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have clear requirements and procedures designed to prevent spills (Shell,
2009, p. 15).
The volume of oil spilled in 2009 during our operations was the lowest we
have recorded (Shell, 2009, p. 36).
In other ways, we undoubtedly had a difficult year in Nigeria in 2009. But we
are looking to the future and working to build on our relationship with the
communities. We have good-quality, committed staff in Nigeria – that’s
another reason for optimism. (Shell, 2009, p.7)

This last statement is similar to the 2005 report, in which Shell is supportive of
communities and educates them about sabotage, which is ‘good news’, even though
the spills are the company’s fault. In 2009 a similar pattern is established, where a
difficult year in Nigeria also becomes ‘good news’. Argument and factual examples
are interwoven to illustrate how Shell is dealing with oil spills. Oil spills caused by
Shell’s ‘operations are reconstructed in terms of the responsible and positive actions
the company has taken.
In 2010, similar discourse is evident:
We were able to renew infrastructure, such as pipelines, and build facilities to
collect gas produced with oil that is normally burned, or flared (Shell, 2010,
p.18).
In addition, in 2010 Shell did more clearly admit to their role in operational spills.
We have made mistakes, but we listen and try to learn from the past to
improve our performance today and in the future (Shell, 2010, p.18).
No operational spill is acceptable and we recognise that we have to improve
our performance in this area. We are investing in an ongoing maintenance
programme. We are also determined to be more transparent in our response to
oil spills (Shell, 2010, p.18)
However, company’s past ‘mistakes’ are also acknowledged in Shell’s 2005
sustainability report. They are aware of the company’s past performance and will do
better by ‘listening’ and ‘trying’ in the future. Although operational oil spills are
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acceptable, it is worth aligning this statement with the response letter to major
shareholders.
Less than 30% of spill volumes in the last five years have been due to
operational failures, such as pipeline corrosion, equipment failure and
human error. SPDC has been working hard to minimise spills due to
operational failures, and only 2% of the 2009 spills were caused by
these issues (Shell, 2010a, n.p).
The controllable oil spills were 2% in 2009. This makes them a significantly smaller
problem than the uncontrollable. The above examples show how, once again,
discourse produced in the sustainability reports is consistent with discourse produced
in the response letter. Throughout the texts there is a repetition of words such as
‘continuing’ and ‘reducing’. Consistent with this disclosure, SPDC annual reports
show the use of similar language to that in Shell’s sustainability reports. The
following section provides examples of the keywords used in SPDC annual reports.

In 2001, a major oil spill occurred in Ogbodo in Rivers State. SPDC’s annual report
for 2001 acknowledges equipment failure, but also states that “an unknown person
closed in a valve on a major delivery trunkline” (SPDC 2001, p.41). This example
demonstrates that Shell admits that equipment failure was the main reason for the
spill, while redirecting the focus to their reluctance to accept explicit responsibility
for the oil spill. Further examples of responsive behaviour are evidenced in the
following excerpts:
We have maintained and strengthened existing measures for oil spills
prevention. As described elsewhere in this report, these include the upgrading
of our facilities to reduce and prevent cases of corrosion and equipment
failure (SPDC, 2000, p.37).

While we are pleased that our spill records now meet the quality standard of
the Shell Group, we also aim to reduce the number of spills that occur
(SPDC, 2001, p.59).
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During the year, we continued monitoring the regulatory compliance of our
operations using a transparent reporting format (SPDC, 2002, p.35).

They continue in the 2002 report:
During 2002, we commenced more intensive investigations into all major
spill cases (SPDC, 2002, p.42).
In 2004, controllable oil spills were also due to issues outside Shell’s control:
Spills from corrosion increased from 18 in 2003 to 38 in 2004 due in part to
denial of access by communities – for an extended period of six to 18 months
– which affected our ability to undertake corrosion mitigating inspections and
cathodic protection programmes (SPDC, 2004, p.16).
Thus, in 2004 the discourse of oil spills was shaped by implicating the community to
take responsibility, thereby creating more focus on the ‘other’.

Also, we increased consultation and engagement of host communities to
create greater awareness on the consequences of oil spills and the need for
timely reporting of incidents. In addition, communities are being encouraged
to take responsibility for safeguarding assets located in their areas, as part of
pipeline and facilities surveillance contracts (SPDC, 2004, p.16).

As in previous years, the denial of access to spill sites by some communities
restricted our ability to respond and clean up spills in good time. In 2005 the
spill response and remediation units were combined into one unit to improve
efficiency in spill response, clean-up and remediation of impacted sites. This
has resulted in a quicker response to spill emergencies, enabling us to achieve
containment and recovery in 82 per cent of the impacted sites (SPDC, 2005,
p.16).
The above excerpts indicate how discourse around controllable oil spills is mostly
concerned with responsive and learning actions. This is further elaborated in 2005
and 2006, when the reports implicate communities as having a role in oil spills:
We continued to remind our host communities about the consequences of oil
spills, and the need for timely reporting of incidents. As in previous years,
communities are being encouraged to take responsibility for safeguarding and
protecting assets located in their areas, as part of pipeline and facilities
surveillance contract (SPDC, 2005, p.16).
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Once again, Shell is taking action in 2005 and 2006.
The remediation of impacted sites is a key focus of Shell Nigeria’s
environmental management programme. Evaluation of impacted sites
continued in 2005, during which a further 346 sites were assessed as
requiring remediation. These included past impacted sites as well as sites
resulting from spills that occurred in 2005 (SPDC, 2005, p.16).
We were able to rehabilitate more sites previously impacted by oil spills than
planned during the year (SPDC, 2006, p.3).

Both Shell and SPDC demonstrate a consistency in language when referring to
controllable spills. There is a dominance of statements and reference to ‘we will’,
‘we continue’, ‘we have’ and other argumentative markers (Figure 6.3).

Corporate reports, as textual discourse, have a rhetorical effect or meaning.
Operational spills’ conveys an impression that Shell is in control of certain oil spills
in Nigeria within their sphere of influence. The notion of the entity principle is
evoked: these oil spills are internal to the entity, as opposed to externalities (in this
case, uncontrollable oil spills). Labels such as ‘we continue, ‘we increased’ or ‘we
cleaned’ are used to demonstrate ownership and present a positive self-representation
of Shell and SPDC as responsible and accountable. In addition, the reports show
how the company brings the community into ‘controlling’ oil spills where discourse
of ‘the other’ is created. This is highlighted in the following section.

6.4.2 Sabotage (uncontrollable) oil spill discourse
This section provides explicit examples of the keywords used in ‘uncontrollable’
disclosures. The analysis reveals that the dominant meaning attached to
uncontrollable spills is ‘sabotage’. Consistent with the response letter to the major
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shareholders, Shell’s 2007 sustainability report (p.20) defines uncontrollable spills as
“spills from sabotage that fluctuate with events”. Sabotage is defined by the
Cambridge Dictionary (2010); the definition even uses oil pipelines as an example:
[to]damage or destroy equipment, weapons or buildings in order to prevent
the success of an enemy or competitor. For example, the rebels had tried to
sabotage the oil pipeline.
Shell refers to an example of sabotage as “when thieves drill into pipelines or
damage wellhead equipment to steal oil and natural gas liquids” (Shell, 2009, p.22).
Shell claims that “the great majority of oil spills in Nigeria are the result of sabotage”
(Shell, 2009, p.22). On average, 95% of spills (by volume) are attributed to sabotage
(Shell, 2009). Shell further states that “most incidents involve people seeking access
to payments and clean-up jobs” (Shell, 2005, p.27). However, the company admits
that “compensation is only paid for operational spills” (Shell, 2005, p.27). There is a
resource-allocation issue here at stake. Nigerians involved in remediating
controllable oil spills are compensated for their work by Shell, and this compensation
is considered an internal cost of production. In contrast, Shell does not have the
responsibility to remediate uncontrollable spills. The following excerpts show the
dominant words used when commenting on uncontrollable oil spills.

In Nigeria’s Niger Delta, well organised armed gangs continued to steal crude
oil (Shell, 2003, p.5).
Similar reporting is also documented in their 2004 sustainability report, in which
Shell states:
The challenging operating environment that we experienced in 2003
continued in 2004. The organised theft of crude oil by armed gangs remains a
major concern. In all, we recorded 71 crude oil theft incidents in 2004 (Shell,
2004, p.2).
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In 2004, the government increased security patrols in the Delta to deal with
inter-tribal violence and combat large-scale oil theft by international armed
gangs (estimated at 40-60 thousand barrels per day). We helped the security
services by alerting them to pipeline tapping and provided logistical support
when asked (Shell, 2004, p.17).
Unfortunately, another 157 spills were caused by sabotage, mostly by
communities seeking access payments and clean-up jobs. Meanwhile, we are
talking to the communities about the dangers (Shell, 2004, p.16).
This last excerpt is consistent with disclosures on ‘controllable’ oil spills where Shell
introduces ‘community’ into the discourse to present itself as a ‘responsive’,
corporate citizen.

In 2005 the following is reported:
Sabotage remains the biggest cause of spills – nearly 95% of spill volumes in
2005 and the hardest to tackle. Most incidents involve people seeking access
payments and clean-up jobs. We continued to improve our spill response,
hiring local community surveillance teams and educating communities on the
dangers of sabotage (Shell, 2005, p.27).

In December 2005, a major pipeline was blown up by members of an ethnic
militia. As a result spill volumes from sabotage rose in 2005 (Shell, 2005,
p.27).
But we did not meet our 2005 target because of higher spill volumes caused
by hurricanes in the US Gulf of Mexico and sabotage in Nigeria. Spill
volumes from sabotage in Nigeria rose despite an increase in community
patrols and protection of vulnerable pipeline sections. This was because of
one big incident, spilling 340 tonnes of oil, when a major pipeline was
bombed by an ethnic militia (Shell, 2005, p.32).

Shell continues to cite sabotage as the main reason for oil spills, and the explanation
for why they have not met their 2005 spill target.

Militants have sabotaged flow stations and pipelines and made it impossible
for us to get to many of these facilities to repair the damage or do normal
maintenance (Shell, 2006, p.32).
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Our total spill volume rose in 2007 mainly because of a sharp rise in spills
due to sabotage in Nigeria (up 80% by volume), where crude oil thefts and
attacks by militants continued (Shell, 2007, p.20).

In 2007, 30 people (two employees and 28 contractors) lost their lives in
confirmed incidents while working for Shell. Two lives were lost due to
assaults and a third died as a result of a fire caused by criminals stealing oil
from a pipeline (Shell, 2007, p.22).
These excerpts are consistent with previous years, reinforcing the terrible conflict
between the company and the people and community, which resulted in the loss of
two lives in 2007. These struggles between the company and ‘the other’ are further
discussed in Chapter 7.

The excerpt below introduces new discourse, where sabotage is a bigger issue, and
beyond the influence of the company. Shell states:
Nigeria’s challenges are familiar: widespread poverty; an ongoing battle with
corruption and neglect; and the rise of organised crime and armed militias in
the Niger Delta, fuelled by large-scale thefts of crude oil, that since early
2006 have made it unsafe to produce in large parts of the region (Shell, 2007,
p.24).
The reporting on 2008 oil spills is similar to the portrayal in 2007 and 2006. Shell
elaborates that:
In November, SPDC temporarily shut down the Soku gas plant to repair
damage from fires and spills caused by criminal gangs stealing condensate
from its pipelines (Shell, 2008, p.20).

Wherever SPDC has been forced to withdraw because of the current security
situation, it has fully shut down the production facilities to limit spill damage
if those sites are vandalised. Unfortunately spills caused by sabotage
remained a serious problem, with their volumes rising again in 2008 for the
fourth consecutive year (Shell, 2008, p.21).
It is more difficult to reduce spills caused by sabotage, hurricanes or other
things we cannot control. About half the total volume spilled in 2008 was
caused by one sabotage incident in Nigeria, where a large pipeline was
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damaged by explosives. As a result of that incident, our spills from sabotage
rose, pushing total spill volume higher (Shell, 2008, p.31).

Furthermore, when Shell articulates issues of safety, sabotage is blamed for the
breaches. This is best illustrated in SSR (2008, p. 42):
In 2008, 26 people (two employees and 24 contractors) lost their lives
working for Shell. Of these fatalities, nine happened on the road. A further 10
occurred in Nigeria, three of these as a result of security incidents and the rest
in one tragic incident in which seven contractors died when repairing a
pipeline after a sabotage incident.
Shell goes on to explain that in 2009 the volume of such spills for the SPDCoperated joint venture was almost 14,000 tonnes, accounting for 98% of the total
SPDC spill volume during the year. This is repeated multiple times throughout the
report; e.g. p.9 of the 2009 report states:
Sabotage in Nigeria was the largest cause of spills for Shell, accounting for
nearly 14,000 tonnes (Shell, 2009, p.9).

This is then repeated on p.15:
Sabotage and theft in Nigeria is the largest single cause of spills for Shell. In
2009, the volume of oil spilled due to the sabotage of operations in Nigeria
was nearly 14,000 tonnes (Shell, 2009, p.15).
On p.22 of the report Shell repeats similar discourse:
The great majority of oil spills in Nigeria are the result of sabotage or are
caused when thieves drill into pipelines or damage wellhead equipment to
steal oil and natural gas liquids. In 2009 the volume of such spills for the
SPDC-operated joint venture was almost 14,000 tonnes, accounting for 98%
of total SPDC spills volume during the year and significantly greater than
sabotage and theft-related spills in 2008 (Shell, 2009, p.22).

Sabotage and theft-related spills in Nigeria increased significantly in 2009,
with spill volume being dominated by two large spills. At the Odidi field,
around 10,500 tonnes were spilled due to theft, and a spill of around 2,500
tonnes occurred due to sabotage at the Trans Escravos pipeline (Shell, 2009,
p.36).
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Nigeria, especially the Niger Delta, remains a very challenging place in
which to operate. Security issues and sabotage are constant threats to our
people, assets and the environment. But we are cautiously optimistic that
conditions there are improving and that our initiatives to help community
development and build on our partnerships with the government will produce
good results (Shell, 2009, p.7).
Building on this, the rest of the 2009 report reinforces the ‘gangs’ and ‘thieves’
discourse. This is repeated in the following two excerpts:
In 2008, saboteurs spilled almost 48,000 barrels of oil in 140 incidents – on
average one leak every two and a half days. About 40,000 barrels of this was
the result of armed gangs blowing up pipelines with explosives in 10 separate
incidents (Shell, 2009, p.22).
The great majority of oil spills in Nigeria are the result of sabotage or are
caused when thieves drill into pipelines or damage wellhead equipment to
steal oil and natural gas liquids (Shell, 2009, p.22).
Thieves or saboteurs spilled about 103,000 barrels from SPDC facilities in 95
incidents – an average of one spill every four days (Shell, 2009, p.15).
This excerpt shows the identification of the ‘other’ with a strong focus on thieves,
criminals, gang members and saboteurs. This is consistent with other years, as
illustrated in the following sections. In 2010 the emphasis in the discourse is again
on criminal gangs and thieves.
Criminal gangs continue to steal oil from pipelines at an estimated rate of
100,000 barrels a day. Theft and illegal refining cause extensive
environmental damage. Sabotage and theft together accounted for more than
80% of the spill volume from SPDC facilities in 2010 (Shell, 2010, p.18)
In recent years most spills from SPDC facilities have been caused by
sabotage and theft (Shell, 2010, p.18)
In 2010, sabotage and theft in Nigeria remained a significant cause of spills,
totalling 3.0 thousand tonnes (Shell, 2010, p.30).
Theft and illegal refining cause extensive environmental damage. Sabotage
and theft together accounted for more than 80% of the spill volume from
SPDC facilities in 2010 (Shell, 2010, p.18).
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Crude oil theft and illegal refining are widespread in the mangrove swamps
of the Niger Delta (Shell, 2010, p.19).
SPDC believes that until organised large-scale oil theft and illegal refining
are stopped, there can be no lasting solution to the pollution of some areas of
the Niger Delta (Shell, 2010, p.19).
Criminal gangs continue to steal oil from pipelines at an estimated rate of
100,000 barrels a day (Shell, 2010, p.19).
The following excerpts are from SPDC’s annual reports. As SPDC is a joint venture
between Shell and the Nigerian government (as discussed in Chapter 3), the public
discourse produced by SPDC can be considered to be that of the government, as a
major shareholder, and other oil companies. Consistent with Shell’s sustainability
reports, the SPDC text reinforces the notion that the majority of oil spills are caused
by sabotage:
Sabotage remains a significant problem and accounted for 40 per cent of the
incidents and 57 per cent of the volume of oil spilled (SPDC, 2000, p.37).
In 2002, 21.8 million barrels was deferred through sabotage, bringing to 39.4
million the total deferment resulting from community disturbances and
sabotage (i.e. criminal damage to facilities for financial benefit). The
company regrets these oil spill incidents and we continue to work with local
authorities (SPDC, 2002, p.4).
Once again the above excerpts show there is a ‘criminals’ versus ‘corporate citizen’
dichotomy; it continues in the excerpts below, where Shell reports that only 3% of oil
spills are the company’s fault:

In 2003 sadly 141 (about two-thirds) of spills were caused by wilful damage
to facilities (sabotage) that accounted for 68 per cent of the total volume of
oil spilled (SPDC, 2003, p.8).
A reduction of 19 per cent was recorded in the total volume of oil spilled in
2004. Significantly, only three per cent of the volume of oil spilled in 2004
resulted from controllable incidents. The remaining 97 per cent was caused
by wilful damage to facilities (sabotage). Oil spills resulting from sabotage
continued to be a significant challenge in 2004 and a cause for concern
(SPDC, 2004, p.16).
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Criminals also used the cover of ethnic conflicts to undertake crude oil theft
activities (SPDC, 2004, p. 2).
As we reported in 2003, we continued to explore measures against sabotage
by integrating our oil spill response and remediation units in one department
under one accountability group for more effectiveness. Also, we increased
consultation and engagement of host communities to create greater awareness
on the consequences of oil spills and the need for timely reporting of
incidents (SPDC, 2004, p. 16).

The above excerpts again illustrate a positive image of Shell as being: responsive,
managed, accountable and transparent, and as continuing to educate the ‘other’ who
is causing the problem. The dichotomy of the ‘corporate citizen’ versus the
‘criminal’ continues in the following excerpts, where the text captures the audience’s
attention through repeated statements that sabotage is the main cause and is
synonymous with the uncontrollable oil spills. In the latter statements, Shell takes a
dominant position, assuming that their ‘reader’ already knows the cause of the spills.
Sabotage accounted for 94 per cent of this volume – 8,064 barrels (1,090
tonnes) in 2004, increasing to 11,265 barrels (1,522 tonnes) in 2005. Oil
spills resulting from sabotage continued to be a significant challenge and a
cause for concern, especially as over half of these incidents (73) occurred
along our major pipelines and manifolds (SPDC, 2005, p.15).
Although, more recently, sabotage has been carried out by armed militant
groups, it is more usually motivated by the desire for economic gain on the
part of some, though by no means all, in our host communities. The prospect
of compensation payments (if the incident can be disguised as a controllable
one), employment opportunities during the spill clean up and the attempted
charging of “access fees” before people and equipment are allowed on site
are all temptations for communities that feel that they have not benefited
from nearby oil production (SPDC, 2005, p.16).

We remain concerned about the possible environmental damage from these
oil spills and we share the frustration of our stakeholders that we cannot get
access to clean them up (SPDC, 2006, p.7).

Attacks on facilities such as flow stations and pipelines led to oil spills in
some of the affected areas and it was difficult for us to access these sites
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during the crisis to repair the damage or carry out routine maintenance. We
remain concerned about the possible environmental damage from these oil
spills and we share the frustration of our stakeholders that we cannot get
access to clean them up (SPDC, 2006, p.7).

However, due to the lack of access to fields in our western area of operation,
we were unable to assess and clean up the spills in this area caused by
militant group activities (SPDC, 2006, p.12).

Oil spills resulting from sabotage continued to be a challenge, with most
incidents along our major pipelines and manifolds. Attacks by armed militant
groups on some of our major pipelines and facilities in our western operations
also led to spills. As in previous years, some communities denied access to
spill sites, restricting our ability to respond and clean up spills in good time
(SPDC, 2006, p.12).

These excerpts demonstrate that Shell’s attempts to clean up oil spills is prevented by
the ‘other’. A similar discourse is repeated when attempts to quantify total oil spill
volume has been thwarted, as in 2006, when:

[d]ue to lack of comprehensive documentary evidence and the security
situation that greatly limited access to affected areas, we have not published
our total spills volume estimate (SPDC, 2006, p.15).
As these excerpts demonstrate, Shell’s and SPDC’s corporate texts construct a
particular version of uncontrollable oil spills. Fairclough (1993, p.64) argues that
“discourse helps construct social relationships between people” and that “discourse
contributes to the construction of systems of knowledge and beliefs”. This is the case
with this discourse on oil spills. The corporate texts essentially aim to construct such
knowledge (van Dijk, 1993a). Strong and powerful language is used when reporting
on uncontrollable oil spills: the words used in relation to sabotage include ‘damage’,
‘thieves’, ‘gangsters’, ‘bombed’ and ‘ethnic militia’; all emphasise the ‘other’ as
responsible for oil spills and thus reinforce the realm of the uncontrollable. The
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discourses in use by Shell maintain that sabotage is the major cause of oil spills, and
in its corporate disclosures sabotage becomes a dominant discourse. On the one
hand, Shell collectively describes the citizens in the Nigerian oil communities as
thieves, gangsters and criminals, without specific identification of individuals. On the
other hand, Shell also tries to engage with communities, either by hiring them for
pipeline security or conferring responsibility for oil spills to them. Shell even goes so
far as to educate citizens on the impact of oil spills. The corporate disclosure assigns
both problem and responsibility to the local Nigerian community. This
‘problematising’ of Nigerian communities will be contested in the next chapter.

This stage of analysis presents dichotomous images from the public discourse
regarding controllable and uncontrollable oil spills, as demonstrated through the
shareholders’ letter, and sustainability and annual reports. There is a differentiation
in the text regarding uncontrollable and controllable oil spills. At this stage these
presentations of oil spills are partisan; however, as Chapter 7 demonstrates, these
definitions or boundaries of responsibility are contested by other groups that produce
a counter-narrative to Shell and SPDC’s portrayal of oil spills.

In the overall text analysis meaning is shaped by different entities involved in the
discourse; one for the company reporting on ‘operational spills’ and one for the
Nigerian community when reporting on ‘sabotage spills’. One is a positive
description of the company and one is a negative description of the citizens of oil
communities. This is an accountability discourse whereby Shell is ‘accountable’ for
small number of operational oil spills but shifts accountability to the ‘other’
regarding the majority of the other incidents. Controllable spills are within a domain
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of responsibility for Shell and SPDC, and therefore these companies are accountable;
a notion not dissimilar to the control discourse so common in the accounting
definitions of assets and liabilities. Uncontrollable oil spills are outside this domain
of responsibility, as the ‘other’ is presented as responsible for these oil spills, and
therefore accountable.

The discourse used by Shell and SPDC clearly illustrate that sabotage is the main
reason cited for oil spills. Halliday (1978, p.109) points out that “text is a matter of
'choice'” as the author of a text selects what, how, and how much to tell in a text. In
this case, Shell has selected a particular text to create their social reality about oil
spills. Shell uses value-laden words that have no clear definition to justify their oilspill disclosures in Nigeria and to distance the company from oil spills. Ferraro et al.
(2005, p. 9) argues that “language affects what people see; how they see it, and the
social categories and descriptors they use to interpret their reality”. When reporting
on operational spills, Shell is presented as in control of maintenance and remediation
where possible, and an environmentally responsible company against seemingly
overwhelming challenges from saboteurs. Shell creates an image of a company that
is a victim of its host community’s violence e.g. ‘heavily armed and well organised
groups’, ‘highly sophisticated crime’ and ‘militant violence’.

Despite some limited examples of operational spills, the dominant use of sabotage in
the text indicates that the community is a constant threat to operations in Nigeria.
This chapter presented the incidence of oil spills due to sabotage according to Shell’s
corporate disclosures. The next chapter will contest these disclosures by invoking the
discourse by NGOs as a counter-narrative.
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6.5 Summary
Accountability discourses involve identification and representation of phenomena
that are within a sphere of responsibility. In this case, the phenomenon of oil spills is
presented as either controllable (accountable) or uncontrollable (not accountable).
This text analysis presented the words and meanings chosen for oil spills in three key
public-discourse accountability documents by Shell and SPDC. The analysis of
keywords in the selected texts reveals that a particular oil-spills discourse has
emerged and has been reiterated over a 10-year period in Shell’s corporate
disclosures.

The disclosures clearly indicate that sabotage is the main reason Shell cites for its oil
spills in Nigeria. There is a positive image of the company and a negative image of
Nigerian community, and Shell has currency in their story, as it is their story. The
sense of the ‘other’ is constructed as being criminal at worst, or, less harshly, as
communities that need to take responsibility or be educated. This thesis argues that
Shell, as a powerful corporate elite in Nigeria, has control in using and disseminating
this discourse for public consumption in its corporate texts. The repetition of
dominant words in the letter and the sustainability reports and annual reports, is not
mere consistency but a way of perpetuating Shell’s social construction of the
meaning of oil spills. The discursive representation of oil spills in all three public
documents reinforced Shell as a responsible corporate citizen, thereby shifting
responsibility away from Shell. The interrogation of text at a micro-level exposes the
151

domination or privileging of certain interests. However, one cannot ignore the
counter-narratives. These are explored in Chapter 7, which presents the second level,
‘discursive practice’, and reveals how language is used and abused in the exercise of
elite power in a “grossly unequal world where the poor and oppressed are subject to
discrimination and exploitation” (Widdowson, 1998, p.136).
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CHAPTER 7: DISCOURSE AS DISCURSIVE PRACTICE

7.1 Introduction
The previous chapter applied the first level of CDA, analysing discourse as ‘text’,
and identified the vocabulary and nuances of keywords used by Shell to describe or
refer to oil spills. The main differences in the text were: controllable oil spills, which
were a small proportion of total spills; and, uncontrollable oil spills which were a
large proportion. However, Chapter 6 only focussed on disclosures according to
Shell. This chapter focuses on the discursive-practice level, and analysing discourse
in terms of the processes by which text is produced, distributed and consumed
(Fairclough, 1992). This involves incorporating a broader view of the texts and how
they are used, and includes how text is consumed by those who did not construct it.
This chapter introduces interpretations that contest Shell’s construction of oil spills.
This alternative interpretation is presented as a counter-narrative predominantly from
NGOs. In this thesis this process of ‘text’ as a discursive practice is evaluated as a
contested terrain between the corporate elite - in this case, Shell - and the NGOs.

The main actors identified in discursive practice for the purposes of this thesis are:
1. Shell, as the MNC parent entity and the primary producer of discourse in its
corporate narrative disclosures.
2. The Nigerian government, as a major shareholder in the joint venture
operated by SPDC and as the governing authority in the country.
3. NGOs that have challenged Shell’s operations and oil-spill disclosures in
Nigeria for the period under investigation.
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Since the aim of this level of analysis is to demonstrate how discursive practices
enable elite discourse, these key players are identified due to their complex direct
and indirect relationship with the issue of oil spills in Nigeria. Shell’s narrative
disclosure provides a partisan view of oil-spill events, and is articulated in different
types of ‘texts’; those examined in this study are the response letter to shareholders,
Shell’s sustainability reports and SPDC’s annual reports. This highlights the different
meanings of oil spills that have been meditated through disclosures that enable the
corporate elite, Shell, to have a dominant voice. The text analysis highlighted that the
dominant voice facilitated a sense of blame towards the ‘other’ for oil spills. This
‘other’ has been identified in Chapter 2 as Nigeria’s oil communities living in areas
where SPDC’s production takes place. This discourse is, however, contested by
counter-narratives; the voices of a number of NGOs are presented as discourse
practice.

This chapter focuses on alternative discourses of oil spills with respect to counternarratives presented by various NGOs. It begins by interrogating the intertextuality
features of the text by investigating how discourse is produced. By disclosing oil
spills, Shell and SPDC (through the letter, and the sustainability and annual reports)
produced a discursive representation of oil-spill events. The analysis in Chapter 6
demonstrates the consistency in the texts examined. For analytical purposes, the
production and distribution of discourse is combined, as it is difficult to segregate or
untangle. Similarly, CDA offers levels of analysis, but these should not be
considered as distinct, but somewhat overlapping.

In analysing the consumption of discourse, ‘cognisance is given to the situation: it is
just not text that shapes interpretation, but also other contextual factors’ (Gallhofer et
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al. 2001, p.128). In this thesis this is the counter-narrative produced by other key
players – specifically, selected NGOs - and completes the process of how discourse
is produced, distributed and consumed (Fairclough, 1992) using public documents.
The following section discusses the discursive practice and uncontrollable and
controllable oil spills. The counter-narrative and the implications and insights from
elite theory conclude the chapter.

7.2 Discursive practice and uncontrollable oil spills
Textual analysis (Chapter 6) highlighted that sabotage discourse ‘stands out’ in the
overall communication of Shell’s and SPDC’s oil-spill narrative disclosures. There is
consistency in the discourse in the selected texts, and this ‘sabotage’ discourse flows
through all the public documents analysed. Textual analysis also demonstrates that
the ‘sabotage’ discourse is given priority within each text under investigation for the
period 2000-2010. With the sophisticated language employed from year to year,
Shell continues a repetitive commentary of sabotage through all these public
documents and the company’s ‘facts’ and story on oil spills. Van Dijk (1993, p.255)
points out that:
[effective] power is mostly cognitive, and enacted by persuasion,
dissimulation or manipulation, among other strategic ways to change the
mind of others in ones own interests [emphasis in original].
The intention of using accusative language associated with the idea of sabotage
presents to wider audiences the rhetoric of Shell’s ‘view’ of oil spills. However, as
the counter-narrative reveals, Shell does not merely describe the world, but rather,
advocates a social reality through corporate texts that present an account of
responsibility towards the ‘other’. The counter-narrative (Section 7.4) further
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demonstrates the nuances and subtleties that are ‘hidden’ in the selected text, and
reveals Shell as an elite that exhibits power in the discourse which is produced. This
is clearly evident in the language chosen when reporting on sabotage oil spills. Van
Dijk (1993, p.258) argues that:
[c]ontrol of knowledge crucially shapes our interpretation of the world, as
well as our discourse and other actions.
This thesis, in using annual reports, recognises and confirms their importance. As
Gray et al. (1995, p.82) argue, “ the annual report not only is a statutory document,
produced regularly, but it also represents what is probably the most important
document in terms of the organization’s construction of its own social imagery”.
Moreover, annual reports are seen as corporate communication, with “strategic
choices regarding rhetoric and rhetorical arguments” (Vaara and Tienari, 2002, in
Laine, 2009, p.1034). Shell has mastered prevaricating language and corporate
communications as a rhetorical accountability device, while at the same time
distancing itself from its responsibility for oil spills in Nigeria. As the textual
analysis demonstrated, the producers of discourse, Shell and SPDC (and indirectly
the Nigerian government), blame the ‘other’ for the oil-spill disasters. Shell portrays
the Nigerian people as its ‘rival’ and, through dominant discourses employed,
simultaneously protects its corporate image.

The descriptive words used in relation to sabotage, such as ‘damage’, ‘thieves’,
‘gangsters’, ‘bombed’ and ‘ethnic militia’, all appeal to a position of blame towards
someone else for oil spills. The intertextuality in the consistent use of these terms in
all the texts examined is an important aspect of the production, transmission and
reception of discourses. These words as a feature of discourse are the means of
symbolic reproduction of the dominance of Shell over the ‘image’ and ‘reality’ of oil
156

spills. Shell thus distinguishes its power by presenting itself as a ‘victim’ to
‘gangsters’ and ‘other militia’.

This thesis argues that Shell uses discourse to sustain sabotage arguments and to
influence the consumption of its corporate narrative disclosures through production
techniques and distribution. That is, Shell’s corporate lexicalisation multiplies the
signals of corporate power, its elite position in Nigeria and its persuasive strategies to
influence a secondary audience: the users of corporate texts. Van Dijk (1993a, p.260)
suggests that:
[i]n production of discourse, notably when addressed to members of
dominated groups, this will be most often the case through the direct
enactment of power abuse. In discourse understanding and reproduction by
the (dominant) audience itself, therefore, we will generally expect the
discourse to focus on the persuasive marginalization of the other by
manipulation of event models and the generalized negative attitudes derived
from them.
The intention of the language of sabotage is to persuade the public of the serious
threats and challenges oil spills have brought to Shell. It appears that the rationale
behind such text is to capture the public’s attention by repeatedly stating that
sabotage is the main and ultimate cause of oil spills. This is consistent with
Fairclough’s (1993, p.64) view that “discourse is a practice not just of representing
the world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in
meaning”. Additionally, Foucault (1981) suggests that discourses that are repeatedly
commented on over a period of time are the ones most likely to be considered valid
and worthy of recognition. Therefore, Shell’s considered and consistent use of
‘sabotage’ becomes more than a descriptor, but a discourse and rhetorical device.
The texts portray a ‘victimised’ company whose operations are not the main cause of
oil spills in Nigeria. Primarily, there exists a discourse of victimisation juxtaposed
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with the ‘we are responsible’ line. With the sophisticated language in use one can
easily be convinced by Shell’s portrayal of oil spill events.

At this level of analysis, it is important to consider the consistency of Shell’s
discourse in terms of its power and access to resources to control discourse
production. This is consistent with Saint (2010, p.16) who argues that:
[w]ith an army of researchers, lobbyists and PR companies at their disposal,
corporations have been able to shape both popular and political opinion on
the environment.
The application of elite theory then is useful to shed light on this relationship and the
power held by Shell. Van Dijk (1993a, p.264) suggests that:
[o]ne of the ways to discredit powerless groups, for instance, is to pay
extensive attention to their alleged threat to the interests and privileges of the
dominant group. Such a strategy is conducive to the formation of models that
feature such well-known propositions as we are the real victims.
This thesis argues that the discourse of SPDC is also the discourse of the Nigerian
government, a 55% shareholder. Okonta and Douglas (2003, p.58) argue that:
Shell has done very well for itself in a Nigeria repressed, brutalized, and
looted in turns by successive military dictators. To outsiders, the company
projects the image of the neutrality in the quicksand of Nigerian politics, a
wise and benevolent patriarch towering above the chaos and corruption that
government and public life has become in Nigeria since the civil war. The
reality, however, is that the multinational has quietly and unobtrusively
worked its way to the epicenter of power over the years.

The assumptions of elite theory are consistent with the arguments of Okonta and
Douglas (2003) but not always evident in financial accounting disclosures. This
thesis demonstrates through a CDA analysis how such assumptions are, in this case,
evident in both accounting and corporate narrative disclosures.
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At the level of reception, albeit from an unspecified public, Shell and SPDC are the
main producers of the text, and therefore have an epistemological claim to the ‘truth’
about oil spills. On the other hand, those characterised as the ‘other’ are affected by
the oil spills and are powerless and without a direct voice in how they are viewed and
represented in the narrative public disclosures.

The sabotage that does occur, as noted by Amnesty International (2009), may be an
attempt by the powerless to assert their presence and power. However, given the
power Shell has in Nigeria, the oppressed and powerless group in this case is given
very little choice. This discursive production, or reproduction, of power results from
social cognitions of the powerful. This is further explored in Chapter 8.

This section has examined what the discursive participants have said about oil spills,
and more importantly, the intertextuality – the sense in which text responds to
previous texts. This section examined Shell and SPDC and how they have influenced
the perception of oil spills. The next section shifts the focus and examines discursive
practice when commenting on operational oil spills.

7.3 Discursive practice and controllable oil spills
The textual analysis (Chapter 6) demonstrated that when reporting on operational oil
spills, Shell and SPDC construct a particular image of a responsible company. Words
such as ‘we continue’, ‘we reduced’, ‘we cleaned’, ‘we helped’ and so on flow
through the public documents used in the analysis and suggest that Shell is taking
responsible action and control of their operational spills. This lexicon implies
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‘ongoing’, ‘proactive’ and ‘successful’ action on behalf of the company in their
management of oil spills. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p.84) argue that such words
constitute a “promotional discourse, and consequently, their construction of identity,
which are dominant”. In relation to annual reports, for example, Bhatia et al. (2008,
p.168) argue:
In recent years, the function of corporate annual disclosure documents, as
many other corporate genres, seems to have undergone a gradual shift from
informing and reporting to increasingly promoting the companies to their
audiences, by mystifying corporate weaknesses through a subtle bending of
socially accepted communicative norms of corporate disclosure genres.

This promotional discourse is evident in Shell’s narrative disclosures, wherein Shell
is personified and defined through this discourse as a ‘good’ participant. This identity
of being ‘good’ is reinforced through the nominalisations of ‘responsible, ‘caring’
and ‘accountable’ (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). The language used emphasises that
Shell has explicit consideration for the natural environment in which it operates;
these considerations are further highlighted by the strong emphasis on argumentative
markers such as ‘we must’, ‘we will’ and ‘we have’, as illustrated through examples
in textual analysis and Figure 6.3. Okonta and Douglas (2003, p.63) argue that:
Shell has been described as a major polluter of the environment on the one
hand, and a busy propagator and purveyor of technical fixes for its
transgression on the other. It is therefore not easy to penetrate the elaborate
‘environmentally friendly’ facade erected by the company’s green lobbyists
and spin doctors to the ogre that is polluting and despoiling the world’s
fragile ecosystems.
Based on the analysis in this thesis Shell presents itself as a corporation that
‘continues’, that ‘will’ and ‘must’, be better in the future because of the company’s
previous faults. For example, in its 2002 SR, Shell states:
When you lose trust, you need to admit it, learn from your mistakes and take
positive action to rectify the situation (Shell, 2002, p. 27)
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In relation to operational oil spills, Shell presents in its sustainability reports an
image of a company focussed on cleaning up oil spills and taking responsibility for
the operational spills in the future. However, Okonta and Douglas (2003, p.44) argue
quite the opposite:
Shell employs a sophisticated array of damage-control experts, scenario
planners, lobbyists, and spin doctors to present the image of caring,
thoughtful, and socially responsible company to the outside world. Long
before the issue of the environment became a topic of national discourse in
Europe and the United States, and multinational oil firms were forced to
adopt to veneer of environmentally friendly companies, Shell had elevated
the concept of selling itself to the powerful conservationist lobby into an art
form devoting a considerable chunk of its budget to this effort over the years.
Van Dijk (1993a, p.259) indicates that “dominant discourses (indirectly) influence
socially shared knowledge, attitudes and ideologies”. For example, Shell’s 2008
sustainability report states:
Since 1997, we have been reducing the amount of spills from our operations
that occur for reasons we can control. We have done so through clear
procedures, consistent compliance and a lot of hard work. However spill
volumes from sabotage rose sharply in 2008 due to one sabotage incident in
Nigeria, pushing up our total volume (Shell, 2008, p. 41).
Van Dijk (1993a, p.259) further suggests that if “powerful speakers or groups enact
or otherwise exhibit their power in discourse, we need to know exactly how this is
done”. This thesis builds on the contribution by Okonta and Douglas (2003) by
explicitly showing, through elite theory, how accounting mediates elite discourse.
Corporate disclosures help Shell create this image as discussed by Okonta and
Douglas (2003). This thesis demonstrates that Shell, as an elite in Nigeria, uses
corporate text as a means to produce dominant discourse. Shell does not merely
describe the world as it is, but rather advocates its social reality through several
media: annual and sustainability reports and communications to major shareholders.
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Shell shapes the discourse directly, and has the indirect support of the government in
this practice. Discourse practice is
one way of enacting power is to control context. Thus, doctors make
'appointments' with patients, professors with students, or tax auditors with
tax-payers, and thereby decide about place and time, and possible other
participants (Van Dijk, 1993a, p.260).
For the purpose of elite theory, Shell’s power and dominance is indicated by the
company’s control over access to and production of discourse (van Dijk, 1993a). In
addition, Shell uses its political power and influence to construct a favourable
‘reality’ of minimal controllable oil spills in their corporate narrative disclosures, and
is indirectly sanctioned by the Nigerian government through their joint venture,
operated by SPDC.
7.4 Counter-narrative: an alternative view of Shell’s oil spills
This section presents a counter-narrative and, in this context, an alternative discourse
from NGOs about Shell’s oil spills and oil-spill disclosures. The counter-narrative
exposes Shell’s reporting practices of uncontrollable oil spills, i.e. ‘alleged sabotage’,
and controllable, i.e. operational, spills. This counter-narrative is based on reports
from following NGOs:
-

Friends of the Earth International (FoE)

-

Christian Aid International Development Charity

-

Amnesty International (AI)

-

Media reports from AI and FoE

This group of NGOs publishes explicit reports on Shell’s operations and oil-spill
performance in Nigeria. In other words, they produce reports that challenge Shell’s
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oil-spill disclosures. A list of the reports used to support the counter-narrative is
presented in Table 2 of Appendix 3.

Over the years NGO research and evidence from several Nigerian court cases have
revealed that Shell has sometimes used false claims of sabotage to escape liability for
environmental damages (Frynas, 1999, 2000; Steiner, 2010). There is about 500 oilspill cases that have been filed against SPDC in Nigerian courts (Nwachukwu, 2011),
and Shell appears to rely very much on claims of sabotage to defend itself. Frynas
(2000, p.161) states that “of all the oil companies in Nigeria, the best evidence of
false claims of sabotage is available on Shell, as with a successful claim of sabotage,
the company could save up to $350,000 in a single lawsuit”.

This is further

supported by Steiner (2010) who in recent times challenged these sabotage claims,
stating:
Oil companies operating in the Niger Delta, in particular Shell, blame most of
the oil spills on sabotage and illegal bunkering (theft) by local community
members. It is in the company’s perceived financial interest to allege such, as
they feel this releases them from legal responsibility to clean up spills or
compensate the local communities (Steiner, 2010, p.6) [emphasis added].
A more recent media report from AI (2013, n.p) on sabotage stated:
Claims by Shell that sabotage is responsible for most oil spilt in Nigeria have
come under fire. A Dutch agency found that the oil giant’s statements were
based on disputed evidence and flawed investigations.

The report further states that:
Sabotage is a problem in Nigeria, but Shell exaggerates this issue to avoid
criticism for its failure to prevent oil spills, said Audrey Gaughran of
Amnesty International.

The oil companies are liable to pay compensation when spills are found to be
their fault but not if the cause is attributed to sabotage – but it is effectively
the company that investigates itself. This is clearly a system open to abuse
and we have evidence that it has been abused. Over the last decade, Shell has
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claimed that most of the oil spilt in the Niger Delta is due to sabotage of its
pipelines on the basis of a system that includes publicly contested data and
relies almost exclusively on information provided by the company itself.
The alleged sabotage cases have not been verified by any independent bodies.
Moreover, some of Shell’s statements on the percentage of oil spilt due to
sabotage are contradictory.

The NCP acknowledged that the oil spill investigation process in Nigeria
relies heavily on the expertise of the oil companies themselves and that, as
the UN Environment Programme found in 2011, “government agencies are at
the mercy of the oil companies when it comes to conducting site inspections.”
The NCP stated that “[Royal Dutch Shell] management should have had a
more cautious attitude about the percentage of oil spills caused by sabotage”
and that “after all JIT (Joint Investigation Team) data are not absolute”. The
NCP called on Shell to “be prudent with regard to general communication to
stakeholders of very detailed figures on oil spills, when discrepancies exist
with regard to the causes or amounts of those oil spills” and also to “share
information on relevant spill causes and spill cause determination procedures,
also dated before January 2011.

Over the years, many critics have argued that if the number or volume of oil spills in
Nigeria occurred in Shell’s countries of origin it would be a different story. Christian
Aid Development Charity (2004) found contrasting evidence to Shell’s claims about
oil spills:
Christian Aid has found evidence that Shell’s clean-up of oil spills and repair
of pipelines in Nigeria is scandalously inadequate and would never be
tolerated in Europe or North America. Oil spills, made inevitable by a
network of ageing pipes, many of which are still routed above ground, are left
for weeks, sometimes months, without being cleaned up. Oil is carried
downstream, visiting a deadly black plague on communities miles away from
the original spillage. This makes a nonsense of Shell’s claims of ‘integrity
and respect for people’, and its ‘commitment to support human rights and to
contribute to sustainable development’ in Nigeria (Christian Aid
Development Charity, 2004, p.29).

Evidence by AI (2009) suggests that equipment and operational failures are
sometimes wrongly designated as sabotage. Court actions in Nigeria such as Shell v
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Isaiah (1997)29 have reached similar conclusions. In this case, the plaintiffs went to
court seeking “compensation because, during a repair operation on a Shell pipe
which was dented when a tree fell on it, oil leaked on to farmland and into fishponds.
Shell claimed the leak was caused by sabotage” (AI, 2009, p.17). The Appeal Court
stated:
The issue of sabotage raised by the defendant is neither here nor there. I am,
having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, convinced that the
defence of sabotage was an afterthought. The three defence witnesses were
agreed on one thing, that is that an old tree fell on and dented the Shell pipe…
How could this have metamorphosed into an act of cutting the pipe by an
unknown person? What is more, there is no evidence whatsoever in proof that
the pipeline was ‘cut by hacksaw’ (Shell v Isaiah, 1997 in AI, 2009, p.17).

Sabotage of pipelines, to either steal crude oil or demand compensation payments,
causes some spills. However, Shell’s management and communities affected by
spills are constantly in disagreements over their cause (Christian Aid Development
Charity, 2004). As such the above example indicates that the Nigerian courts do not
simply accept sabotage as a claim.
Steiner (2010) for example argues that Shell’s pipe-maintenance standards in Nigeria
are insufficient compared to standards Shell follows elsewhere. In Nigeria Shell’s
spills and gas flaring are also seen as “a major human rights and environmental
tragedy” (FoE, 2010, n.p.). A recent report by the United Nations (UN) in 2011 has
placed Nigeria as one of the most vulnerable oil spill areas in the world. However,
the report brought a great deal of controversy as it was financially supported by
Shell, SPDC and other partners in the joint venture. An FoE (2010, n.p.)
representative stated:

29

Even though this case is not within the period of analysis in this thesis, it does illustrate contested
views.
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Friends of the Earth International is outraged by reports that a major UN
investigation into Nigeria oil spills funded by oil giant Shell relies more on
figures produced by oil companies and Nigerian state statistics than on
community testimony and organizations on the ground who work with
communities. Shell oil spills and gas flaring in Nigeria are a major human
rights and environmental tragedy.
It is interesting to note the reliance on ‘hard’ evidence such as ‘figures and state
statistics’. In terms of production and consumption, this genre of evidence, as found
in the sustainability and annual reports examined here, is considered elite discourse.

AI (2009, pp.31-32) further notes that:
Numerous reports, including the UNDP Niger Delta Human Development
Report (2006), acknowledge the problem of vandalism and sabotage of oil
pipelines. The problem was also acknowledged in interviews with a range of
stakeholders in the Niger Delta, including NGOs, communities, government
representatives and companies. However, in almost all cases (with the
exception of the companies), the lack of independent means of verification of
the facts was also acknowledged, as was the fact that some spills have been
designated sabotage but later found to be due to company failures.

Nnimmo Bassey, chair of Friends the Earth International and director of
Environmental Rights Action in Nigeria said:

We monitor spills regularly and our observations often contradict information
produced by oil companies and Nigerian regulatory agencies. If the UNEP
team would ask community monitors it would avoid falling into the trap of
spinning Shell's figures. The UN assessment is being paid for by Shell so we
are not surprised that it tells Shell's version of the facts. But the reality is that
several studies have placed the bulk of the blame for oil spills in the Niger
Delta on the doorsteps of the oil companies; particularly Shell (FoE, 2010,
n.p.).
Furthermore, Geert Ritsema from Friends of the Earth Netherlands Milieudefensie,
added:

UNEP should base its findings mostly on independent sources rather than on
information from the oil companies responsible for the massive oil pollution
in Nigeria. Last week UNEP team head Mike Cowing repeated Shell's lies
that only ten percent of oil pollution in Ogoniland was caused by equipment
failures and company negligence and 90% by locals stealing oil. Yet he
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himself earlier stated that Shell's large scale oil pollution and performance in
Ogoniland was 'unacceptable'. These figures are not even consistent with
some Shell official reports which admit that 45% of all leakages from Shell
facilities between 1998 and 2007 were due to poor maintenance of oil
installations (FoE, 2010, n.p.).

The following excerpts from Amnesty International (2009) relate to further views on
Shell’s alleged sabotage disclosure:

Today companies increasingly maintain that the majority of oil spills are
caused by sabotage and not by their poor infrastructure or operational
problems. Communities, and many NGOs, strongly disagree over the number
of spills that are attributed to sabotage, and accuse companies of designating
controllable spills as sabotage in order to avoid liability for compensation
(AI, 2009, p.15).
The designation of the cause of oil pollution as sabotage is heavily dependent
on the oil companies’ own assessment (AI, 2009, p.54).
While sabotage is clearly an issue, SPDC appears to have considerable
control over how spills causes are designated and Amnesty International
found evidence of poor practice in the process of attributing causality (AI,
2009, p.81).
The above excerpts are important. The extent and frequency of oil spills attributed to
sabotage are contested, as is the ‘evidence’. This indicates that two parallel discourse
practices persist: the disclosures by the MNC and those by NGOs. This demonstrates
how global corporations produce elite discourse. NGOs have challenged not only the
company, but the government as well, for its participation in the joint venture. FoE
(2002a, p.25) notes that:
In Nigeria oppressive political climate and Shell’s collusion with the
government and the military protection afforded the oil industry to have had
murderous results for those who resist.
This statement by FoE (2002a) offers a hint as to why exploring Shell’s elite status in
Nigeria is important, as it raises the complicity of the government in constructing a
perspective on oil spills not shared by NGOs. The role of the Nigerian courts will be
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reconsidered in terms of legislation analysed in social practice in Chapter 8. The
following excerpts illustrate this argument:

While there is no one underlying explanation for the complex conflict
situation in the oil producing states of the Niger Delta, the actions of armed
groups and communities – while important to acknowledge should not be
used by oil companies and the government to deflect attention away from
their own failures and poor practice (AI, 2009, p.81).
Most recently, AI (2012) said their investigations into Shell oil spills in Nigeria
‘were a fiasco’, alleging that the company repeatedly blamed sabotage in an effort to
avoid responsibility. Audrey Gaughran, director of global issues at AI, said in a
statement that

[t]here is more investment in public relations messaging than in facing up to
the fact that much of the oil infrastructure is old, poorly maintained and prone
to leaks – some of them devastating in terms of their human rights impact
(AI, 2012, n.p.).
She continued:
No matter what evidence is presented to Shell about oil spills, they constantly
hide behind the ‘sabotage’ excuse and dodge their responsibility for massive
pollution that is due to their failure to properly maintain their infrastructure
and make it safe, and to properly clean up oil spills (AI, 2012, n.p.).
This is consistent with Shell not engaging with NGOs or their counter-narratives. As
an elite Shell is able to contain and construct the discourse practice that sustains its
views.

Thousands of oil spills have occurred in the Niger Delta since the oil industry
began operations in the late 1950s. Corrosion of the pipes and equipment
failure were responsible for the majority of spills. In recent years sabotage,
vandalism and theft of oil have also contributed to pollution. However,
corrosion and equipment failure remain very serious problems which have
never been addressed. Oil companies are responsible for ensuring that, as far
as possible, their equipment is not vulnerable to tampering. However, Shell
has not responded to request for information on any measures it has taken to
prevent sabotage and vandalism (AI, 2012, n.p.).
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Shell’s lack of response is another way in which it chooses its terms of engagement.
In this way, its discourse practice does not acknowledge the counter-narrative
produced by NGOs. AI asked the US company Accufacts, which has many years’
experience in examining oil infrastructure, to examine photographs of the pipes after
one of the Shell’s oil spills in Nigeria. They stated:
This is apparently due to external corrosion. Notice the layered loss of metal
on the outside of the pipe around the stick from pipe wall loss (thinning) due
to external corrosion. It is a very familiar pattern that we have seen many
times on other pipelines (AI, 2012, n.p.).
AI (2012, n.p.) further states that:
Shell have said locally that the spill looks like sabotage, and they completely
ignore the evidence of corrosion. This has generated a lot of confusion and
some anger in the community, said Stevyn Obodoekwe, Director of
Programmes at CEHRD.
By ignoring the counter-evidence of corrosion, Shell maintains control of its
discourse and its discourse practice. Stevyn Obodoekwe, Director of Programmes at
Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD), further states:

We have seen the pipe and brought an expert to look at it, and it seems pretty
clear it is corroded. Years of bad practice with regard to oil spill
investigations have left communities highly distrustful of the process and
outcomes. Shell has never addressed evidence of bad practice in the oil spill
investigation process. Spills can be attributed to sabotage when they are in
fact due to corrosion and Shell knows this has occurred in the past (AI, 2012,
n.p.).

In contrast to sabotage oil spills, Steiner (2010, p.30) states that:
Controllable oil spills show no decline and Shell in Nigeria uses the terms
‘operational’ or ‘controllable’ for oil spills that are within its `control to
prevent’ (non-sabotage) and due to `failure of equipment, corrosion or human
error’. Compared to the period 1989-1994, the period 1998-2007 reflected no
decline in the volume and amount of controllable oil spills by Shell Nigeria.
FoE (2002b, p.12) also challenges Shell for poor environmental performance in
Nigeria and suggests:
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It is time Shell took responsibility for being the major oil company for more
than 40 years in one of the most heavily polluted parts of Africa, if not the
planet.
This challenge to Shell’s accountability is not acknowledged by Shell, nor do the
counter-narratives produced by NGOs enter the discourse perpetuated by Shell.
Shell’s discourse practice, on the other hand, uses intertextuality as not just a
repetition but implicit support for the joint venture and the Nigerian government and
vice versa. This relationship is discussed further in Chapter 8.

A spokesman for SPDC said:
SPDC is committed to cleaning up all spills, no matter what the cause, from
its facilities. The real tragedy of the Niger delta is the widespread and
continual criminal activity, including sabotage, theft and illegal refining, that
leads to the vast majority of oil being spilled. It is this criminality which
blights the Niger delta and which all organisations with an interest in
Nigeria's future should focus their efforts on highlighting and dealing with
(Vidal, 2012, n.p.).

FoE (2002b, p.5) further asserts that, Shell responds to problems on the ground oil
spills in Norco, Louisiana; however, they do so in Nigeria only when the company’s
practices are brought to public attention. This underscores the importance of
disclosures and counter-narratives, and also the social-practice level of analysis,
which is presented in Chapter 8. In its defence, Shell in its 2000 sustainability report
(2000, p.48) states that “for some data, such as spills, volumes have to be estimated”,
in accordance with Nigeria’s regulatory requirements. However, as will become
evident in Chapter 8, the regulated and the regulator are implicated in a fiduciary
relationship through the joint-venture arrangement. Human Rights Watch (2010)
believes that the oil industry in the Niger Delta may be publishing statistics that show
‘spill damage at one-tenth of its actual level’.
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The counter-narratives demonstrates a significant difference between Shell’s view of
sabotage and the NGOs. Both Shell and the NGOs have their own rhetoric of and
perspective on the phenomena of oil spills, and these alternative views further expose
nuances and subtleties that are hidden in the selected text. There is a conflict between
these two views: Shell is a supporter of the sabotage discourse and the NGOs are
opponents, as demonstrated above by the different connotative meanings assigned to
keywords in the debate. According to Gallhofer et al. (2001, p.136) “the credibility
of argumentation is influenced by discourse practice - for example, the mode of
argument of those engaged in the debate, including the ways in which they attempt to
substantiate those arguments, an aspect of text production”. For Shell, the
production, distribution and consumption of texts are through its accountability
discourses of mandatory annual reports and voluntary sustainability reports, which
substantiate its claims of uncontrollable and controllable oil spills. For the NGOs,
production, distribution and consumption is through counter-narrative disclosures
that directly challenge Shell’s claims.

In summary, this particular section has demonstrated the discursive struggle over oil
spills between Shell and NGOs. As Christian Aid (2009) argues, counter-accounts
play an important role in shaping the perceptions and dialogue around accountability
and human rights. Buhr and Reiter (2006, p.9) argue:
For a corporation to secure a space in the market for green images, it is
necessary to adopt the preferred language and terminology. The process in
obtaining this space and a green image may enable an interest to capture the
agenda or more likely some part of the agenda. At the same time, though,
other views may well have an influence in the marketplace.
This appears to be the case of Shell in Nigeria, although this view is challenged in
the counter-narratives by the alternative corporate ‘image’ presented.
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7.5 Elite discourse and its implications for accountability
The above analysis of discourse practices demonstrates how Shell draws ‘oil spills’
into its corporate narrative disclosures. Shell’s corporate documents present a
specific rhetoric to incorporate elements of blame and shift the responsibility for oil
spills. Textual analysis demonstrated that the content of oil-spill disclosures is
generally accusative: even when reporting on ‘operational’ spills, the company
commonly refers back to sabotage to remind the consumer of the text that sabotage
still plays a role. Strong and authoritative words are used when reporting on oil spills
due to sabotage, and biased and value-laden words when reporting on operational
spills. When reporting on ‘operational spills’, the company presents itself in a certain
way as a ‘victim’ of sabotage. On the other hand, when disclosing ‘sabotage’ spills in
the discourse, the company presents the Nigerian local oil communities in a different
light.

Shell’s powerful position raises the issue of the relationship between transparency
and accountability. The potential role of accounting information is to ensure
accountability. In addition, Shell’s story has a currency and represents a partisan
view, given that its corporate discourse has authoritative backing from International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and accounting standards. However, this does
not necessarily mean that by providing transparency in the form of disclosures of its
oil spills in Nigeria, Shell is holding itself accountable. These two notions are
interrelated, and there is a somewhat naive assumption that if one provides
information, one immediately becomes accountable to the ‘other’.
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This thesis explicitly demonstrates how a powerful position can switch the roles of
who is accountable to whom. Roberts (2009) is critical of this notion of transparency
as a form of accountability, and argues that:
[t]ransparency and face-to-face accountability always coexist and it is all too
possible for the subjective effects of transparency to invade the scene of
intelligent accountability such that it too becomes a self-defensive or
aggressive space full of self-blame and/or attempts to displace blame onto
others (Roberts, 2009, p.966).
It is evident in Shell’s discourse production that transparency involves the
displacement of blame onto others, and that this limited accountability and
displacement of accountability is enabled by the relationship between the regulator
and regulated. Therefore, intertextuality, as part of discourse practice, has the effect
of distancing the uncontrollable oil spills not only from Shell but also from the
government. The conflation of uncontrollable oil spills with sabotage and its
attribution to criminals (Figure 6.4) is also significant. It is not just Shell (in its letter
and sustainability reports), but Shell through SPDC, and thus, indirectly, the Nigerian
government, that is replicating and distributing this discourse.

The discourse of the ‘powerful’ is created through Shell’s disclosures of operational
spills and a discourse of the oppressed and ‘powerless’ is created through reporting
on alleged sabotage spills. There is a representation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ evident in the
documents. Van Dijk (1993a, p.264) argues that in such instances “we need to
examine in more detail which discourse structures are conducive to such processes”.
In the textual analysis, this is simply seen through semantic content (van Dijk,
1993a). In other words, the processes are expressed in statements that directly entail
negative evaluations of ‘them’, Nigerian communities, and positive ones of ‘us’,
Shell. A ‘we are good – you are bad’ dichotomy exists, and this preferred ideological
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stance is evident throughout the texts used in the analysis in this study. Shell’s choice
of words implies negative (or positive) evaluations of this dichotomy, as illustrated in
the keyword analysis. This contributes to the creation of inequality between the two
groups identified in the discourse. As van Dijk (1993a, p.151) argues, “because they
do not have active control over public elite discourse, ordinary people often have no
more 'to say' or 'to do' against the Others than talking negatively to Them, and about
Them”. This is evident in Shell’s narrative disclosures, where the ‘other’ is
constructed in criminal terms. Further, any counter-narratives by NGOs are not
acknowledged in Shell’s public accountability discourses examined in this thesis.
This disengagement is possible because of its status as a corporate elite. NGOs
cannot compel Shell to respond. The closest one may get to a response is Shell’s
letter addressing shareholders’ concerns. Once again this response to questions raised
does not acknowledge any counter-narratives or other evidence, or any other
discourse. Shell contained and controlled the discourse and the discursive practice
using the texts examined.

Shell employs positive discourse about itself to delineate the company’s
responsibility towards oil spills. Ezzamel et al. (2007, p.673) argues that:
[s]ites of discourse (geographical locations, issues debated, and media
through which discourse is disseminated) are not the outcome of random
choice but, we contend, are carefully selected by those who produce and
circulate discourse in order to produce maximum effects.
When an MNC, such as Shell, produces corporate documents to share with the
public, it presents information about itself and its actions. In other words,
“[corporations] select a style of writing partly on the basis of the image they thereby
construct for themselves” (Fairclough, 1995, p.75). As identified in textual analysis,
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Shell and SPDC are presented in a certain way, and the ‘other’ is a secondary
character that represents the primary metaphor of ‘dangerous criminal’.

This metaphor of the ‘other’ raises important questions, such as what it means to be a
criminal in a literal sense. Criminals can be ‘soft’, such as a fraudster, not dangerous
or life-threatening in an explicit way, but these criminals that Shell constructs are
‘militia’ and ‘gangsters’, they have ‘weapons’ and they are ‘hard’ and dangerous
criminals. Calling someone a ‘criminal’ is a strong accusation and shows how
information, such as accounting information, “can be used to highlight particular
inequalities and needs” (Cousins and Sikka, 1993, p.53). This is an example of
language constructing identity and how the discourses produced in accounting texts
are dominant, as they are sanctioned by legal frameworks and widespread public use,
and present a partisan view of this particular ‘oil spill’ phenomenon via both
regulated and voluntary disclosure.
While the oil spills are considered ‘external’ phenomena, Shell encompasses both
accidental and operational oil spills with their sphere of responsibility. This raises
important questions of accountability and why a MNC, such as Shell, would draw
such externalities into its discourse and corporate narrative disclosures. Building on
from text analysis, this thesis argues that Shell is in a position to manage and control
the discourse by objectifying oil spills. This analysis of corporate elite discourse
offers a particularly relevant perspective on the way inequality in corporate narrative
disclosures is reproduced in society generally, and by Shell in Nigeria specifically.

This thesis adopts Schwieker’s (1993) concept of accountability, which sees a
corporation, i.e. Shell, as accountable to the ‘other’ in its corporate narrative
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disclosures. This view is based on the idea that the “primary exposure to the other
requires us to account to this person, instead of accounting simply to ourselves”
(Shearer 2002; Roberts, 2009 as in Messner, 2009, p. 927). The ‘other’ in this thesis
is the Nigerian communities living in the areas where oil production by Shell’s
subsidiary’s SPDC takes place. By applying Schweiker’s (1993) concept of a moral
accountability, this thesis exposes the subjectiveness and identities reinforced by
accounting practices in mandatory as well as voluntary corporate disclosures. Even
though corporate annual reports, for example, are not the “motor of social change,
they can be mobilized to secure greater accountability and give voice to competing
discourses” (Cousins and Sikka, 1993, p.55).

Accountability to the ‘other’ can contribute to a ‘free and fair’ society because,
according to Gray et al. (1996, p.42), “it holds out the possibility for the development
of accounting in a way in which individuals are better informed and empowered, in
which inequities in wealth are potentially exposed and the inequalities of power are
somewhat reduced”. Discursive practice analysis demonstrates that this is not quite
the case of Shell in Nigeria: rather, the counter-narrative brings out a subversive
‘turning of accountability around’ to make ‘other’ responsible to Shell. This is
further supported by McMurtry (1998, p. 140), who argues that
[g]iven their ability to confer or withdraw investment from national
economies in free movement across boundaries, regulatory standards, tax
regimes, natural resource sites, and labour forces, [transnational corporations]
have no accountability to nation-states or their electorates. On the contrary,
nations and societies have become accountable to them.

The need for accountability arises because all production is a cooperative and social
effort that creates numerous social interdependencies. Yet control over resources,
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according to Cousins and Sikka (1993, p.53), is “concentrated in relatively few
hands” and therefore the “aim of accountability is always to affect the discretion and
autonomy of those who are in positions of power” (Cousins and Sikka, 1993, p.53;
Stewart, 1984). This, then, according to Roberts (1991) and Shearer (2002), allows
accountability to shape identity. Messner (2009, p.928) argues:
if a particular type of discourse assumes a dominant position in the sense that
it determines what kind of accountability is available and/or acceptable, then
this discourse has power effects. But power operates not only through the
relative dominance of a particular type of discourse. It is also a function of
the absolute extent to which demands for accountability shape practice, i.e.
the extent to which a practice is problematised in discourse and to which this
problematization feeds back into practice.
Shell is in a dominant position relationally with the state; these issues are further
explored in the following chapter.

7.6 Summary
This chapter presented alternative and challenging views to the discourse produced
by Shell to problematise the notions of production, distribution and consumption of
text according to Fairclough’s (1992) discourse practice. The counter-narrative
revealed an opposing story to Shell’s oil-spill disclosures. Shell’s discourse creates
an image of a company responsible for the environment in which it operates. By
disclosing information on different causes of oil spills, Shell attempts to convince the
reader that the majority of oils spills are due to sabotage and beyond its control. The
accusative language also reinforces the dichotomy of 'us' and 'them', and of good
versus bad behaviour. According to elite theory, the ‘elite’ dominates public
perceptions, and produces and controls elite discourse. Shell’s public interface is
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controlled through mandated and voluntary disclosures, and this discourse of oil
spills is dominant through these corporate communications.

The chapter considered Shell’s intertextuality as part of its discourse practice. NGOs
also produced counter-narratives that used Shell’s text and were ‘intertextual’.
However, Shell maintained its control of discourse practice by limiting its
intertextual practices to the sites of its control.

The most obvious instance of

intertextuality appears in how the public-discourse documents, i.e. sustainability and
annual reports, are produced. Considering the broader view of not just the text, but
how the text is created and consumed, provides insight into how texts are perceived,
understood and used. The public documents used in this thesis originate from the
entity Shell, and are a communicative act of powerful discourse in Shell’s efforts to
provide accountability for the oil spills in Nigeria.

Fairclough (1993, p.67) argues that “discourse as a political practice establishes,
sustains and changes power relations and the collective entities (classes, blocs,
communities, groups) between which power relations are obtained”. This thesis
argues that Shell, as a corporate powerful elite in Nigeria, controls the discourse that
serves to further accountability and responsibility to the host country, Nigeria, and
discharge its responsibility through disclosure practices. The following chapter
considers the final level of analysis, social practice, and explores the wider sociopolitical context of discourse production.
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CHAPTER 8: DISCOURSE AS SOCIAL PRACTICE

8.1 Introduction
Chapters 6 (textual analysis) and 7 (discursive practice) presented the first two levels
of Fairclough’s CDA. This chapter proceeds to discourse as social practice, which is
the third and final level of analysis. The first level, text analysis, demonstrated that
sabotage discourse drives the majority of Shell’s narrative disclosures on oil spills.
The second level, discourse practice, highlighted intertextuality practices between
Shell’s letter, and sustainability reports and SPDC’s annual reports. Despite the
counter-narratives of NGOs, which challenged the sabotage discourse, it does not
penetrate Shell’s discourse practice.

Social practice links the meaning of discourse within its social context. For
Fairclough (1995, p.97), the “link between sociocultural practice and text is mediated
by discourse practice, how a text is produced or interpreted”. Discourse, as a social
practice, “both reproduces and changes ideas, thoughts and power relations, ruling
individual and social interactions, discourse acts ideologically in the social world”
(Nielsen and Thomsen, 2007, p. 26). In this chapter the third level of analysis social
practice will focus on the relationship between Shell and the Nigerian government
through SPDC and how this relationship has enabled self-regulation and pro-MNC
legislation. Elite theory will explicate this relationship. Oil-spill legislation and
regulation, as contextual factors, play a role in how language is used to silence the
less powerful and maintain the status quo to benefit the power elite. The company,
Shell, and the regulating body, the Nigerian government, are deemed to be part of the
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power elite, since social dominance enacted by elites is legitimated by law (van Dijk,
1993a).

The first part of this chapter outlines Nigerian legislation and regulation of oil spills,
followed by a critical analysis of this regulatory system in Nigeria and how it
facilitates Shell’s elite status. This power that Shell has in Nigeria, it is argued, is
privileged by the close relationship the company has with the government via SPDC.

8.2 Oil-spills legislation and regulation in Nigeria
Nigeria’s environmental legislation comes in many different forms including:
ordinances, acts, decrees, laws and edicts (Okonta and Douglas, 2003). Okonta and
Douglas (2003, p.21) emphasise that “Nigeria’s environmental laws are not to be
found in any one volume in the country, [but] they can be ferreted out of several
sources, as indeed is the case within the Nigerian legal system”. In addition, given
that Nigeria is a former British colony “some aspects of English law still form part of
Nigerian law, especially in the core area of the Niger Delta, where SPDC reigns
supreme” (Okonta and Douglas, 2003, p.212).

The oil industry in Nigeria is subject to a number of environmental laws. The main
standards, guidelines and legislation for the petroleum industry, particularly the oil
exploration and production activities relevant to this thesis are outlined in Table 8.1.
Each of these will be discussed, after first presenting the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria.
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Table 8.1 Relevant Oil-spill Legislation
Year
1958
1969

Regulation
Oil Pipelines Act
Nigerian Petroleum Act

1969
1988

Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation (PDPR)
Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Decree

revised 2002 Department of Petroleum Resources, Environmental Guidelines and
Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN) –
revised 2002

These laws are concentrated around the prevention and clean-up of oil spills.
According to Steiner (2008, p.5), to prevent oil spills,
Nigerian law requires oil companies to ensure ‘good oil field practice’ by
complying with internationally recognized American Petroleum Institute
(API) and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) standards for
all petroleum production and transportation operations and to control oil
spills, Nigerian law requires companies to take `prompt steps’ and initiate
clean up operations within 24 hours of the spill.
In addition to petroleum legislation and regulation, the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria (1999) recognises, within its fundamental objectives that the
State needs to protect the environment. For example, Clause 20 of the Constitution
states that:
The State shall protect and improve the environment and safeguard the water,
air and land, forest and wild life of Nigeria (Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 1999).

Further, Clause 17(2) (d) establishes that:
[e]xploitation of human or natural resources in any form whatsoever for
reasons, other than the good of the community, shall be prevented
(Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999)
In addition, to the above regulation there are many customary laws existing in rural
communities of Nigeria regulating the protection of the environment (Okonta and
Douglas, 2003). A common definition of customary law is:
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a body of customs and traditions which regulate the various kinds of
relationships between members of the community in their traditional setting
(Okonta and Douglas, 2003, p.213).
In addition, under the Constitution, “all minerals, oil and gas belong to the Nigerian
federal government, which negotiates the terms of oil production with international
oil companies” (Ngomba-Roth, 2007, p.140). Chapter 4, Section 44 (3) of the
Constitution states that:
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the entire property
in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in under or upon
any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial waters and the
Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of the
Federation and shall be managed in such manner as may be prescribed by the
National Assembly (AI, 2009, p. 24).
These regulations in relation to Shell, and how they have been controlled by the
discourses of the power elite, will be examined. It will be argued that Shell’s power
enables it to negotiate weak regulation for oil spills in Nigeria.

8.2.1 Oil Pipelines Act of 1958

Under the Oil Pipelines Act (1958) the “[M]inister can grant permits to survey routes
for oil pipelines and licences to construct, maintain and operate oil pipelines” (AI,
2009, p.41). Clause 6 (3) of the Act states that:
[t]he holder of a permit to survey acting under the authority of section 5 of
this Act shall take all reasonable steps to avoid unnecessary damage to any
land entered upon and any buildings, crops or profitable trees thereon, shall
make compensation to the owners or occupiers for any damage done under
such authority and not made good.
Therefore, this part of the Act requires SPDC through the joint venture to survey
damages. In addition, Clause 11 (5) states that: the holder of a licence shall pay
compensation:
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(a) to any person whose land or interest in land (whether or not it is land in
respect of which the licence has been granted) is injuriously affected by the
exercise of the rights conferred by the licence,
(b) to any person suffering damage by reason of any neglect on the part of the
holder or his agents, servants or workmen to protect, maintain or repair any
work structure or thing executed under the licence, for any such damage not
otherwise made good; and
(c) to any person suffering damage (other than on account of his own default or
on account of the malicious act of a third person) as a consequence of any
breakage of or leakage from the pipeline or an ancillary installation, for any
such damage not otherwise made good. If the amount of such compensation
is not agreed between any such person and the holder, it shall be fixed by a
court in accordance with Part IV of this Act” (AI, 2009, p.70).

These sections refer to compensation and would pertain to communities affected by
oil spills. There is an important caveat or exception to the right to compensation. In
Nigeria damage caused by oil spills from sabotage is not compensated. Therefore,
this link between Shell’s discourse of sabotage and legislation is an important issue.

For years NGOs have claimed that SPDC has engaged in practices known to be
damaging to the environment and people. One of the practices has been the lack of
adequate maintenance of pipelines, which is a breach of the Oil Pipelines Act.
According to AI (2009, p.80), “after a brief period of openness during the 1990s,
when SPDC recognised that its operations were causing serious problems, SPDC and
its parent company, Shell, today refuse to acknowledge most problems associated
with their operations in the Niger Delta”. Moreover, some provisions in the oilindustry legislation appear to give them much leeway in the placement of pipelines.
For example, Section 16 (2) of the Oil Pipelines Act states that:

[t]he holder of a licence may for the purpose of exercising the powers
conferred upon him alter the level or position of any pipe, conduit,
watercourse, drain, or electric, telephone or telegraph wire or post, but shall
give reasonable notice of his intention so to do to the person in control
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thereof and shall execute the work to the reasonable satisfaction of the person
(AI, 2009, p.114).

This section provides oil companies with an opportunity to conduct potentially
damaging activities on any land covered by their permit, licence or lease (AI, 2009).
According to AI (2009, p. 45) section 5 (1) of the Act allows the holder of a ‘permit
to survey’ to:
dig and bore into the soil and subsoil… to cut and remove such trees and
other vegetation as may impede the purposes specified in this subsection…
and to do all other acts necessary to ascertain the suitability of establishment
of an oil pipeline or ancillary installations, and shall entitle the holder … to
pass over land adjacent to such route to the extent that such may be
necessary or convenient for the purpose of obtaining access to land upon the
route specified [emphasis added].

This access to pipelines assigned to the oil company is worth reconsidering in the
context of SPDC’s claims of being denied access to assess oil spills for the purposes
of clean-up or maintenance. The legislation renders the communities both culpable
and powerless.

8.2.2 The Nigerian Petroleum Act of 1969

The Nigerian Petroleum Act is a legal framework for the prevention and remediation
of oil spills. The Act makes it compulsory for oil companies to use best practice in
their operations. Specifically, to prevent oil spills, Section 25 of the Act provides
that oil companies:
[s]hall adopt all practicable precautions including the provision of up-to-date
equipment approved by the Head of Petroleum Inspectorate to prevent
pollution of inland, water… of Nigeria… and where such pollution occurs or
has occurred shall take prompt steps to control and if possible to end it (The
Nigerian Petroleum Act of 1969).
The Act also “grants the Minister of Petroleum Resources the statutory authority to
revoke an oil operator’s license to operate if the operator does not comply with good
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oil field practice” (Steiner 2010, p.16). According to the counter-narratives of NGOs,
SPDC fails to maintain effective compliance with the Act and, consistent with earlier
findings, Shell has been publicly criticised by many NGOs for having outdated
equipment, including pipelines (Steiner, 2010). For example, in 2004, SPDC
admitted that oil companies in the Niger Delta were violating guidelines and
standards set by the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) for the regulation of
the oil sector in the areas of off-shore disposal of created water and gaseous
emissions.

The Act also empowers the Minister to allocate oil-exploration and ‘oil-prospecting
licences, and oil mining leases’ (The Nigerian Petroleum Act of 1969). However, it
is interesting to note that “there are no provisions for communities in the licence or
lease areas to be consulted, no provision for objections and only limited provisions
within subsidiary legislation to prohibit or restrict activities that would harm
livelihoods” (AI, 2009, p.46). Shell’s power is demonstrated through its freedom to
publicly admit non-compliance with regulatory frameworks, despite the public
criticism the company has received over its controversial operations in Nigeria. This
demonstrates that regulation is not enough, especially if the laws are not enforced
when there is non-compliance. These issues of non-compliance and enforcement will
be reconsidered later with respect to Shell as a corporate elite, and its relationship to
Nigeria. The failure of SPDC to comply with the Act is ‘deliberate’ contempt of the
law, as admitted in the one of SPDC’s annual reports (2004, p.11):
We are not complying fully in some areas of regulations. These areas of
noncompliance are part of ongoing discussions between the DPR and the Oil
Producers’ Trade Section (OPTS) aimed at setting achievable regulatory
standards and limits.
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In addition, the enforcement of the Act is difficult given that SPDC through its joint
venture with Nigerian government is both the regulated and the regulator. This will
be reconsidered later in this chapter.

8.2.3 Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation (PDPR) 1969

Clause 25 and Clause 21 (2) of the PDPR are relevant to oil spills and oil pollution.
Clause 25 requires licensees or lessees to:
adopt all practicable precautions … to prevent the pollution of inland waters,
rivers, watercourses, the territorial waters of Nigeria or the high seas by oil,
mud or other fluids or substances which might contaminate the water, banks
or shoreline or which might cause harm or destruction to fresh water or
marine life, and where any such pollution occurs or has occurred, shall take
prompt steps to control and, if possible, end it (Petroleum Petroleum
(Drilling and Production) Regulation (PDPR) 1969).
Clause 21 (2) of the PDPR states that:
if the licensee or lessee cuts down or takes any other productive tree, he shall
pay fair and adequate compensation to the owner thereof…(Petroleum
Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation (PDPR) 1969).
In addition, the oil operators are:
also required to maintain all installations in good repair in order to prevent he
escape or avoidable waste of petroleum, (and to cause) as little damage as
possible to the surface of the relevant area and to the trees, crops, buildings,
structures, and other property thereon (Steiner, 2010, p.16).
This aspect of the regulation appears to be weakly enforced, given that Shell’s oil
spills continue to damage trees, crops and other necessities that ensure the living
conditions of Nigerian communities 30 (as described in Section 3.3.4 of this thesis).

30

For example, on April 29 2001, there was an explosion at Shell’s Well 10 facility (Yorla Oil Field)
(SPDC, 2001, p.41). This spill caused major social and environmental damage. For nine days crude
oil and gas poured onto Yaata village and other surrounding villages, swamping farmlands, forests,
streams and rivers (Johansen, 2008). The village was uninhabitable, residents were forced to move
into other villages and one man was shot dead (Johansen, 2008). According to Johansen (2008), Shell
has made no attempt to clean up damage from the spill.
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In addition, Okonta and Douglas (2003, p.200) argue that “Shell disrespects and
flagrants violations of local customs and laws” which were “developed from moral
rules that still exist in the communities of the Niger Delta” (Okonta and Douglas,
2003, p.217). In refusing to respect these local laws and customs, Shell violates
Regulation 45 of the PDPR (Okonta and Douglas, 2003).

8.2.4 Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Decree 1988

The FEPA Decree is an attempt by the federal government to protect the Nigerian
environment (Adibe and Essaghah 1999; Alapiki, 2004; Ibaba, 2010). The FEPA
decree outlines liabilities and penalties “for oil spills spillers of hazardous
substances, whether on water or land” (Okonta and Douglas, 2003, p.217). Section
34 of the FEPA Decree (1998) states that:
[s]pillers are compelled by the decree to bear the cost of removal;
replacement of natural resources damaged or destroyed by the discharge, and
report same to the agency or other related agencies.
Okonta and Douglas (2003, p.217) argue that traditionally “there is no area in the
Delta where Shell has successfully restored or replaced a natural ecosystem”. Shell’s
destruction of the Niger Delta environment from spillages has been recorded by local
and international observers alike, including environmental groups and sundry
agencies. International organisations such as Greenpeace and the World Bank have
also chronicled in detail Shell’s devastation of the Niger Delta. According to FoE
(2003, p.21) “local people have suffered from decades of pollution as a result of oil
spills and fires from Shell’s rusting network of pipes”. For example in December of
2003, “oil pipeline in Rukpokwu, which has been a problem since 1963, ruptured,
causing an oil spill and fires. It took Shell more than six weeks to put the fires out
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and make basic repairs” (FoE, 2003, p.21). As a result of oil spills Chief Clifford E.
Enyinda and Azunda Aaron, the Chairman of the Mgbuchi Community, have said:
Our only source of drinking water, fishing stream, and farm-lands covering
over 300 hectares of land with aquatic lives, fishing nets and traps, farm
crops, animals, and economic trees worth several billions of naira [equivalent
to millions of dollars] are completely destroyed by the spillage and was made
worse by the three separate fires that broke out of the spill site (FoE, 2003,
p.21).
For example Egi women are farmers, fishers and hunters in the Niger Delta. They
state that:
[w]ith all the flaring and pumping of oil into our swamp areas they have
denied us every living thing. Today we have no hope while they are making
billions of naira with our gifts from God. They don’t care or hear our cry.
When we cry the oil companies will only throw tear gas on us and beat us and
drive us out of our land (FoE, 2002a, p.25).
Over a decade has passed and still oil spills pollute the Niger Delta.

8.2.5 Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry of the
Nigerian government (EGASPIN) 2002

EGASPIN provides a set of environmental guidelines and standards and is the “main
environmental document used by the oil industry” (AI, 2009, p105). EGASPIN was
first introduced in 1991, and further revised in 2002 (Steiner, 2010). The guidelines
cover the “handling of wastes, including wastewater and drilling waste, oil spillage,
and dealing with effluents” (AI, 2009, p.41). Part VIII of the standard states that:
[a] spiller shall be liable for the damage from a spill for which he is
responsible. Settlement for damages and compensation shall be determined
by direct negotiation between the operator(s) and the landlord(s) (EGASPIN,
2002).
The significant word here is ‘negotiation’, which occurs between the operator(s) and
the landlord(s). In this case the operator is Shell via SPDC and the landlord is the
Nigerian government. Therefore, the ‘negotiation’ is between the regulated and
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regulator and is an example of ‘weak legislation’ when the legislator – in other
words, the regulator - is, in fact, the operator, or the regulated. The elite status of
Shell, reinforced or legitimated, through SPDC compels the researcher to conclude
that the Nigerian government, through its 55% ownership in the joint venture,
confuses the notion of regulation/regulator/regulated. Furthermore, according to the
EGASPIN, SPDC must have an Oil Spill Contingency Plan (OSCP), with a detailed
description of how the company will respond to oil spills from its facilities,
irrespective of the cause. Steiner (2010) who conducted field research for FoE in
2008, requested a copy of Shell’s OSCP. According to his findings, SPDC refused
his repeated requests for a copy, thus making it difficult to assess their compliance
with EGASPIN requirements. It is also worth noting that this refusal by SPDC to
respond to FoE’s requests is another example of Shell not engaging with NGOs. In
this way, Shell can control how it constructs its discourse practice.

The annual reports, which can be accessed by a broad range of users, remain as
Shell’s main ‘accountability’ mechanism. Furthermore, their actual performance in
responding to some spills leaves no doubt that they are not in compliance with the
EGASPIN requirements (Steiner, 2010). In addition, SPDC’s earlier admission
speaks volumes about their compliance or lack thereof. Steiner (2010, p.37) further
notes that “it is evident whatever their OSCP asserts with regard to SPDC readiness
to respond to oil spills in the Niger Delta, the company’s actual performance in oil
spill response in the region is far below the internationally recognized standards”.

Parts of EGASPIN also deal with restoration of oil spill sites; for example, the
“spiller being responsible to clean up the site and restore it to its original state”
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(Imoobe and Iroro, 2009, p.58). According to EGASPIN (2002, p.148 as in Steiner,
2010, p.17) in relation to oil spills:
Clean-up shall commence within 24 hours of the occurrence of the spill. For
inland waters/wetland, the lone option for cleaning spills shall be complete
containment and mechanical/manual removal. It shall be required that these
clean-up methods be adopted until there shall be no more visible sheen of oil
on the water. Clean-up of oil spills in contaminated environments shall be
conducted in such a manner as not to cause additional damages to the already
impacted environment.
This excerpt indicates that there is a clear mandate of what to do, when to do it and
how to do it for oil companies operating in Nigeria. This suggests a comprehensive
and unequivocal legislation; however, as indicated previously, the word ‘negotiation’
creeps into the legislation. SPDC annual report has indicated that often it is not
notified of oil spills or not able to gain access to them. This is important (as raised in
Chapter 6), as it signals a shift of responsibility away from Shell to the community,
irrespective of whether the oil spills are operational or due to sabotage. While the
negotiation relates to settlement for damages, the Act does not treat non-compliance
specifically. In relation to SPDC, there is evidence that the company has not
conducted a clean-up after 24 hours of the spill31.

Furthermore, Section 3.2.2 (v) of EGASPIN requires “monthly inspection of
pipelines for corrosion including monitoring indications and measurements”
(EGASPIN, 2002 as in Steiner, 2010, p.43). Steiner (2010, p.37) argues that “with
the thousands of kilometres of buried pipelines, the primary method uses internal

31

An example of this non-compliance is a spill that occurred on 25 June 2001 in Ogbodo in Rivers
State (AI, 2009), where a ruptured pipeline exploded, spilling oil over the surrounding land and
waterways. According to the AI (2009) report, the community notified SPDC the following day.
However, it “was not until several days later that a contractor working for SPDC came to the site to
deal with the oil spill” (Johnson, 2008, n.p.). AI (2009) asked SPDC to comment on this case, but the
company did not do so.
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inspection devices (smart Pipeline Inspection Gadgets, etc.) and it is difficult to
know the extent of compliance of Shell Nigeria with this requirement” (Steiner,
2010, p.37). In addition, Section 2.6.1 “requires that operators respond immediately
to contain an oil spill, and it has been well established that Shell’s response to most
spills is far from immediate, but takes on average several days” (Steiner, 2010, p.38).

One of the other requirements relevant to oil spills is that companies must prepare an
Environmental Evaluation Report (EER). Section 2.2 of EGASPIN (as in Steiner
2010, p.44) requires
that the EER shall contain a full description of the spill incident, qualitative
and quantitative descriptions of the already impacted environment, loss of
and significance of impacted environmental resources, restoration plans `to
either eliminate or decrease adverse environmental impacts to the greatest
extent possible,’ and an environmental management plan post-EER [emphasis
in original].

This requirement to prepare an EER represents an interesting link between disclosure
and accountability. Many NGOs argue and suspect that Shell has not fully complied
with this directive (Steiner, 2010), and even if it has, Shell’s reports have not been
made available. In addition, “it is a global standard that such post-spill environmental
evaluations consist of a comprehensive scientific analysis of the affected
environment, and there are no such assessments for any large spills in the Niger
Delta” (Steiner, 2010, p.38).

Relevant to clean up and removal of oil spills Section 2.6.3 (i) of EGASPIN requires
oil companies to control removal of spills (Steiner, 2010). According to Steiner
(2010) SPDC consistently violates EGASPIN standards and has not satisfied the
requirements of the standard given there are many un-remediated oil spill sites.
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Finally, where oil spills are also due to sabotage, companies are obliged under
EGASPIN (pp.148, 269, 152) to ‘contain, cleanup and remediate the affected area’
(AI, 2009, p.65), actions that SPDC has not taken.

8.2.6 Weak regulation

According to (AI, 2009, p. 41) environmental regulatory system in Nigeria is
described as ‘chaotic’ and “the content of Nigeria’s laws on oil operations is
considered minimally sufficient by environmental and oil experts, in terms of
compliance with international standards in relation to oil operations” (AI, 2009, p.
41). These laws are also considered to have significant flaws, particularly as they
relate to the impact of the oil industry on the environment and the affected
population. According to AI (2009, p.52) both the Petroleum Act of 1969 and the Oil
Pipelines Act of 1958 neither ‘provide for meaningful sanctions for failure’ to
comply with the Acts ‘nor does the legislation appear to deal with persistent poor
performance’. Under the Petroleum Act, “the Minister of Petroleum Resources has
general supervisory powers over oil-company activities and may revoke any oil
prospecting licence or oil mining lease if, in his opinion, the licensee or lessee is not
conducting operations in accordance with good oil field practice” (AI, 2008, p.52).
While some oil licences and leases have been revoked, a study by AI (2008)
indicates that revocation has never been exercised on the grounds of environmental
damage. The legislation makes provisions for power and remedy; however, the
challenge is, would it be able to invoke this on SPDC as it regulates itself as a joint
owner?
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The penalties for pollution and environmental damage in Nigeria are financially
inadequate to ensure compliance (AI, 2009). For example, oil companies that fail to
report an oil spill to the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency
(NOSDRA) are fined 500,000 naira (approximately US$3,500) (AI, 2009).
Consistently, the fine for failure to clean up the affected site is also relatively low of
1 million naira (approximately US$7,000) (AI, 2008). In addition, the FEPA Act of
1988 also prescribes inadequate and insignificant fine of 20,000 naira for offenders
(Ibaba, 2010). According to AI (2009, p.52),
The amount paid by oil companies in fines is unknown, but many civil
society organizations in the Niger Delta are concerned that low fines reflect
the fact that the government is the major partner in the joint venture
operations, and therefore liable for the bulk of any fine imposed.
As a result of Shell’s operations in Nigeria thousands of oil spills have occurred in
the past decades, with little or no clean-up by the company (FoE, 2002a)32. During
the period under investigation, 2000-2010, Shell disclosed more than 2,000 spills in
Nigeria. Even though the company attributes the majority of spills to sabotage
(Chapter 6), the counter-narrative (Chapter 7) suggests that sabotage is used by Shell
to distance its responsibility towards the ‘other’ and therefore avoid paying
compensation to local communities (Frynas, 1999; 2000). Even if Shell does not
award compensation, EGASPIN allows for SPDC as an operator to negotiate with
the landlord. This is only possible because of Shell’s unique relationship with the
government and its elite status in Nigeria.

32

Outside the period of this study, but important to acknowledge, is a Shell pipeline explosion in the
Niger Delta in 1998 that “killed more than 400 people” (FoE, 2002a, p.25).
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Shell’s Group Environmental Standards (Shell, 2002, n.p.) state that:
In Shell, we are committed to having an environmental performance we can
be proud of. In all our activities we always take a responsible approach, and
our environmental management policy applies globally. We have minimum
standards for our major risk areas…and we have assurance processes in place
to confirm that the policy is being followed and that the minimum standards
are being met.

Further, the Shell General Business Principles (Shell, 2002, n.p.) state:
Shell companies seek a high standard of performance…[and] to conduct
business as responsible corporate members of society, to observe the laws of
the countries in which they operate…to give proper regard to health, safety,
and environment…. Therefore, it is the duty of management continuously to
assess the priorities and discharge its responsibilities as best it can on the
basis of that assessment.

In addition, these principles state that Shell will observe the laws of the country in
which they operate. This would include the requirements of Nigerian law. Steiner
(2010, p.40) argues “that it is obvious that these professed internal corporate
standards for Shell Group are not being met by SPDC”. The empirical analysis in this
thesis is consistent with these previous findings. Shell’s corporate position is used as
a discursive tool to express accountability for its actions in Nigeria on one hand, and
as a means to violate the legislation relevant to oil spills on the other. Under Nigerian
law, “the operating oil company is responsible for the clean-up of oil spills, and the
clean-up is supposed to both be swift and meet good practice standards” (AI, 2013,
p.60). According to the EGASPIN guidelines, issued by the Department of
Petroleum Resources (DPR), ‘clean-up should commence within 24 hours of the
spill’. However, Shell has been criticised of violating this requirement for many
decades now (Steiner, 2010), and SPDC has also admitted with not fully complying.
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Steiner (2010, p.12) states that “government and operating companies maintain their
own data on oil spills, but these cannot be considered reliable as both the government
and operators seek to limit their legal liability for claims for oil spill damage”. As
established previously, “under Nigerian law, local communities have no legal rights
to the oil and gas reserves in their territory” (AI, 2009, p.24). This ineffective
governance on behalf of Nigerian government has been exploited by Shell for many
years and “invoked it as an excuse for their poor environmental performance in
Nigeria” (Steiner, 2010, p.43). One example of this ineffective governance is that
[h]olders of leases and licences and permits to survey under the Petroleum
Act, Oil Pipelines Act and subsidiary legislation are entitled to engage in a
range of activities such as cutting down trees and other vegetation, to
dredging without any adequate safeguards in terms of the impact of these
activities on the environment and associated livelihoods of the communities”
AI (2009, p. 24)
As a result of this there is a continuous “conflict between the communities and the oil
companies over land as companies depend on land because the oil is beneath it, while
communities depend on land for farming and fishing” AI (2009, p. 24).

8.3 The discursive power of elites – regulator and regulated
The previous section presented a wide assortment of intervention instruments meant
to protect the environment in Nigeria. This thesis argues that Shell’s elite status
makes it difficult to ensure robust legislation including enactment, compliance,
enforcement and penalty. The legislation is compromised by a discourse of
‘negotiation’, especially in the Nigerian Petroleum Act of 1969 and the
Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry of the Nigerian
Government (NG - EGASPIN) 2002. This issue highlights the complex relationship
between the regulator and regulated. Okonta and Douglas (2003, p.64) argue that the
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“Nigerian government officials are noted for their cautious use of words”. In reality
it is the oil companies, in particular Shell, that dominate power and control the oil
industry. The Nigerian government implicitly supports this stance due to the
relationship it has with Shell. Okonta and Douglas (2003, pp.58-59) further suggest
that Shell:
[e]njoys cordial relations with the soldiers and politicians in power, in a
symbiotic relationship sustained by a mutual desire to control the Niger Delta
and exploit the oil. The multinational maintains its own private police force,
imports its own arms and ammunition, and at least in two instances has
admitted payments to the Nigerian military.
In addition Amnesty International (2009, p.60) highlights that Shell exploits weak
regulatory system in Nigeria, “making the poor the most vulnerable to exploitation
by corporate actors”.

Shell has been able to shape the discourse of oil spills (Chapter 6) and, as an elite,
successfully construct two different images, one of themselves and another of the
Nigerian people, the ‘other’. This discourse, construction, consumption and
distribution is controlled by Shell, and this is possible because of Shell’s close
relationship with the government. This relationship is evident in the joint venture,
and hence SPDC’s annual reports also implicate the government. Mills (1956, p.9)
argues that a “highly-concentrated number of elites control most of the wealth, most
of the power and most of the privilege in society – and use this wealth, power and
privilege to influence the decisions of governments”. The analysis of discourse at the
social-practice level demonstrates how the corporate elite draws its economic and
political importance from the Nigerian government legislation and regulations.
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Shell’s narrative disclosure practices and weak government regulation sustains the
power of this dominant elite. The context and social relations that shape this elite’s
oil-spill discourse is complex, given the fact that the regulator is also the regulated as
a partner in, and a major financial beneficiary of, a joint venture. SPDC and the
cooperation between regulator and regulated shows the nexus of state and corporate
power as an elite whose interests are served, and who have influential and special
access to, and control over, public discourse. This then forms an integral component
of corporate power that has accountability consequences. These consequences were
explicitly shown in Chapters 6 and 7 and the way elite discourse plays out in Shell’s
corporate narrative disclosures.

8.4 Summary
In summary, discourse as social practice identified the main legislation and
regulation governing oil spills, and provided another locus for Shell’s influence as a
corporate elite in Nigeria. Analysis of social practice also highlights the hidden social
relations that shape Shell’s narrative oil-spill disclosures. This revealed that Nigeria’s
regulatory system is complex and allows companies to ‘negotiate’ with the
government. SPDC’s compliance is difficult to ascertain, as the Nigerian government
is a 55% shareholder in the joint venture. In other words, penalising SPDC would
require the regulator to penalise itself.

It is argued in this thesis that Shell has the power to produce elite discourse about oil
spills and sustain this discourse over the period under investigation from 2000-2010.
In addition, weak regulation enables the power of the dominant class to construct the
discourse of oil spills and their subsequent consequences. Due to its close
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relationship with the government, Shell’s elite status is not challenged; it is, rather,
supported by the legislation. Shell’s status as an elite is important because, as a
MNC, Shell has international reach, provides wealth and contributes to the GDP in a
poor and developing country.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTION

This chapter summarises the key issues that have arisen from a critical analysis of
Shell’s disclosures of oil spills in Nigeria and conclusions drawn from the analysis.
The contributions are explicated as particular theoretical and methodological
contributions to the accounting field of knowledge. Research limitations and further
research opportunities are presented in the concluding section of the chapter.

9.1 Summary
This thesis critically investigated the narrative disclosure of oils spills of an MNC,
Shell, operating in a developing country, Nigeria. Over the years Shell has been
scrutinised by NGOs for its operations in Nigeria and for the oil spills resulting from
its presence in the Niger Delta. While oil extraction and production brings great
wealth and opportunity to Nigeria, oils spills create environmental damage and
exacerbate poverty, as this wealth is not evenly distributed. How, after over 50-years
of operations in Nigeria, are oils spills resulting from Shell’s operations still
contested, controversial and continuing?

To address this issue this thesis had the following purpose and objectives:
1. What is Shell’s discourse of oil spills?
2. How is Shell’s discourse of oil spills sustained with respect to NGOs’
discourse of Shell’s oil spills?
3. Does the Nigerian legislation of the oil industry play a role in sustaining
Shell’s oil spills?
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Oil spills occur for a number of reasons, ranging from controllable to uncontrollable.
The power to define that which is controllable or uncontrollable has been explored in
this thesis using critical discourse analysis (CDA) informed by elite theory. CDA has
allowed the researcher to explore not only the specific words and meaning of oil
spills, but the practices of production and distribution within the broader social
context. Since the thesis focussed on the discursive representation of the
phenomenon of Shell’s oil spills as elite discourse, the examination of the social
context specifically focussed on the unique relationship between Shell and the
Nigerian government. This relationship is explicitly demonstrated in the joint venture
arrangement operated by SPDC, Shell’s wholly-owned subsidiary, on behalf of
NNPC, Shell, Total Exploration and Production Nigeria Limited (TEPNG) and
Nigerian Agip Oil Company limited (NAOC). It was established, therefore, that the
regulator is also the regulated. This thesis illuminates Shell’s complex relationship
with the government and the consequences of this relationship for the occurrence and
disclosure of oil spills in accountability discourses produced by the parent company
Shell and the operating subsidiary SPDC.

Accounting studies of corporate social and environmental disclosures are orientated
towards developed countries; this thesis contributes to the study of corporate
disclosures by examining how these differ when the MNC is operating in a
developing country. While there are studies from an African context, the majority of
this research has focussed on the quantity of disclosure supported by general
descriptions of what is disclosed relating to environmental issues.
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In addition, the use of CDA together with elite theory explored the power and
dominance incorporated in public discourse. CDA recognises that “power abuse is
enacted, reproduced or legitimated by the talk and text of dominant groups and
institutions” (van Dijk, 1996, p.84). The framework of elite theory recognises the
existence of elites in society and explicates how this power can be manifested.
Corporations are one of the most powerful institutions in the current global capitalist
society, and encompass both financial and political power. Therefore, it is important
to understand the discourse produced by a corporate elite. With the application of
elite theory in an accounting context we begin to understand how corporate elite
discourse contributes to reproduction of dominance and inequality in society. This is
of enormous importance given that the global society is fighting against
environmental issues, inequalities and poverty, especially in developing countries.

In terms of the analysis of Shell’s and SPDC’s public discourse, the first level of
Fairclough’s CDA, text analysis (Chapter 6), revealed a number of dominant
discourses in Shell’s oil-spill disclosures. While oil spills are considered ‘external’
phenomena, Shell encompasses both accidental and intentional oil spills within its
public discourse. In other words, Shell interprets the nature and subsequent
responsibility for what is considered an ‘environmental disaster’. This is a result of
Shells’ status in Nigeria and how its elite discourse is presented in corporate
narrative disclosures. According to Shell’s public discourse, uncontrollable oil spills
are explained as sabotage and account for the majority of oil spills reported by the
company. The boundary of responsibility and the subtle and nuanced meaning of
controllable and uncontrollable are contestable, and elite theory (Mills, 1956)
explicates Shell’s ability to dominate, enter and shape the discourse about its oil
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spills. This thesis argued that Shell as a corporate power elite in Nigeria, has the
power to define, construct and disseminate sabotage-related oil-spill discourse by
replicating its production in the shareholders’ response letter, annual reports and
sustainability reports.

The discourse practice (Chapter 7) led an interpretative investigation into these
dominant discourses by looking at other key players as a counter-narrative (NGOs).
The intertextuality element of Fairclough’s discursive practice level demonstrated
how similar oil-spill discourse flows through the documents used by Shell:
specifically, the shareholders’ response letter, annual reports and sustainability
reports. This thesis then shows how corporate communication vehicles, language and
power interact especially when SPDC’s annual reports incorporate the interests of the
joint venture with the Nigerian government. In effect, the elite discourse is also
sanctioned by the government.

The social-practice level (Chapter 8) of CDA explored oil-spill regulation in Nigeria
and exposed the legislation as being ‘weak’ with respect to enforcement. In
particular, settlement for compensation to those affected by oil spills is negotiated.
This close relationship between Shell and the Nigerian government is explicitly
shown via SPDC, as the operator of the joint venture between Shell and the Nigerian
government. Elite theory explicates the ‘weak’ regulation, as a ‘weak’ regulatory
system in Nigeria, a developing country, enables Shell as an elite to control its
operations and limit the responsibility it has for the consequences of oil spills. The
discourse of oil spills as reported by Shell is sustained by its relationship with the

202

Nigerian government. This relationship ‘plays out’ at the social-practice level as the
continuing control and power of the corporate elite.
9.2 Contribution to literature on corporate disclosures in developing countries
This thesis presents a unique contribution to the study of corporate disclosure in the
context of a developing country. It was identified that current literature on voluntary
corporate social and environmental disclosure focuses on developed countries.
While, a number of studies have investigated such a phenomenon from the
perspective of developing countries, in particular in the African context, the majority
of these studies examined the concept of voluntary disclosure in general and applied
quantitative analytic approaches. This thesis departs from this extant literature and
critically explores Shell’s narrative corporate disclosures in their broader sociopolitical context.

Given that Shell operates in more than 80 countries worldwide and is a powerful
player in the global oil industry, it is important to study its narrative disclosures that
contribute to accounting. The discourse of oil spills in the examined reports of Shell
and SPDC offers another way in which accounting is implicated through the rhetoric
of disclosure. It was identified in Chapter 2 that the literature on Shell as a group of
companies is limited to its operations in developing countries. Second, unlike the
majority of the studies of corporate disclosures, this analysis adopts a discursive
approach with the specific aim of examining language and context to explore the role
of accounting disclosure as elite discourse that perpetuates power relations in
Nigeria.
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9.3 Theoretical contribution
Elite theory was used in this thesis to understand, examine and explain the power of
Shell to control its narrative oil-spill disclosures. On a general level, elite theory can
be used to explain how MNCs play a major role in global capitalism. It is important
to study such corporate institutions as elites and understand the elite discourse they
produce in their corporate narrative disclosures. MNCs such as Shell, as an
institutional corporate elite, are economically, politically and socially powerful and
significantly affect the communities in which they operate. Elite theory has offered
important insights into how power can be pervasive, so that concepts of
accountability can be limited.

Interrogating corporate discourse from the perspective of a powerful corporate elite
provide insight into its relationship with host countries. These insights augment CDA
which focuses on language use and unequal relations of power (Fairclough, 1989).
This thesis provides empirical evidence of how this is manifested in explicit terms
especially when the host country of the MNC is a developing country.

In addition, elite theory reinforces the role of language and accounting as a
discursive practice. This offers potentially useful insights in its focus on elites, and
on how discourse perpetuates inequality in Nigeria in a number of ways. First, there
is the issue of resource allocation, as the definition of 'controllable' creates the
responsibility for Shell (or SPDC) to clean up oil spills. Besides the environmental
and social advantages associated with remediation, clean-up efforts also employ
members of local communities. However, uncontrollable oil spills are 'external' to
the company and Shell is therefore unaccountable.
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Second, it was identified that Shell is an economic, social and political elite in
Nigeria, and therefore has the power to identify the ‘other’, i.e. Nigerian
communities, as criminals. According to van Dijk (1993a) elites through their
‘influential text and talk’, maintain their dominance and legitimate their own power
in general. This thesis “supports the argument that, although elites cloak their
language in tolerance, they linguistically institutionalise their dominance over” (van
Dijk, 1993a, p.2) the less powerful ‘other’ in Nigerian society by creating a victim
status.

Third, Shell has the epistemological privilege over a ‘truth’33 about oil spills and
what is constituted as controllable, or those for which they take responsibility.
Shell’s discourse is legitimated through socially sanctioned discursive media such as
regulated annual reports and voluntary, sustainability reports.

Significantly, the methodological and theoretical frameworks are also consistent, and
can be combined for future research into corporate disclosures; this provides a
complementary and expanded research framework for exploring other MNCs in
developing and developed countries.

In addition, this thesis demonstrates the opacity of language and how this is played
out in corporate narrative disclosures; it subsequently raises questions of
transparency as a means of accountability (Roberts, 2009). As stated previously, elite
theory is relatively underdeveloped in contemporary accounting studies, although

33

In this thesis the meaning of truth is what Shell says and how it represents its oil spills.
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issues of power and dominance infuse critical theory as applied by scholars and
accounting researchers.

9.4 CDA contribution

This thesis applied CDA to Shell’s corporate disclosures for the period 2000-2010.
CDA explicitly recognises power, context and language of powerful institutions,
including corporations, examining how they can use text to manipulate power
relations. CDA exposes the dominant discourse, produced by Shell, which may have
a significant impact on the outcomes of accountability. Attempts to achieve a better
and more equal society must challenge economically powerful institutions such as
MNCs, and make them accountable. This methodology is especially concerned with
making visible the ideological struggles fought over social change that are typically
manifested in language. Therefore, this thesis is a response to recent calls for such
works in the accounting literature (Craig et al., 2010).

The complexity in the case of Shell and Nigeria is that this dominance is also
accommodated, willingly or unwillingly, by the Nigerian government. Given that the
public discourse of the Nigerian government is limited, and there is limited access to
it, any speculations by the researcher as to the Nigerian government’s intent would
not be prudent.

This thesis makes a methodological contribution in a number of ways. As a case
study it provides an application of CDA to the analysis of corporate narrative
disclosure. Second, the data used for the application is unique. At the textual level,
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the thesis used a response letter to major shareholders by the parent company,
voluntary reports of the parent company and mandated reports of its subsidiary in the
host country. The discourse emanating at this level was considered as discursive
practice. Next, the thesis introduced counter-narratives by NGOs to demonstrate that
intertextuality was controlled by Shell. At the social-practice level, legislation was
introduced to demonstrate language and power use. These levels were presented in
sequence, which in the aggregate sense does have a role.

Although specific oil-spill events were not the focus, this thesis contributes to the
literature as it analyses the complex existence of an MNC giant, Shell, in a
vulnerable and developing country, Nigeria, by analysing ‘oil spills’ as a collective
of events. Second, unlike the majority of the literature on corporate disclosures, this
analysis is discursive in nature, rather than focussing on quantitative analysis of oil
spills or their disclosure.

9.5 Thesis limitations

An important limitation is restricted access to the public discourse of SPDC and the
Nigerian government. SPDC annual reports are only publicly available for a period
of six years from 2000-2006. In addition, these reports are not available on the
websites of Shell, the Nigerian government or NNPC. The reports were accessed via
external sources. Therefore, additional data sources could be considered in future
research. This thesis has focussed on narrative disclosures in public documents.
However, other narrative discourse could be used; for example, the researcher could
have conducted interviews with representatives of Shell, SPDC, the Nigerian
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government, oil communities and FoE and other NGOs and could have considered
visual images and photography of oil spills.

9.6 Future research

There are a number of research opportunities arising from this thesis. The example of
Shell as a corporate elite in Nigeria is fundamental in understanding the role of other
MNCs and their operations in developing countries to understand elite discourse and
how it is played out in corporate narrative disclosures. This work can also be applied
to Shell’s operations in other developing countries, such as Somalia for example
where the context of the company’s operations is very similar to its Nigerian
operations.

In addition to the Nigerian context, there also emerges an opportunity for a
comparison study between MNCs’ operations in developing and developed
countries. This thesis examines an example of a public/private partnership between
an MNC, Shell, and a developing country. Further studies could explore partnerships
in a similar context and in different locations. A potential study on the accountability
of governments in developing countries, including Nigeria, would be beneficial to
justify the use of public resources, such as oil in the context of Nigeria.

Finally, this thesis has focussed only on the environmental ‘disasters’ caused by oil
spills on land, and has not explored the range of destruction to air and water and
consequent impacts on communities and future generations.

208

APPENDICES
Appendix 1
Shell and SPDC oil spills in Nigeria

As a result of SPDC operations, a large number of oil spills occurred in Nigeria
during the period under investigation. Shell states that they “report, as a single
volume figure, spills of crude oil, oil products and chemicals” (Shell, 2001, p.29).
Table 1 provides a summary of the reported number of spills, volumes and their
cause.

Table 1: Oil Spills in Nigeria between 2000 and 2010 as reported by Shell

YEAR OF
OCCURRENCE

NUMBER
OF OIL
SPILLS

DUE TO
SABOTAGE

340
302
262

VOLUME
OF OIL
SPILLED
IN
TONNES
OR
BARRELS34
30,751
76, 854
20,007

NUMBER
CLASSIFIED AS
CONTROLLABLE
INCIDENTS

OIL SPILLED
DUE TO
CONTROLLABLE
INCIDENTS IN
TONNES OR
BARRELS

137
147
160

OIL
SPILLED
DUE TO
SABOTAGE
IN TONNES
OR
BARRELS
17,644
38,711
18,724

2000
2001
2002

203
155
101

13,107
38,143
1,278

2003

221

9,900

141

6,732

80

3,186

2004

236

8,317

157

8,064

79

253

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

224
241
330
160
132
144

11,921
23,000
30,000
56,325
105,600
27,580

138
165
221
140
95
112

11,265
12,600
18,500
48,000
103,000
22,310

86
50
109
53
37
32

659
10,400
11,500
8,325
2,300
5,270

Source: SPDC annual reports 2000-2006; Shell Sustainability Reports 2000-2010.

34

The reports are not consistent in terms of volume nomenclature. One tonne equals 7.4 barrels.
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Figures 1 and 2 give a graphical representation of the reported spills. Figure 3
illustrates solely oil spills due to sabotage. In addition, Table 1 shows SPDC oil spills
compared to the Shell Group.

Figure 1: Number of spills by category (Shell, 2010a, n.p)

Figure 2: Spills in thousands of tonnes by category (Shell, 2010a, n.p)
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Figure 3: Volume of sabotage-Nigeria (SSR, 2009, p.36)

Table 2 shows SPDC oil spills compared to those for the Shell Group overall.

Table 2: Volume of Oil Spills from Shell’s Nigerian Operations as a Percentage
of the Total from Shell Operations as a Whole

(Steiner, 2010, p.48)
The majority of Shell’s total oil spills during 2000-2009 have occurred in Nigeria. In
fact, during the period 2003-2009, 61% of Shell’s total volume was spilled in
Nigeria. SPDC oil spills in Nigeria have increased in line with its oil exploration and
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production. Throughout the years 2000 to 2005 there was an increase in the total
number of oil spills. The highest number was recorded in 2000, with a reported 339
oil spills and 30,751 tonnes of oil spilled. Since 2005, SPDC has averaged 175 oil
spills a year (Shell, 2010a). During the period 2003-2009, 61% (Steiner, 2010) of
Shell’s total volume of oil spills was spilled in Nigeria. In its 2007 sustainability
report, Shell (2007, p.20) states that:
Spills from oil tankers attract the most public attention but are thankfully rare.
Less dramatic but more frequent – are spills at our facilities.
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Appendix 2
Corresponding to Chapter 6 - Structure of the documents
Table 1: Response Letter
Aspect
Title
Graphic Design
Content on oil spills

Description of text
‘Letter from a major shareholder’ 31st May 2010
15 pages, graphs and images
This letter was Shell’s response to a major shareholders interested about
their activities in Nigeria. The content of the letter is centred on oil
spills.
Information on the number, volume, location and timing of oil spills in
the period 2000 to 2009 is presented.
Images of oil-spill fields are also provided. The majority of images are
of oil spills as a result of sabotage and theft. Other images include
examples of a spill site before and after clean-up. Shell does not state
whether those sites are cleaned up after acts of sabotage or their
operational failures.

Summary

The letter provides aggregate information on oil spills for the period
2000-2009. Shell (2010) states that “this was a detailed response to a
major shareholder that had asked us for additional information about
SPDC’s activities in the Niger Delta”. For privacy reasons, the details
and addresses of the shareholder/s have been removed in the letter.
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Table 2: SPDC Annual Reports Summary

Aspect

Description of the text

Title of the report
Graphic Design

‘People and the Environment’ Annual Report
The annual reports for the selected period are typically around 35
pages long and include pictures and graphs. The first page of every
report starts with the title and an image over the entire page. Images
vary from year to year and include people, children and nature.
A detailed section titled ‘Oil spills’ is included in the reports.
SPDC publicly reports on oil spills using text and graphics. This
includes the number of oil spills, volume and cause. Usually, data
for the past five years is disclosed in each report. A section titled
‘Preventing oil spills’ includes a description of Shell’s actions to
prevent any future spills.

Content on oil spills

Summary

SPDC discloses a substantial amount of detail on oil spills through
annual reports. The amount of disclosure has substantially increased
from 2000 to 2009.

Table 3: Shell Sustainability Reports Summary
Aspect
Title of the report

Graphic design

Content on oil spills

Summary

Description of text
The title of the report varies from year to year. However, most
frequently they use the title ‘The Shell Sustainability Report:
Meeting the Energy Challenge’.
The number of pages varies. However, reports are typically around
40-50 pages long.
Photos, graphs and tables are included
The reports contain a section on oil spills and SPDC operations.
The volume, number and cause of spills are disclosed. Graphical
representation includes spills and volume for the past five to seven
years. However, this disclosure does vary from year to year.
Although Shell operates in many countries, its operations in Nigeria
receive a special section. From 2004 Shell started to provide an
additional section titled ‘Location Reports’ – and an entire page is
dedicated to SPDC’s operations in Nigeria. Nigeria and SPDC
operations are well documented in reports.
A section of the reports titled ‘Tell Shell’ allows the general public
to comment/ask questions about Shell’s operations. In SSR 2000,
p.27, they state that major topics of interest continue to be
renewables, Nigeria and a range of environmental issues.
Comparing the 2000 report to the 2009 shows that there is more
disclosure as the years progress.
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Appendix 3
Table 1: Shell and SPDC Reports Used in This Research
Shell (SPDC) (AR)
People and the Environment Annual
Report (2000)
People and the Environment Annual
Report (2001)
People and the Environment Annual
Report (2002)
People and the Environment Annual
Report (2003)

People and the Environment Annual
Report (2004)

People and the Environment Annual
Report (2005)
People and the Environment Annual
Report (2006)
Not Available
Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Shell (SR)
People, Planet & Profits
The Shell Report (2000)
People, Planet & Profits
The Shell Report (2001)
Meeting The Energy Challenge
The Shell Report (2002)
The Shell Report (2003)
Meeting the energy challenge – our
progress in contributing to sustainable
development
The Shell Report (2004)
Meeting the energy challenge – our
progress in contributing to sustainable
development
The Shell Sustainability Report (2005)
Meeting the energy challenge
Meeting The Energy Challenge -The
Shell Sustainability Report (2006)
Responsible Energy The Shell
Sustainability Report (2007)
Royal Dutch Shell Plc Sustainability
Report (2008) Responsible Energy
Sustainability Report
Sustainability Report – Royal Dutch
Shell Plc Sustainability Report (2009) or
just Shell
Sustainability Report – Royal Dutch
Shell Plc Sustainability Report (2010)
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Table 2: NGOs Reports Used in This Research

NGO

FoE

Title of Report
Clashes with corporate giants, 22
campaigns for biodiversity and
community Report (2002a)
Failing the challenge - The other Shell
Report (2002b)
Behind the shine - The other Shell Report
(2003)
Lessons not learned The other Shell
Report (2004)

AI
FoE Netherlands – Richard Steiner

Christian Aid International Development
Charity

Shell’s Big Dirty Secret - Insight into the
world’s most carbon intensive oil
company and the legacy of CEO Jeroen
van der Veer (2009)
Nigeria: Petroleum, Poverty and
Pollution in the Niger Delta (2009)
Double standard: Shell Practices
in Nigeria Compared with International
Standards to Prevent and Control
Pipeline Oil Spills and the Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill (2010)
Behind the Mask: The real face of
corporate social responsibility (2004)
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Appendix 4
Shareholders Response Letter35
.

35

Accompanied by appendix at the back of the letter.
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